12 Nov '14 19:04>
In another thead, Thread 161552, you claimed many times that God is not capable of sin and is essentially righteous. I took you to mean that it is not possible for God to do anything morally wrong; that there are no possible worlds wherein God does something morally wrong.
However, when coupled with your views on free will, this all becomes puzzling. When we combine your conception of freedom and the above considerations, it should follow that, on your view, God does not have moral freedom; God is basically a moral robot. Yet, on the other hand, you maintain that moral freedom in humans is a critical good. For instance, appeal to human moral freedom is a critical, explicit component of your attempts at theodicy and is also, on your view, a necessary component for God's creative purposes for us. But this seems a problematic combination of commitments. Here is a paper that gives some background on why this is potentially problematic:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/whats-so-good-about-moral-freedom.pdf
Specifically, one of the puzzling aspects, at least on first inspection, is that you are committed to the stance that moral freedom is a critical good; on the other hand, your supposed perfectly righteous moral exemplar does not exemplify this supposed good in any meaningful form. You'll perhaps rebut, maintaining that, well, God does not want us to be robots; we have to be morally free in order to meaningfully accept or reject His offer of love toward us. But, this type of response only seems to make the problem more acute. You're claiming that moral freedom is necessary for us to be loving creatures; and yet, God is supposedly the very embodiment of things like love and yet, on your view, He is a moral robot. You cannot have it both ways: either moral freedom is necessary for things like love; or not; but it cannot be both.
So, from what I can tell, your view is incoherent in this respect. Could you please clarify this?
However, when coupled with your views on free will, this all becomes puzzling. When we combine your conception of freedom and the above considerations, it should follow that, on your view, God does not have moral freedom; God is basically a moral robot. Yet, on the other hand, you maintain that moral freedom in humans is a critical good. For instance, appeal to human moral freedom is a critical, explicit component of your attempts at theodicy and is also, on your view, a necessary component for God's creative purposes for us. But this seems a problematic combination of commitments. Here is a paper that gives some background on why this is potentially problematic:
http://spot.colorado.edu/~morristo/whats-so-good-about-moral-freedom.pdf
Specifically, one of the puzzling aspects, at least on first inspection, is that you are committed to the stance that moral freedom is a critical good; on the other hand, your supposed perfectly righteous moral exemplar does not exemplify this supposed good in any meaningful form. You'll perhaps rebut, maintaining that, well, God does not want us to be robots; we have to be morally free in order to meaningfully accept or reject His offer of love toward us. But, this type of response only seems to make the problem more acute. You're claiming that moral freedom is necessary for us to be loving creatures; and yet, God is supposedly the very embodiment of things like love and yet, on your view, He is a moral robot. You cannot have it both ways: either moral freedom is necessary for things like love; or not; but it cannot be both.
So, from what I can tell, your view is incoherent in this respect. Could you please clarify this?