27 Sep '16 17:49>
KJ, I have read the first chapter of The Divine Conspiracy now multiple times. Unfortunately, I find any arguments contained therein very hard to parse. Willard strikes me as somewhat of a non-linear thinker. What I can parse most clearly is some sort of pragmatic argument for belief in God; actually, more narrowly, some sort of pragmatic argument for belief in some specific Christ-centric narratives. I still don't really understand the argument, so perhaps we can take this slowly and you can help me understand.
Willard starts the chapter with what I would describe as a restrained diatribe against modern intellectualism, based on little more than some scattered anecdotes regarding higher education and modern society and some deference to Tolstoy’s A Confession. He claims that modern academia is committed to the idea that ethics and morality are not subjects of knowledge:
I think we can safely say here that Willard is hopelessly confused between the function of a survey course in ethics and the function of an ethical theory. Survey courses give students a broad introduction to many different theories that are of literary, historical, and logical importance. That's just the function of a survey course. In no way at all does that imply that the students and teachers of such courses are somehow committed to the idea that ethical discourse is not a subject of knowledge. This should go without saying, but contrariety of theory on some matter does not imply that no theory can be correct. Survey study can be useful as an introduction to works that are considered seminal, and part of the purpose is to understand how those influential works have shaped the field. But, of course, one can still endorse one particular theory to the exclusion of others; or cobble together one's own theory based on joining together different elements or novel ones. There's nothing mysterious about this.
To see the folly of Willard's argument here, one can simply note that there are survey courses in theistic ethics, too. Even for something like theological voluntarism, there are so many different flavors of it that it would probably make Willard's head spin. So, now simply apply Willard's own argument to this, and it would end up defeating his own position. Clearly, there's something very wrong with this argument.
The bulk of chapter 1 (starting I would say with the section "Word from a Different Reality" ) seems to simply presuppose the veracity of biblical narratives and is probably better viewed as an exhortation than an argument. Before we get there, though, there is one other basic objection I have. Again, as best I can tell, Willard's argument is some sort of pragmatic argument to the effect that one's life will go better if one endorses certain specific Christian narratives. But, if you look at what sorts of "slogans" he thinks can fill this, they generally have nothing necessarily to do with specific Christian narratives. He gives some examples on page 10 as slogans that affirm respecting responsibilities, or seeking knowledge, or encouraging practices that promote kindness and beauty, etc. None of that has any fundamental connection with religion or theism, let alone Christianity. So, the obvious objection here is that there are many diverse ways to promote these sorts of appreciations and practices, and there's no reason to think that endorsing some specific Christian narratives is necessary for any of this.
Willard starts the chapter with what I would describe as a restrained diatribe against modern intellectualism, based on little more than some scattered anecdotes regarding higher education and modern society and some deference to Tolstoy’s A Confession. He claims that modern academia is committed to the idea that ethics and morality are not subjects of knowledge:
"Indeed, in the current world of accepted knowledge one can’t even know the truth of a moral theory or principle, much less a specific rule. You could never grade someone for holding Utilitarianism or Kantianism to be true or false. One can only know about such theories and principles, and think about them in more or less clever ways. You can brightly discuss them. For that the young man got his A’s. But that, of course, had no bearing on his character or behavior because it is only literary or historical or perhaps logical expertise, not moral knowledge."
I think we can safely say here that Willard is hopelessly confused between the function of a survey course in ethics and the function of an ethical theory. Survey courses give students a broad introduction to many different theories that are of literary, historical, and logical importance. That's just the function of a survey course. In no way at all does that imply that the students and teachers of such courses are somehow committed to the idea that ethical discourse is not a subject of knowledge. This should go without saying, but contrariety of theory on some matter does not imply that no theory can be correct. Survey study can be useful as an introduction to works that are considered seminal, and part of the purpose is to understand how those influential works have shaped the field. But, of course, one can still endorse one particular theory to the exclusion of others; or cobble together one's own theory based on joining together different elements or novel ones. There's nothing mysterious about this.
To see the folly of Willard's argument here, one can simply note that there are survey courses in theistic ethics, too. Even for something like theological voluntarism, there are so many different flavors of it that it would probably make Willard's head spin. So, now simply apply Willard's own argument to this, and it would end up defeating his own position. Clearly, there's something very wrong with this argument.
The bulk of chapter 1 (starting I would say with the section "Word from a Different Reality" ) seems to simply presuppose the veracity of biblical narratives and is probably better viewed as an exhortation than an argument. Before we get there, though, there is one other basic objection I have. Again, as best I can tell, Willard's argument is some sort of pragmatic argument to the effect that one's life will go better if one endorses certain specific Christian narratives. But, if you look at what sorts of "slogans" he thinks can fill this, they generally have nothing necessarily to do with specific Christian narratives. He gives some examples on page 10 as slogans that affirm respecting responsibilities, or seeking knowledge, or encouraging practices that promote kindness and beauty, etc. None of that has any fundamental connection with religion or theism, let alone Christianity. So, the obvious objection here is that there are many diverse ways to promote these sorts of appreciations and practices, and there's no reason to think that endorsing some specific Christian narratives is necessary for any of this.