Originally posted by bbarr
Let's just run through the Euthyphro question, it will be fun for everybody:
Take some act A that you consider to be morally good. Now, is A morally good because God commands that A be done, or does God command that A be done because A is morally good independently of God's command?
The question here is one of explanatory priority. Do God's comman ...[text shortened]... lly you realize that these are all ways of asking the exact same question.
So, whaddya think?
Did you have a natural tendency to bite children that your mother had to curb, Bennett? Even more worryingly, has she succeeded in eradicating it???
If something is objectively good before God endorses it, then we are still left with Darfius's question of what makes something objectively good, because God would not be making it objectively good.
The trouble is, of course, that declaring something to be objectively good, no matter how powerful or wise you are, doesn't suffice to make it objectively good. At least, I can't see how it does. Declaring that 2+2=5 doesn't make it objectively true; declaring that playing chess is bad doesn't make it objectively bad. (Nor indeed does declaring 2+2=4 is true *make* it objectively true, or declaring that chess is good *make* it objectively good.)
Darfius, if you think otherwise, you will have to elucidate the mysterious mechanism whereby declarations, by virtue of the power and wisdom of the being declaring them, turn initially neutral (or alternatively valenced) things into good or bad things.
Tell me, is there any initially apparently bad thing that God couldn't make good just by declaring it? Rape, murder, pillage, Bennett biting babies -- that sort of thing? Or is there any initially apparently good thing that God couldn't make bad just by declaring it? Charity, fortitude, bravery, intelligence -- that sort of thing?