02 Apr 16
Originally posted by humyThat applies both ways, so there is simply no way for the probability to ever change. No experimental data could ever prove the existence or non-existence of randomness. Only theory can get us there.
How on earth can an observation show that there does NOT exist any kind of hidden cause to any apparent randomness? -that's why.
I assume that 0.5 probability really just means 'we haven't got a clue'.
No, because that 0.5 is a real probability which means we have no more reason to favor than to refute and no more reason to refute than to favor the hypothesis.
In this case its because we haven't got a clue.
If a toss a coin, I would say it has a 0.5 probability of it being heads because it is rational to assign equal possibilities with equal probabilities
And that is a very different scenario in which we know that statistically they are equally likely. That is very different from a once off where we simply haven't got a clue.
NO! Because no matter how good the theory, there is no logical contradiction of there being no randomness and no possible observation show that there does NOT exist any kind of hidden cause to any apparent randomness thus no valid logical reason to increase that 0.5 probability that there exists true randomness to a value greater than 0.5 -we are just back where we started.
I disagree. I think some future theory of everything might strongly indicate one way or the other. Without such a theory, we cannot really say.
Why not? Excluding any probability that comes from true randomness (if such a thing exists) , all assignment of probability is based on and defined as the current most rational level of certainty given our current limited knowledge and our current ignorance.
In this case, total ignorance, and likely to remain so. I still say that assigning a probability to complete ignorance is not particularly useful in most circumstances.
02 Apr 16
Originally posted by humySo tell us how many "and's" there are in
The prior probabilities that there exist a God depends on how you define God but, generally, tie statistics would give it a vary small prior probability. This is because the hypothesis that there exists a God is not one hypothesis but a compound hypothesis that consists of attaching many attributes to the same object; God is supernatural AND God is the creator ...[text shortened]... object (which is God in this case) for there to be not such object (which is God in this case).
a) there exists true randomness.
b) there does not exist true randomness.
How did you come to the 0.5 estimate?
02 Apr 16
Originally posted by twhitehead
That applies both ways, so there is simply no way for the probability to ever change. No experimental data could ever prove the existence or non-existence of randomness. Only theory can get us there.
I assume that 0.5 probability really just means 'we haven't got a clue'.
[b]No, because that 0.5 is a real probability which means ...[text shortened]... assigning a probability to complete ignorance is not particularly useful in most circumstances.
That applies both ways, so there is simply no way for the probability to ever change. No experimental data could ever prove the existence or non-existence of randomness.
Right; but experimental data could ever prove the non-existence of randomness probable but not vice versa ; THAT is what I am saying.
No, because that 0.5 is a real probability which means we have no more reason to favor than to refute and no more reason to refute than to favor the hypothesis.
In this case its because we haven't got a clue.
No, we can say the probability is 0.5. Not a clue means we cannot even say that.
If a toss a coin, I would say it has a 0.5 probability of it being heads because it is rational to assign equal possibilities with equal probabilities
And that is a very different scenario in which we know that statistically they are equally likely. That is very different from a once off where we simply haven't got a clue.
wrong; the first one wasn't not a clue and for the same reason; we can say its probability is 0.5.
02 Apr 16
11 edits
Originally posted by twhiteheadanswers:
So tell us how many "and's" there are in
a) there exists true randomness.
b) there does not exist true randomness.
How did you come to the 0.5 estimate?
a) zero
b) zero
and that 0.5 isn't an "estimate" in the narrow sense it is the exact prior probability because of answers a) and b) are both zero. I have the mathematical proof (to be published and which I won't say here before publication due to the obviously high risk of plagiarism but will say after publication ) from axioms that equal possibilities have equal probabilities therefore if you have two mutually exclusive exhaustive hypotheses that are equal logical possibilities, NOT to be confused with causal possibilities, they have equal prior probabilities, NOT to be confused with posterior possibilities esp statistical probability as has repeatedly been confused with here in this thread via equivocation:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Equivocation
You cannot extrapolate from the rules for statistical probability the rules for prior probability as has repeated been done here again and again in this thread: they obey completely DIFFERENT rules other than the rules that define what a probability is irrespective of the type of probability. What you must understand there are different TYPES of probability that must not be confused with each other. And failure to take any account of the differences between these types of probability is what has resulted in the the logical errors here.
An example of such a logical error done in this thread is with that coin example and erroneously extrapolating from that to conclude that the probability of there being true randomness doesn't exist:
Ask yourself this: is the 0.5 probability of tossing a head a statistical probability or a prior probability? answer: it is a statistical probability NOT a prior probability!
Is there any logical contradiction, in we living in a universe where all coins have not heads on one side and tails on the other, but, say, blue on one side and red on the other? -answer, no! Therefore we haven't got a prior probability of tossing a head, only a statistical probability.
OK, lets see if that is mirrored by the probability that there exists true randomness:
Is there any logical contradiction, in we living in a universe where BOTH nowhere does the exist true randomness and somewhere does there exist true randomness? -answer, yes! So, because we have not only two possibilities there but two exhaustive possibilities, we HAVE got a prior probability of there exist true randomness! But that is not a statistical probability.
-NOW do you see the logical error repeatedly done via equivocation in this thread?
02 Apr 16
Originally posted by humyI forgot to add right at the end of my argument:
answers:
a) zero
b) zero
and that 0.5 isn't an "estimate" in the narrow sense it is the exact prior probability because of answers a) and b) are both zero. I have the mathematical proof (to be published and which I won't say here before publication due to the obviously high risk of plagiarism but will say after publication ) from axioms that equal pos ...[text shortened]... obability.
-NOW do you see the logical error repeatedly done via equivocation in this thread?
" Therefore, you cannot go from a coin toss outcome has no prior probability to, as done here in this thread by false inference, there existing true randomness must have no prior probability. "
02 Apr 16
7 edits
I also forgot to explain there are two kinds of prior probabilities, true priors and conditional priors. When I said the outcome of the coin toss has no prior, what I meant to say it has no true prior. But it does have a conditional prior which is conditional that we live in a universe where natural law is the way we think it is such that the prior is 0.5. There is no logical contradiction in us living in a universe where that is false. The conditional priors, unlike the true priors, takes no account of the probability of that logical possibility that what we think is causally possible and causally impossible, i.e. that we live in a universe where natural law is the way we think it is, is false.
02 Apr 16
1 edit
Originally posted by humySo:
have the mathematical proof (to be published and which I won't say here before publication due to the obviously high risk of plagiarism but will say after publication ) from axioms that equal possibilities have equal probabilities therefore if you have two mutually exclusive exhaustive hypotheses that are equal logical possibilities, NOT to be confused with ca ...[text shortened]... tistical probability as has repeatedly been confused with here in this thread via equivocation:
a) God and all his and's exists.
b) God and all his and's do not exist.
Prior probability: 0.5
Only when you start to take into account other information does that probability change. On its own however it really isn't that useful. It basically says 'I don't know'.
02 Apr 16
9 edits
Originally posted by twhiteheadwell, I hate to be pedantic and quibble/nitpick here but, strictly speaking, the probability wasn't ever 0.5 to start with and was always a lot lower than that because you should always take into account all other currently information available to you to start with to have any truly valid assignment of probability because one of the things I define probability as being from my axioms is that it is the most rational degree of certainty you would have with your current ignorance and limited information if you, hypothetically, magically had unlimited flawless logic (I say 'magically' because truly 'unlimited' flawless logic is unattainable ) and unlimited epistemic rationality (not to be confused with instrumental rationality ) ; but, still, I like to say that is close enough to what I am saying, yes.
So:
a) God and all his and's exists.
b) God and all his and's do not exist.
Prior probability: 0.5
Only when you start to take into account other information does that probability change.....
(If anyone is interested, for explaining the difference between "epistemic rationality" "instrumental rationality", see;
http://www.uni-konstanz.de/philosophie/fe/files/esir3.pdf
although I will explain it simpler and possibly better on request here )
02 Apr 16
Originally posted by humyBut you did not do this for the case of randomness. Why not?
well, I hate to be pedantic and quibble/nitpick here but, strictly speaking, the probability wasn't ever 0.5 to start with and was always a lot lower than that because you should always take into account all other currently information available to you to start with to have any truly valid assignment of probability
02 Apr 16
9 edits
Originally posted by twhiteheadBut I did to this for the case of true randomness. But there wasn't much info to take into account; unlike the meaning of 'God', the meaning of true randomness isn't an object with a number of attributes attached to it hence the 0.5 prior probability that there exists true randomness but much less than 0.5 prior probability that there is a God because it only takes one of those attributes of God to not be attached to the same object for God to not exist according to what we mean by 'God'.
But you did not do this for the case of randomness. Why not?
If there is a particular object in reality that has all the said attributes of 'God' then "God exists". If all those attributes exist but no particular object is such that it has all of those attributes then "God doesn't exist".
For example, if there exists a supernatural intelligence and if there exists a creator of the universe but there is no single object in reality that is both a supernatural intelligence and a creator of the universe because what created the universe wasn't supernatural, then, given the usual meaning of God, no God exists. That is just considering two attributes but if we have a long list of n such 'God attributes' and we give a 0.5 prior probability of each one being attached to the same object in reality, that means the prior probability that there is a God is 0.5^n and not 0.5 (except, as I will explain in my book, it's a bit more complicated than that )
03 Apr 16
1 edit
Originally posted by humyWhat information did you take into account?
But I did to this for the case of true randomness. But there wasn't much info to take into account;
That is just considering two attributes but if we have a long list of n such 'God attributes' and we give a 0.5 prior probability of each one being attached to the same object in reality, that means the prior probability that there is a God is 0.5^n and not 0.5 (except, as I will explain in my book, it's a bit more complicated than that )
So if I ask "what is the prior probability of a red ball with yellow spots existing?", then its 0.5*0.5*0.5 ?
03 Apr 16
4 edits
Originally posted by twhitehead
What information did you take into account?
[b]That is just considering two attributes but if we have a long list of n such 'God attributes' and we give a 0.5 prior probability of each one being attached to the same object in reality, that means the prior probability that there is a God is 0.5^n and not 0.5 (except, as I will explain in my book, it's a ...[text shortened]... what is the prior probability of a red ball with yellow spots existing?", then its 0.5*0.5*0.5 ?
What information did you take into account?
As I said, not much, because there isn't much to take account other than they are 2 mutually exclusive exhaustive theories (there exists true randomness; there doesn't ) and neither one can be broken down to two or more 'simpler' theories.
So if I ask "what is the prior probability of a red ball with yellow spots existing?", then its 0.5*0.5*0.5 ?
The simplistic answer to that would be, providing we 'cheat' a little with a shortcut and allow ourselves the epistemological sin of not taking account of ALL information before calculating the probability, yes!
Except, just like with most cases, it is a bit more complicated than that because we ideally ought to take into account ALL information. One of the complications with such cases as your above example is that there is seemingly an infinite number of ways you can classify your attributes (such as color) into different categories with each set of categories gives rise to a different conclusion to what the probability should be. This is what I call the 'attribute classifier problem' which is closely related to what is more conventionally called the 'asymmetric reasoning problem' and I admit I currently have only partial solutions to both those problems and I will need to mathematically formulate complete solutions before I publish my book; in other words, I am still working on the problem.
03 Apr 16
Originally posted by humyDid you take any information whatsoever into account?
As I said, not much, because there isn't much to take account other than they are 2 mutually exclusive exhaustive theories (there exists true randomness; there doesn't ) and neither one can be broken down to two or more 'simpler' theories.
The simplistic answer to that would be, providing we 'cheat' a little with a shortcut and allow ourselves the epistemological sin of not taking account of ALL information before calculating the probability, yes!
Except, just like with most cases, it is a bit more complicated than that because we ideally ought to take into account ALL information. One of the complications with such cases as your above example is that there is seemingly an infinite number of ways you can classify your attributes (such as color) into different categories with each set of categories gives rise to a different conclusion to what the probability should be. This is what I call the 'attribute classifier problem' which is closely related to what is more conventionally called the 'asymmetric reasoning problem' and I admit I currently have only partial solutions to both those problems and I will need to mathematically formulate complete solutions before I publish my book; in other words, I am still working on the problem.
But none of those issues occur with the randomness situation?
03 Apr 16
4 edits
Originally posted by twhitehead
Did you take any information whatsoever into account?
[b]The simplistic answer to that would be, providing we 'cheat' a little with a shortcut and allow ourselves the epistemological sin of not taking account of ALL information before calculating the probability, yes!
Except, just like with most cases, it is a bit more complicated than that because w ...[text shortened]... still working on the problem.
But none of those issues occur with the randomness situation?[/b]
Did you take any information whatsoever into account?
Yes and, as I said/implied, this information that I took into account specifically literally was;
" they are 2 mutually exclusive exhaustive theories (there exists true randomness; there doesn't ) and neither one can be broken down to two or more 'simpler' theories."
But none of those issues occur with the randomness situation?
correct:
1, at least as far as I can currently think, the theory that there exists true randomness cannot be broken down into two or more simpler theories.
2, In addition, the theory that there exists true randomness isn't attaching a number (greater than 1) of attributes to the same object i.e it isn't saying some object has both attribute A and attribute B etc. In contrast, to claim there exists a red ball with yellow spots is to claim there is a particular object with the list of essential essence attributes of 'ball' AND it is (~mainly) red AND it has yellow spots; that's more than 1 attribute attached to the same object.
( except, as I implied, when calculating the true prior probabilities, that is not the only info/factors one must take into account so I made that explanation a bit too simplistic here )