originally posted by LemonJello
As should have been obvious enough, 'deliberative' in my original claim denotes the involvement of deliberation. There are, of course, different flavors of deliberation. One can deliberate about what to do, evaluating practical reasons in relation to action-guiding. One can deliberate about what descriptively is the case, evaluating theoretical reasons in relation to propositional truth. We should be concerned here with the latter, inasmuch as belief is a propositional attitude wherein one takes some proposition to be true, or at least likely true beyond a certain level of credence. First thing to note here: even if such a state of deliberation implies intentional effort to focus one's cognitive efforts,** there's nothing conceptually indicating that the outcome of such effort is of one's choosing. This alone should be sufficient to clear up whatever misconception plagued your thinking on this: there need not be any inconsistency in claiming that a deliberative product is not within one's control.
Who said that applying the will guarantees the desired result? And why are you slamming solid walls of text at me that contain only simple points? Is your style here, especially since it includes insult, intended as a point in itself?
‘Verisimilitude’ in a restricted, technical sense is a philosophical concept dealing with various interpretations of truth as a coarse-grained property. I am using the term here in a more general sense, in the sense of being verisimilar. And 'verisimilar' means having the appearance of truth. So, I am talking about the appearance of truth as the outcome of one's cognitive processing. There's a reason why I would choose this phrasing, since I think it tends to elicit some apt perceptual analogs. Compare, for example, visual processing. One can choose to engage in a visual processing event and, say, exert control in focusing one's eyes in a particular direction with the intention to make out what is there. But, of course, that control does not generally extend to the end result of that event. Even if one makes an intentional effort to see what is there, the result is not a matter of choosing what one sees there but rather a matter of one's seeing what's there on a basis of being thusly appeared to. Well, I’m claiming something similar about belief. One can choose, say, to engage in deliberation about what is the case, but that control does not generally extend to belief outcomes. Just as what one ends up seeing is handcuffed to visual appearance as the outcome of perceptual processing, what one ends up believing is handcuffed to the appearance of truth as the outcome of cognitive processing. Just as the perceptual processing provides sensory representation of our surroundings, in providing beliefs, the cognitive processing is providing a type of mental representation. Think about why a standard view of belief is as a representation. A representation is such that it stands in for something else, either as a likeness or in specific virtue of something external to itself. Our mental representations are not our own unconstrained creative projects, they are strongly bound to how external things present themselves to us and generally result from our being thusly presented to.
And yet we still can decide for ourselves what justifications to use as our cognitive processes get all busy cognitively processing.
LemonJello, I would like to like you, but if all your intelligence and education leaves you unable to talk to us lesser people, than what use is it?