The many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is an attempt to force reality to conform to a deterministic world-view. But even if the MWI is correct, our universe would still be probabilistic.
Even if the MWI has restored determinism of a sort to the description of the postulated multi-verse, it completely fails to allow us to predict what we will see in our actual future.
Even if the MWI has restored determinism of a sort to the description of the postulated, it completely fails to allow us to predict what we will see in our actual future.
There is a distinction to be made between an outcome being unpredictable because we cannot with sufficient accuracy or ability observe and measure the variables that determines which outcome (so unpredictability doesn't equate with true randomness) and an outcome being unpredictable because of true randomness i.e. without there existing any such variables that determines which outcome.
Most people would make that distinction and would say in normal conversation that if the former and not the latter was the case then there wouldn't be such thing as true probability and would insist if the former was the case then everything is determined albeit with pseudo-randomness as opposed to true randomness.
There existing a multi-verse or not, I don't see how you can validly rule out the former (I haven't ruled out either one).
Originally posted by apathist The many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics is an attempt to force reality to conform to a deterministic world-view. But even if the MWI is correct, [b]our universe would still be probabilistic.
Even if the MWI has restored determinism of a sort to the description of the postulated multi-verse, it completely fails to allow us to predict what we will see in our actual future.[/b]
Actually what we have here is an 'understanding of the many-worlds fail'.
If MWI is correct then every possible future is your future. Any valid prediction you make will be correct in at least one world and incorrect in others.
Otherwise you are correct that it fails to satisfy someone who desires pure determinism for the sake of predicting his own future. Although why you believe that is the aim of MWI is for you to prove. Further, failing to achieve that goal doesn't make it false.
Originally posted by humy There is a distinction to be made between an outcome being unpredictable because we cannot with sufficient accuracy or ability observe and measure the variables that determines which outcome (so unpredictability doesn't equate with true randomness) and an outcome being unpredictable because of true randomness i.e. without there existing any such variables that ...[text shortened]... se or not, I don't see how you can validly rule out the former (I haven't ruled out either one).
You are talking about hidden variables again. I understand that the existence of local hidden variables have been dis-proven. Non-local hidden variables are still possible, and isn't that interesting? A game-changer.
Anyway, probability is all around us, and quantum mechanics confirms that reality is probabilistic. The universe is not like a giant clockwork mechanism. Well, it is, but it is also so much more. Thank the stars!
Originally posted by apathist probability is all around us, and quantum mechanics confirms that reality is probabilistic. !
But not confirmed with specifically having true randomness as opposed to only pseudo-randomness thus it still might be deterministic. Neither possibility (true randomness exists verses only pseudo-randomness exists) has yet validly been confirmed or refuted nor even shown to be very slightly more or less probable or improbable than the other.
Originally posted by twhitehead Not in the many-worlds interpretation.
It seems to me the MMW hypothesis is a very messy universe. I don't think things would be arranged like that unless there was also some pruning procedure that limited the amount of possible outcomes.
Otherwise you have a situation where a duck quacks to his left in one universe and quacks to the right in another and quacks straight ahead in yet another ad nauseum
Originally posted by sonhouse It seems to me the MMW hypothesis is a very messy universe. I don't think things would be arranged like that unless there was also some pruning procedure that limited the amount of possible outcomes.
Otherwise you have a situation where a duck quacks to his left in one universe and quacks to the right in another and quacks straight ahead in yet another ad nauseum
But you have no issues with a universe with a billion billion billion stars many billions of light years across and billions of years old?
My only real objection to it is a lack of evidence ie its possible, but not probable at this stage.
Originally posted by twhitehead But you have no issues with a universe with a billion billion billion stars many billions of light years across and billions of years old?
My only real objection to it is a lack of evidence ie its possible, but not probable at this stage.
What is there to be impossible? All you do is take the wavefunction of the universe and regard terms in the superposition of states as being inaccessible to each other. The problem with the theory is that there's no way of distinguishing it from the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum mechanics - in that sense it's meta-physics.
Originally posted by humy But not confirmed with specifically having true randomness as opposed to only pseudo-randomness thus it still might be deterministic. Neither possibility (true randomness exists verses only pseudo-randomness exists) has yet validly been confirmed or refuted nor even shown to be very slightly more or less probable or improbable than the other.
What do you suppose would count as evidence of "true" probabilistic behavior? (I don't like the term "randomness" here - there is a crucial difference between those terms.)
Originally posted by sonhouse It seems to me the MMW hypothesis is a very messy universe. I don't think things would be arranged like that unless there was also some pruning procedure that limited the amount of possible outcomes.
Otherwise you have a situation where a duck quacks to his left in one universe and quacks to the right in another and quacks straight ahead in yet another ad nauseum
Yes. That's the Occam's Razor objection. The math is outrageous: how many probabilistic quantum events, with how many possible outcomes, occur every Planck moment in a single atom? Times how many atoms in our known universe? That's a lot of universes popping into existence every second - and each one exponentially starts spawning more.
The point of this thread is that the MWI fails to provide a deterministic explanation for the probabilistic outcomes which occur in THIS universe.
Schroedinger's cat is either alive or dead in this world, and the MWI doesn't help us determine which - and that's why the MWI is a fail. Our world remains probabilistic.
Originally posted by apathist Yes, even in the many-worlds interpretation.
No, in the many-worlds interpretation, although you are at the current moment only one man, your future includes many different men. If we are talking about predicting your future, then it becomes incoherent as you have many possible futures (an infinite number perhaps?) and any possible outcome is one of your futures. None of those futures is special.
many-worlds fail
05 Apr '16 16:10
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