Originally posted by twhitehead
Actually I think he is arguing that it is the only means of understanding the nature of reality. Where there may be some confusion is what constitutes 'the nature of reality'. I don't think he is arguing that empiricism can lead you to learn maths, or how to understand logic or even how to understand and practice the scientific method, or even to understand why the scientific method is useful.
Well, you might be right. But I would say that how we form beliefs about “the nature of reality” is also part of the nature of reality, and so his claim should apply to that as well. If that is an exception, what is the nature of the exception, for example? (Is it just pragmatic to exclude issues of self-reference, for example?)
He made a truth claim about “the
only valid means of forming beliefs about the nature of reality”. What is the basis for such a truth claim, other than that very empiricism (as carried out via scientific method)? It does not appear to be a claim of logical necessity. So, if such a truth claim (and its justification for belief) is an exception—perhaps, as you might be suggesting, because it is not really within what he intended by “the nature of reality”—then what is the basis for the truth claim?
Once again, I want to paraphrase Niels Bohr: Whatever I might seem to be arguing should be taken as a question.
Logical positivism (at least in a strong form) held that a statement is only meaningful if it is either (a) verified strictly according to its terms (analytic), or (b) verifiable empirically. Popper showed that verificationism fails: simply, no matter how strongly the evidence points to the belief that “all swans are white”, there is still a nonzero probability that there can be a (as yet unobserved) non-white swan—the so-called “black swan” problem.
But, what I was after is that that strong claim itself is not meaningful according to its own criteria for verifiability (either analytic or empirical). That’s what I was reminded of by DT’s question to Google about whether or not he is a logical positivist. His claim seems similar to me.
But I might misunderstand what he was saying—and I did just take that post out of context for the sake of addressing just that point.
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EDIT: Upon reflection, I think I am focusing more on that word "valid" (especially with the strong "only" attached to it.) And by the criteria of falsification, the fact that I (or anyone else) cannot think of one, is not enough to validly support that strong claim.