As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matter--with a view to clarifying mine, and maybe putting together a paper on the subject.
What is the self, do you think?
What do you have to be, to be a self?
Is the self subjective, objective, both, or neither?
Another thing I want to do is distinguish the self conceptually from a number of allied concepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
2 edits
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeRobert Ornstein, I think, said that consciousness is being aware that we’re aware—that there seems to be a somebody-subject that is aware (not to say that his definition is universal). Antonio Damasio talks about how we are aware not only of the “movie” going on in our head (and by “movie,” he is only abstracting from senses other than the visual for simplicity), but of witnessing (experiencing) that movie, and aware of that sense of being “somebody” who witnesses it, from within our own skin. I believe that in some Eastern traditions, the self is referred to as that “witness.”
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
Perhaps the “self” is simply a useful term for describing that process and the sense we have of being a “subject”—that we are able to “select” own experiential perspective (and the sensations, feelings, thoughts associated with it) as a unique figure against the ground of the rest of our perceptions. (Does Perls have anything to say about that vis-à-vis his figure/ground gestalt?)
Also (as an aside), the fact that we are able to identify with that perspective, as associated with this particular biological entity--and as we observe that all biological entities die--raises the question of our own impending death: the termination of this perspective with which I identify...
Ego is a slippery term because so many different traditions use it differently.
I’m interested to see where this discussion goes…
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeOne could take the position that one's self is the sum total of all one's actions. Or that there is no fixed self, but that you are defined by the choices you make. "Existence precedes essence", as Jean Paul Sartre said.
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
Originally posted by PawnokeyholePerhaps all that is not the "others" is the "self".
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
2 edits
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeHey Aiden,
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
Suppose those bright folks at M.I.T. develop a couple of "transportation" machines that work as follows:
Machine 1: M1 takes a perfect, complete functional scan of your body. The process of scanning your body, however, causes the atomization of your body. The atoms that comprise your body are collected by M1. M1 then takes the information from the scan and sends it to another device, along with all the atoms that comprised your body. This device then assembles a body that is physically identical to yours, comprised of all the same material. identical to yours, but comprised of a completely different set of atoms. Of course, this body will claim to be you, and will have all the same memories, dispositions and traits that you had when you stepped into M2. This body will be both physically and psychologically identical to you.
Machine 2: M2 takes a perfect, complete functional scan of your body. The process of scanning your body, however, causes the atomization of your body. M2 then takes the information from the scan and sends it to another device which assembles, from its surroundings, all the raw material necessary for assembling a body functionally identical to yours. This device then assembles a body functionally identical to yours, but comprised of a completely different set of atoms. Of course, this body will claim to be you, and will have all the same memories, dispositions and traits that you had when you stepped into M2. This body will be both functionally and psychologically identical to you.
Questions: Does M1 truly transport you, or does it merely kill and copy you? Is the person that gets out of the M1 have the same self as you? What about M2? Does it transport you, or merely kill and copy you? Is functional identity sufficient for personal identity, or is physical identity necessary? If functional identity is sufficient, then suppose M2 malfunctions, and scans your body without atomizing it. Suppose further that the information from this scan is sent to the device, and a duplicate of you is assembled. Is it the case that there are now two distinct persons that bear a relation of personal identity to themselves? Is it now the case that there are two identical selves, or one shared self, or...?
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeI am going to take a risk and offer a view that may not fit with deists, theists, or humanists, but here goes. To me the "self" is a spiritual concept that expresses an understanding of an individual as being complete in many facets. It goes beyond mere consciousness in that the individual is genetic make-up, but also a person who has core feelings, drives, desires, and purposes that hopefully give him purpose beyond himself. That's kind of vague, but the best I can do at the moment.
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
3 edits
Originally posted by bbarrDoesn't this suppose the non-existence of a soul or any similar sort of non-physical component of self that could possibly be the only distinguishing feature between some two non-identical selfs?
Of course, this body will claim to be you, and will have all the same memories, dispositions and traits that you had when you stepped into M2.
4 edits
Originally posted by bbarrDoesn't it suppose that one's psychology derives fully from one's physical essence and not at all from any soul or non-physical aspect of the self? If it doesn't, then I don't think I'm clear on the specification of either machine, for it seems that they only measure and reproduce that which is in the physical realm. But if machine operations based solely in the physical realm are sufficient to preserve the original phychology, while possibly annihilating the soul (such as if it is the case that souls require a physical body to persist), it seems that any non-physical element of the self must make no distinguishing contribution to the self's psychology.
No, it doesn't.
Originally posted by DoctorScribblesIf by 'derived' you mean 'is caused by or identical with', then yes. Is this problematic? What right thinking people are substance dualists?
Doesn't it suppose that one's psychology derives fully from one's physical essence and not at all from any soul or non-physical aspect of the self?
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrIt's not problematic. I just wanted to be clear, because accepting the machine problem as being relevant to the original question places constraints on how it can be answered. That is, one cannot say that a fully characterized and distinguishable self exists entirely in the non-physical realm - which is the position that many people who believe in heaven adhere to - once one accepts the machine problem as relevant. The machine cannot operate on souls in the afterlife, while many claim that the self does persist in heaven. Thus, those believers would say that either the machines cannot reproduce selfs at all, or that there are some selfs that cannot be reproduced by the machine.
If by 'derived' you mean 'is caused by or identical with', then yes. Is this problematic? What right thinking people are substance dualists?
Originally posted by PawnokeyholeMy self is that which experiences those perceptions which I experience. In the case of bbarr's scenario(s), which atoms I am made of do not determine whether it I am the same self. I don't know if I would become the new person or if it would be a case of kill/create.
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
Originally posted by Pawnokeyholeyour self is yourself
As a psychologist, I study aspects of selfhood (e.g., self-esteem, self-concept, self-regulation). However, I have trouble figuring out what the self is. Worryingly, some philosophers have opined that the self doesn't really exist. This suggests I might be studying aspects of something that isn't there.
So, I want to hear your thoughts on the matte ...[text shortened]... oncepts, including these:
brain
organism
mind
consciousness
subject
person
ego
Aiden
mine is myself
you have brain
you are an organism
you have a mind
you are conscious (unless otherwise!)
you could be a subject
and hopefully a person
and you have an ego
apart from that why overcomplicate things