I agree that the tractatus is macroscopically a "failure", so to speak. However, certain smaller aspects of it I find interesting or useful. I think he acknowledged that through the cross-referencing of sentences he introduced. In other words, the Tractatus is kind of "fractally profound".
You're right on about the truth-tables. They're quite useful in computer programming, as well.
Originally posted by royalchickenWhat specifically in his thought do you find interesting? What specifically do you find profound? Many philosophers think Wittgenstein is profound, but very few of them understand what he was getting at in either the tractatus or the Philsophical Invesitgations. Wittgenstein is slow going, he is rarely clear and rarely says exactly what he thinks. So I'm interested in hearing what you thought he was about in the tractatus, other than the general project of 'axiomatizing thought' which is a locution vague to the point of vacuity.
I agree that the tractatus is macroscopically a "failure", so to speak. However, certain smaller aspects of it I find interesting or useful. I think he acknowledged that through the cross-referencing of sentences he introduced. In other words, the Tractatus is kind of "fractally profound".
You're right on about the truth-tables. They're quite useful in computer programming, as well.
Immanuel Kant was a real pissant
Who was very rarely stable.
Heidegger, Heidegger was a boozy beggar
Who could think you under the table.
David Hume could out-consume
Schopenhauer and Hegel,
And Wittgenstein was a beery swine
Who was just as schloshed as Schlegel.
There's nothing Nietzche couldn't teach ya
'Bout the raising of the wrist.
Socrates, himself, was permanently pissed.
John Stuart Mill, of his own free will,
On half a pint of shandy was particularly ill.
Plato, they say, could stick it away--
Half a crate of whisky every day.
Aristotle, Aristotle was a bugger for the bottle.
Hobbes was fond of his dram,
And René Descartes was a drunken fart.
'I drink, therefore I am.'
Yes, Socrates, himself, is particularly missed,
A lovely little thinker,
But a bugger when he's pissed.
--Eric Idle (from Monty Python)
Originally posted by bbarr"A consequence of the tractatus is that logical truths are nonsense, they are literally neither true nor false. This is, I think, a reductio of his whole project. Additionally, the study of metaphysics and ethics is relegated to the trash bin. The problems of what constitutes the good, and of the nature of reality are alleged to arise from a misuse of language."
This is not a consequence of it so much the whole intent. You are correct, however. His goal seems to be similar to that of Russell and whitehead; to reduce thought to a series of symbolic manipulations. The fact that the Tractatus was not constructed in this manner means he is using something more complex than his own system to construct his system, which is contrary to what he is driving at. This much is clear.
"But this is clearly wrong, progress has been made. Contrast the paternalistic political philosophies of the middle-ages to the social contract of the enlightenment. Clearly the latter more cloasely accords with our intuitions about the just use of power, as well as providing the ideological foundations for democratic forms of government. "
Back this up. While I would tend to agree, you have too much here that is lacking in the objectivity and dense dialectical defense that is normally a feature of your posts.
Again, I agree with the rest of your post, which is why I called the Tractatus a macroscopic failure. The system as a whole does not hold water because, as you said, it uses, for its construction, methods that it necessarily precludes. But look at a few INDIVIDUAL STATEMENTS, which are of interest and value:
6.021 A number is the exponent of an operation.
This is interesting, as his conception of number, which, despite its inability to handle transfinites, still contains what is essentially the induction axiom.
6.125 It is possible...to give at the outset a description of all "true" logical propositions.
This is the famous "no surprises in logic" statement. This idea is actually quite powerful. To know in principle that a given set of circumstances has the "potential" for some event (i.e. changes in circumstances) is the basis of, among other things, the theory of probability. (What did he say about this?)
6.363 The process of induction is the process of assuming the simplest law that can be made to harmonize with our experience.
Most people consider a dichotomy of logic: inductive and deductive logic. He goes on to explain that induction is not logic at all, which is obviously the case. (Number theory is an experience for me which bears this out. "Inductive logic" in number theory is no more than high-grade intuition. The results are arrived at this way, and logic only provides justification.)
SO basically, while his system may be useful for enriching lawns, he has a few interesting ideas, if only for providing something to think about.