In the upcoming quarter at the University of Washington I'll be T.A.ing an introductory course in ethics. One of the general questions we'll be considering is what constitutes moral reprehensibility. We often claim that particular acts are morally reprehensible, but we are very rarely explicit on what property those acts have in virtue of which they are morally reprehensible. That is, we are very rarely clear on just what it is that makes bad acts bad. I've had quite interesting discussions about precisely this question in recent games with David Tebb and legionnaire, and the question was touched upon in a recent thread concerning whether T1000 should give money back to a company who paid him more than they intended. So what do y'all think about this? What is it that morally bad acts have in common in virtue of which they are morally bad? Here are some answers that have been common in the history of philosophy:
Error Theory: There is no such thing a 'moral badness'; whenever we make a claim of the form 'act X is morally bad' or 'act X is morally good' we are claiming something false.
Emotivism: It is a mistake to think that claims like 'act X is morally bad' or 'act X is morally good' mean that acts actually have those properties. When we make claims like that, we are merely expressing how we feel about those acts. Saying 'act X is morally bad', for instance, just means 'I don't like act x'.
Ethical Egoism: An act is wrong if and only if it does not further the interests of the actor.
Normative Cultural Relativism: An act is wrong if and only if the culture within which the act takes place prohibits the act.
The Divine Command Theory: An act is wrong if and only if God has commanded that act not be done.
Utilitarianism: An act is wrong if and only if it does not maximize overall utility.
Deontologism: An act X is morally wrong if and only if it treats a person as a mere means to some end, rather than an end in and of him/herself.
This is by no means an exhaustive list, but it serves to indicate the range of postions that have been taken concerning moral properties. I'm hoping people here will share what they feel to be the most plausible answer to the general question of what makes certain acts morally reprehensible.
Bennett
Ah, to live such a sheltered life. Morally reprehensible is my father. Using knives, guns, blunt intruments,leather belts to abuse, physically torture and psychologically abuse six children and a defeated woman; at least twice a week for eighteen years. It is LAW in all its forms which comes to your house, fills out reports and does nothing. It is the leaders of your church who come into the home and give blessings, knowing that with love and devotion to the lord, all will be well... Morally reprehensible is very simply those who don't see evil when it is in plain sight.
My group ethic had to be : "Defend the innocent and oppose the tyrant". I don't suffer from not knowing evil when I see it.
Originally posted by StarValleyWySo you're claiming an act is morally reprehensible if it is an instance of failing to see evil. But 'evil' is just synonymous with 'morally reprehensible', so your account is circular. Since you know nothing about my life, don't presume it was shelterd. Just because I don't cry and moan about my childhood in the forums doesn't mean it didn't have it's share of pain.
Ah, to live such a sheltered life. Morally reprehensible is my father. Using knives, guns, blunt intruments,leather belts to abuse, physically torture and psychologically abuse six children and a defeated woman; at least twice a week f ...[text shortened]... the tyrant". I don't suffer from not knowing evil when I see it.
Originally posted by royalchickenRegardless, it is an instance of a holier-than-thou attitude common to victims of abuse. As though their physical and emotional sufferring accorded them some priveleged insight into truth.
Calm yourself. I think he (StarValleyWy) was talking to me. And, if what he says is true, then he has every right to call my life sheltered. But you are right about his argument being circular.
Originally posted by bbarrAnger, anger. You asked what "morally reprehensible" is. I said "it is not seeing evil when it is in plain sight." If anything is circular here, it is probably your logic. You infer that a is b and blast your own misunderstanding of my reply to your question. It is you who say the two arguments are the same thing.
So you're claiming an act is morally reprehensible if it is an instance of failing to see evil. But 'evil' is just synonymous with 'morally reprehensible', so your account is circular. Since you know nothing about my life, don't presume it was shelterd. Just because I don't cry and moan about my childhood in the forums doesn't mean it didn't have it's share of pain.
Originally posted by StarValleyWySo you think that the statement 'act X is evil' and the statement 'act X is morally reprehensible' are NOT synonymous?
Anger, anger. You asked what "morally reprehensible" is. I said "it is not seeing evil when it is in plain sight." If anything is circular here, it is probably your logic. You infer that a is b and blast your own misunderstanding of my reply to your question. It is you who say the two arguments are the same thing.
Originally posted by bbarrIt may be circular, and not helpful for an academic discussion, but a similar line of reasoning was adopted by the US Supreme Court (although it could have been a different level of court, I'm not sure) when considering the problem of defining obscenity. To paraphrase: "I can't define it, but I know it when I see it."
So you're claiming an act is morally reprehensible if it is an instance of failing to see evil. But 'evil' is just synonymous with 'morally reprehensible', so your account is circular.
The inherent problem with providing a definition of "morally reprehensible" is that, as soon as you pin yourself down, someone will come up with a cleverly crafted hypothetical situation and force you to either change your definition or accept an evil act as being not morally reprehensible.
Originally posted by bbarrWould it make you feel better if i had answered "evil is not recognizing moral reprehensibility when it is in plain sight..."? either way, i know it when i see it.
So you think that the statement 'act X is evil' and the statement 'act X is morally reprehensible' are NOT synonymous?
Originally posted by StarValleyWyIt would make me 'feel better' if you didn't approach the question dismissively. If you think the question isn't worth thinking about, or taking time to answer, then don't. Trying to understand moral reprehensibility in terms of evil is an obvious non-starter, the two terms are used interchangeably. 'I know it when I see it' isn't an answer to the question either. I'm asking, in effect, what you see when you see 'it'. I know a cat when I see one, there are certain properties almost all cats have in common and when I see a bunch of those properties all bundled together in one delightful creature I'm disposed to call that creature 'cat'. What properties do the evil acts you know when you see all share in virtue of which you can identify them as evil? This is the question.
Would it make you feel better if i had answered "evil is not recognizing moral reprehensibility when it is in plain sight..."? either way, i know it when i see it.
Originally posted by richjohnsonTo say that it is an inherent problem commits you to the claim that any proposed definition will have a decisive counter-example. If a proposed definition has a decisive counter-example then it is an incorrect definition. So you either believe that moral properties are ineffable or that there are no such properties. Which is it?
It may be circular, and not helpful for an academic discussion, but a similar line of reasoning was adopted by the US Supreme Court (although it could have been a different level of court, I'm not sure) when considering the problem of defining obscenity. To paraphrase: "I can't define it, but I know it when I see it."
The inherent problem with p ...[text shortened]... you to either change your definition or accept an evil act as being not morally reprehensible.
Hello,
Isn't moral reprehensibility just an extreme form of moral badness, however one cares to define it?
One subtle question is whether the division between moral badness and moral reprehensibility is a matter of continuous degree or categorical kind. I would incline towards the former possibility, on no firmer basis than an aesthetic preference for smooth curves. However, when people use the word "reprehensible", I would suggest that they are often singling out an especially heinous act of a qualitatively different kind, where some kind of rubicon of moral acceptability had been breached.
I mention this because many people seem to believe that some values are sacred and inviolable, such that anything is justified in order to realize them and anything that prevents their realization is supremely evil. This seems to be a point of view common, but not unique, to religiously-minded people, and most blatantly expressed, and acted upon, by ideological fundamentalists, as contemporary world event all too clearly illustrate. Everything is sacrified to some abstract and holy ideal that attempts to crush into dust the rocky moral texture of human life.
My own view is that all values are relative, and that when the come into conflict, as they often must, some must be realized at the expense of others, giving rise to a moral tragedy. By moral tragedy, I mean that the virtue of one value being realized does not undo the vice of the other not being realized. I don't incline to the utilitarian view that the positive and negative values realized by a particular act neatly cancel each other out so that whichever component is of greater magnitude determines the overall value of the act. If you have kill Iraqs to prevent even greater terrorist enormities--I don't believe this is necessary, but 85% of Americans would beg to differ, according to the latest poll--the prevention of such enormities would still not make the act of killing Iraqis a good thing, merely a regrettably necessary evil. I agree that we have to make utilitarian calculations to minimize evil or maximize good on the whole. But that doesn't mean that an act optimally guided by utilitarian considerations is good itself, merely the best morally mixed act available.
Where genuine moral tragedy exists, I would say there is no moral reprehensibility. It is only when the value conflict is precipitously unbalanced, and the far superior compromise not taken, that moral reprehensibility arises.
Aiden
This all reminds me of Robert Pirsig's initial idea of "Quality" in "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance". All of this "I can't define it, but I know it when I see it". That is certainly true, and I am aware that many of us have, as humans, fairly acute evil-detecting equipment in our emotional toolkits. What we do NOT all have, and what I think bbarr is trying to get us to equip ourselves with, is some sound evil-detecting equipment in our INTELLECTUAL toolkits. The intellect performs its manipulations based on reason, at the foundation of which is the axiom and the definition. So if we want to have this discussion, a good definition, as bbarr indicated, is in order.
EDIT: This was written prior to Pawnokeyhole's post, and does not contain any intentional response to it.
Originally posted by bbarrI did not say that any proposed definition will have a decisive counter example. The point I was trying to make is that, for any property put forth as being shared by all morally reprehensible acts, I have no doubt that you could come up with a hypothetical example of an act which is morally reprehensible, but does not have the property in question.
To say that it is an inherent problem commits you to the claim that any proposed definition will have a decisive counter-example. If a proposed definition has a decisive counter-example then it is an incorrect definition. So you either beli ...[text shortened]... are ineffable or that there are no such properties. Which is it?
As for your question "Which is it?", the answer is neither. There are moral properties, and they are "effable" (i.e., capable of being expressed in words). However, with respect to characterizing a given action as "morally reprehensible," I believe that the best you can hope for is a list of factors to consider when characterising actions.
ps - to the spelling police: I know I used both the 'z' and 's' spellings - we haven't really decided whether to follow the Americans or the British on this one yet in Canada.
pps - I just read Pawnokeyhole's post. While I disagree with the proposition that "all values are relative", he does make a good point about context. It is impossible to judge an action in the abstract, without looking at the alternatives and all of the surrounding circumstances.