Originally posted by no1marauder
I really wish you would simply answer my question rather than prattling on and on about an analogy, Bbarr. And if you're going to quote me, please don't play games like others do here and leave out a critical word, in this case "If ........."
If there was one, and only one person, with a one in a billion chance of winning a lot ...[text shortened]... bility of Design or some other mechanism so that the universe was geared for life more likely.
I didn't mean to leave out 'if' in the quote above. I do not assume that you agree with the conclusion of the fine-tuning argument.
You are completely misunderstanding the role of probabilistic considerations in the fine-tuning argument, and hence you are failing to grasp the point of the analogy. So, I'm going to run through this one more time:
The fine-tuning argument assumes that the physical constants could have possibly had any number of other values. It has to do this, else it could not claim that the probability of the physical constants being as they are is low. In fact, if it denied this, it would have to claim that the probability of the physical constants being as they are is equal to 1.
The fine-tuning argument then points out that the values the physical constants do have are such that biological life forms like ours are possible.
The fine-tuning argument then points out that were the values different, biological life forms like ours could not exist.
The fine-tuning argument then asserts that the preceding considerations are sufficient to show that the creation hypothesis is better than the coincidence hypothesis.
Now, the point of the lottery analogy is just that the low probability of some state of affairs S obtaining does not suffice to show that the best explanation for S's obtaining is other than coincidental. Someone had to win the lottery, after all, just as the universe had to be some way or another.
Here's another way of looking at it: Suppose the universe had physical constants with values that precluded biological life like ours but were ideal for life of some radically different nature. Now, would that suffice to make it likely that the universe was geared towards life of this radically different sort? Suppose the universe had physical constants that precluded any life at all, but were ideal for the formation of large crystalline structures. Would this make it likely that the universe was geared towards crystal formation? When you start inferring from low probability to creation or design, you can't non-arbitrarily refrain from inferring that lotteries are rigged in favor of whomever actually wins.