Conclusion of Alister McGrath's lecture .....

Originally posted by ivanhoe
That sounds pretty impressive, but can you tell me what it means ?

One problem is that 'faith' has too many connotations. Dawkins thinks that which is faith is grounded definitionally on insufficient or countervailing evidence; McGrath, on the other hand, thinks that which is is faith is grounded definitionally on "adequate evidence". But this is just insignificant quibbling. The point is still that the discussion should substantively be concerned with whether or not theism is true and whether or not theistic belief is warranted.

McGrath seems largely confused to me because he acts like Dawkins' attack on theism (really, Dawkins is just attacking a sort of theism much like Christianity, in which there is purportedly a personal supernatural creator) is wholly de jure, which it isn't. When Dawkins labels theistic belief as 'faith' he is largely issuing a de facto challenge to the point of countervailing evidence.

The point I was making is that I much more readily agree with Dawkins' definition of 'faith'. I think 'faith' should be viewed as a pejorative for any rational agent. And I think that when Dawkins labels Christian belief as 'faith', he is more or less making the proper accusation: that such belief is lacking in evidential weight and also happens to be unwarranted. Besides, the definition of 'faith' that McGrath cites seems ridiculous. I'm not even sure it's a definition. But, at any rate, it's not reasonable for McGrath to describe 'faith' as substantively consisting of heartfelt and active volitional expression and then also to sort of give the impression that it's all based on "adequate evidence". That simply cannot be the case. As Hume points out, evidence gains only the "cool assent" of the intellect. Motivations and desires -- not evidence -- are what is necessary for the sort of volitional expression and call to conduct that McGrath describes. Possessing such volitional motivations and desires is not itself a bad thing, but the problem is when such volition corrupts the epistemic process and causes the agent to make endorsements aimed not at reflecting true propositions, but at reflecting cherished propositions.

Originally posted by LemonJello
One problem is that 'faith' has too many connotations. Dawkins thinks that which is faith is grounded definitionally on insufficient or countervailing evidence; McGrath, on the other hand, thinks that which is is faith is grounded definitionally on "adequate evidence". But this is just insignificant quibbling. The point is still that the discussion sho flecting true propositions, but at reflecting cherished propositions.

Are there any claims or statements made by Richard Dawkins in his role as an apologist of atheism which you critisise, question or doubt to be true ?

Originally posted by ivanhoe
Are there any claims or statements made by Richard Dawkins in his role as an apologist of atheism which you critisise, question or doubt to be true ?

To your broad question, the broad answer would be yes.

Originally posted by LemonJello
To your broad question, the broad answer would be yes.

Could you point out the three most important ones ?

Originally posted by ivanhoe
Could you point out the three most important ones ?

😴 What, like, seriously?

Dawkins brings attacks that bear both on the truth/falsity of theism and on theistic belief. Most of my problems would be with his attacks against belief. I think he's good at delineating what appear to be prima facie objections, but not so good at developing and defending an ultima facie conclusion. I think there may be models of warranted theistic belief that Dawkins dismisses for the wrong reasons. And somewhere around here Pawno said that he objects to Dawkins' treatment of the notion of consolation. I would agree with that to an extent. Also, from what I can tell, Dawkins is a materialist, whereas I think materialism is false.