Free will, a Necessary Illusion

I really think we ought to use the reformulated version of the original premise, as it is much more challenging, and an elucidation of it would be much more fundamental and satisfying.

For example, if we say "Free will is a necessary condition to the existence of a self", it is simple to point out that the term "self", by definition, means "of me", and that a so-called "self" whose every thought, feeling, and sensation are determined extrinsically cannot be a self at all, because this is inconsistent with the definition of "self".

If instead we consider the proposition that "Free will is (to some degree) a necessary condition of consciousness", that is a tougher nut to crack. Superficially, it appears that there might be something called a "consciousness" whose every aspect (thought, feeling, sensation, etc.) involves something extrinsically determined. This version of a consciousness is merely a kind of helpless viewer, as it were.

My fundamental sense of the matter is that there can be no coherent definition of a viewer, thinker, or feeler without the inclusion of the concept of freedom of will. Nobody, and nothing, can think your thoughts for you, or feel your emotions or sensations for you: yet, that seems to be what is implicit in the notion that consciousness could exist in the absence of free will, and to be what is implicit in the concept of a MERELY passive viewer, since EVERY experience and action of such a putative consciousness is WHOLLY determined extrinsically (i.e., by something else).

This isn't my proper reply, incidentally. This is simply an intermediate step towards it, which I wished to express before proceeding.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
I have just pointed out a *few* of the implications of the (false) premise that consciousness can exist without free will. These include the implications that knowledge and reason are impossible under such a premise.

I'll try to get to some of the other implications shortly, if you'll give me a chance without having to respond to constant jack-in-the-box replies from you.

My apologies for the rapid responses. It's been a horribly boring day at work -- for whatever sort of entity I "am." This will be my last post today:


I do understand the implications that you've described so far. I would modify them, though. Knowledge and Reason are still possible without free will. Without free will I could still know that I am sitting here at a computer even though I had chosen to know this fact. And I could still reason that 2+2=4 even though I had never chosen to perform this act of reasoning.

I admit that this is counterintutuitive (but so is solipsism). It conflicts with our tendancy to judge people for holding false beliefs or reasoning poorly. It helps to imagine the idea of brainwashing. Think of the man in 1984 who is brainwashed into thinking that 2+2=5. He knows (wrongly) that 2+2=5 after he is brainwashed, but he never freely chose to know what he knew . He wasn't able to choose between the true answer and the false one, and he certainly can't be held responsible for his false knowledge. But he still had that knowledge.



I hope this clears some things up. Once again, sorry for the rapid posts... 🙂

Originally posted by bjohnson407
My apologies for the rapid responses. It's been a horribly boring day at work -- for whatever sort of entity I "am." This will be my last post today:


I do understand the implications that you've described so far. I would modify them, though. Knowledge and Reason are still possible without free will. Without free will I could still know that I am sit ge.



I hope this clears some things up. Once again, sorry for the rapid posts... 🙂

Without free will, you could NOT know anything, including the supposed state of "sitting here at a computer".

For example, let's say for the sake of argument that someone is actually a "brain in a vat". That brain is being fed false sensory data indicating that it has a physical body and that said body is sitting in front of a computer. But with free will there is nothing necessitating (as opposed to strongly, misleadingly suggesting) the conclusion that the brain has a body and is sitting in front of a computer; whereas without free will the conclusion is not the product of chosen or rejected assumptions, or of a process of reasoning or intuition leading thereto, but is merely an inelectable result which is entirely, extrinsically determined: that is, not only is the conclusion extrinsically determined, but the process leading to it is also.

That in turn appears to imply the claim that something else is doing your own thinking for you and coming to your own conclusions for you, and not only does this smack of logical (including definitional) inconsistency, but even if this could be sensibly claimed, exactly what is the putative consciousness doing itself? And if it is doing nothing itself, in what sense can it be said to exist? Because a consciousness is, definitionally, a thing of action: but if all the action is extrinsic, there remains nothing intrinsic to perform.

Of course, you still might arrive at an erroneous conclusion even with free will. But you can also possess true knowledge.

Nor could you "reason" without free will (e.g., that 2+2 = 4). Reasoning is a process involving judgment and the freedom to consider, accept, and reject premises, arguments and conclusions on the basis of that judgment. Whereas, if the entire process, from premise through argument to conclusion, is determined extrinsically, there is no consideration, no judgment, and no freedom for you to consider and weigh alternatives: and in the absence of ANY evaluation by you, you cannot be said to have reasoned. Furthermore, even the appearance of such evaluation would be an illusion involving entirely extrinsically determined processes.

Again, having free will does not imply that reasoning cannot be flawed or that erroneous conclusions cannot be reached: but lacking free will implies that reasoning and knowledge are both impossible.

If consciousness were possible without free will, and such a consciousness were dictated a false conclusion, that would not constitute knowledge, since false belief cannot meaningfully be defined as "knowledge". Furthermore, not only does such a belief fail to be knowledge in the sense that it is factually false, but it also in the sense that it was not even the result of genuine (if flawed) reasoning, but of the merely passive, non-reasoned receipt of the dictation from some entirely extrinsic process; and remember that if free will does not exist, that extrinsic process is also ipso facto unreasoned. If a rock falls under the influence of gravity, is that a process of reasoning, and does the rock possess knowledge? No, and no. (Furthermore, can the rock even be said to possess consciousness? No.)

I think that the question "Why does consciousness imply the existence of free will?" is such an interesting and important question that it deserves a better formulated response. Meanwhile, I have at least replied to your latest comments.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
Without free will, you could NOT know anything, including the supposed state of "sitting here at a computer".

For example, let's say for the sake of argument that someone is actually a "brain in a vat". That brain is being fed false sensory data indicating that it has a physical body and that said body is sitting in front of a computer. But with ter formulated response. Meanwhile, I have at least replied to your latest comments.

Nor could you "reason" without free will (e.g., that 2+2 = 4). Reasoning is a process involving judgment and the freedom to consider, accept, and reject premises, arguments and conclusions on the basis of that judgment.

Really? I often use computer technology to do reasoning for me. This website is particularly helpful:

http://www.umsu.de/logik/trees/

It can determine the validity of an argument without free will, but it still uses reason in its determination of validity.

P.S. I have also said that all proofs ultimately depend on unproven premises, since all proofs are finite (else one could never reach their conclusions); and even if one expands those proofs or introduces separate proofs such that the originally unproven premises are now proven conclusions, then those expanded and/or separate proofs continue in their turn to rely on new, unproven premises.

"Proof" may thus be defined as a form of reasoning through which conclusions are derived from premises, using deduction and/or inference; but as the starting points of proofs, premises are themselves of logical necessity unproven.

The unproven premises can be of three general types: (1) self-evident truths (this refers to a category of knowledge which is not dependent upon assumptions or conditional truths -- my own existence, i.e., the existence of my own consciousness, is such a truth; (2) working premises accepted as conditionally true because they function as useful or practical starting points; (3) mere arbitrary assertions.

Note however that it is impossible for a consciousness to directly apprehend self-evident truth, if that consciousness has no free will: for "direct apprehension" is an intrinsic act of the self; whereas a putative consciousness without free will cannot undertake any act. Since, however, all consciousness knows (via direct apprehension) that it exists, all consciousness must ipso facto possess some degree of free will.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Nor could you "reason" without free will (e.g., that 2+2 = 4). Reasoning is a process involving judgment and the freedom to consider, accept, and reject premises, arguments and conclusions on the basis of that judgment.

Really. I often use computer technology to do reasoning for me. This website is particularly helpful:

http://www.umsu.de/log ...[text shortened]... y of an argument without free will, but it still uses reason in its determination of validity.[/b]

No, a computer cannot reason. The physical elements (e.g., voltage levels) used by it are not interpreted by it as symbols, much less as symbols given an additional layer of interpretation in which they are viewed as conceptual or concrete referents; nor do the physical processes which manipulate these physical elements constitute any form of reasoning. A computer no more reasons about Boolean logic (or anything else) than a mechanical alarm clock does about time. The alarm clock doesn't know what time (the general concept) is, doesn't know what the current time (the hour and minute) is, and doesn't know when you want to get up; in fact, doesn't know anything, doesn't reason, and has no consciousness or judgment. Yet it keeps time and goes off when you want to get up.

Conventionally, the clock is created by a sentient designer so that certain deterministic physical processes may be interpreted as indicative of abstract temporal concepts. The user of the clock, sharing this interpretation, can also make use of it.

More generally, a sentient being designing such a machine (clock or computer) first conceives of a physical process which, if reliable and if interpreted properly, may be regarded by him as isomorphic to the manipulation of symbols in an abstract reasoning process carried out by him (e.g., Boolean algebra). Subsequent users may then make use of the automated product instead of consulting the sentient designer about such matters, provided they are capable of formulating the input and interpreting the results according to the same scheme of isomorphism.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
No, a computer cannot reason. The physical elements (e.g., voltage levels) used by it are not interpreted by it as symbols, much less as symbols given an additional layer of interpretation in which they are viewed as conceptual or concrete referents; nor do the physical processes which manipulate these physical elements constitute any form of reasoning. ulating the input and interpreting the results according to the same scheme of isomorphism.

I think you need to define "reason" in a precise way. Perhaps your definition would disallow computer-reasoning.

As I see it, reason is the simply application of logic to argument - which is what this website offers. With only a few rules of reason, this web-application can detect invalidity. Given a formula (for example, p implies q). It then attempts to find when that formula can be false - or, in this programme, when its negation is true (when ~(p -->q) is true). It gets the result that this is true when p is true and q is false. The formula is thus invalid. I achieved this result in the exact same way as the computer, following teh same rules. Free will had no bearing on reason in this case.

This, as I see, is a very reasoned proof. It can do even bigger formulae, which no human can attempt without the aid of paper.

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
No, a computer cannot reason. The physical elements (e.g., voltage levels) used by it are not interpreted by it as symbols, much less as symbols given an additional layer of interpretation in which they are viewed as conceptual or concrete referents; nor do the physical processes which manipulate these physical elements constitute any form of reasoning. ulating the input and interpreting the results according to the same scheme of isomorphism.

And to address your analogy about the clock. A clock does not apply these logical processes. The mechanics may not even involve computers. It could be a battery connected to a small motor: as the electricity passes through a magnetic field, the motor spins. The strength of the magnet and the size of the motor can be calibrated such that it spins every second. This does not entail logic at all.

A digital clock is more complex. More precisely, the circuit board is a logical argument itself. Given an input of p, say, might lead to an output of q. This is a concrete expression of p implies q. But this is again a false analogy of what the web application does.

The web application, while governed by a series of programmed rules, functions to detect an invalid argument. Unlike the digital clock, its function is to reason, to perform truth valuations of arguments and locate counterexamples. Thus while a digital clock and this web-application rely on logic built into their system, the web-application performs reason.

If you, however, insist that reason must involve an interpretation of physical elements as symbolic of an abstract concept, then you will not see this as reason. For you, the web-application would have to instantiate the p's and q's into a natural language. I think this is a distraction. The reason the web-application cannot do that is because it does not have the sensory abilities to build inductive premises (it cannot say the sky is blue, for example, because it has no vision.) But you cannot contend that having vision gives us reason. We supply the visual information, blue sky = p, and it analyses the argument. Surely that is reason?

EDIT: I would also add that having free will subverts reason. If I have free will, then I might mistakenly maintain an argument like p = ~p. I might deny modus ponens (p implies q; p; therefore q). For example, "If it rains, the road will be wet; it is raining; I refuse to believe that the road is wet." That is totally unreasonable, yet free will allows this to occur. It is determinism, therefore, which codifies reason and ensures that departure occurs from reason.

Originally posted by cpbrown
Free will is a necessary illusion:

Consider a) is "free will" (true to the common concept of it) empirically possible and b) what would happen if we didn't feel we had free will, in evolutionary terms.

I think the answers are a) no, all that science can help us with is either causality or randomness, neither of which constitute an ability to make "free ...[text shortened]... tional beings.

Hence, I hope that my initial statement stands supported.

(discuss) :p

Free will is as free as any behavior; it's comparative to the environment.
You behave in a certain way, because you want people to extend that same behavior to you. It's a balance. It's what the bible's commandments are about. It's what the law is about.

Sociopaths and people with powers above the law can behave as they please, because other people's behavior is of no concern to them.

Originally posted by Conrau K
And to address your analogy about the clock. A clock does not apply these logical processes. The mechanics may not even involve computers. It could be a battery connected to a small motor: as the electricity passes through a magnetic field, the motor spins. The strength of the magnet and the size of the motor can be calibrated such that it spins every secon ...[text shortened]... determinism, therefore, which codifies reason and ensures that departure occurs from reason.

EDIT: I would also add that having free will subverts reason. If I have free will, then I might mistakenly maintain an argument like p = ~p. I might deny modus ponens (p implies q; p; therefore q). For example, "If it rains, the road will be wet; it is raining; I refuse to believe that the road is wet." That is totally unreasonable, yet free will allows this to occur. It is determinism, therefore, which codifies reason and ensures that departure occurs from reason. --------conrau---------

------response---------------

........And if God really had given us free will then this would allow us to act and behave in unreasonable ways if we so chose to. Hmmmm.....I wonder if there is any evidence for this????? LOL

Originally posted by Conrau K
I think you need to define "reason" in a precise way. Perhaps your definition would disallow computer-reasoning.

As I see it, reason is the simply application of logic to argument - which is what this website offers. With only a few rules of reason, this web-application can detect invalidity. Given a formula (for example, p implies q). It then attempts ...[text shortened]... ed proof. It can do even bigger formulae, which no human can attempt without the aid of paper.

Conrau K wrote: I achieved this result in the exact same way as the computer, following the same rules.

Really? I thought you claimed to be a human being? And human beings do not get the result "in the exact same way" nor does the computer follow any "rules" of reasoning. But I have already adequately explained this, and as usual you simply ignore my careful, well thought out arguments and plow ahead with your inanities.

Conrau K: It can do even bigger formulae, which no human can attempt without the aid of paper.

Does this make it "creative" according to your definition? And if so, does that imply that it has an ego, according to you? (Note: this reference stems from another thread).

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
Without free will, you could NOT know anything, including the supposed state of "sitting here at a computer".

For example, let's say for the sake of argument that someone is actually a "brain in a vat". That brain is being fed false sensory data indicating that it has a physical body and that said body is sitting in front of a computer. But with ter formulated response. Meanwhile, I have at least replied to your latest comments.

I think what our dispute comes down to is how "thick" one's concept of of consciousness is. Your concept of consciousness seems to have free will built into it. And you would respond to my brainwashing example by saying that the brainwashed person isn't really conscious because his decisions were decided externally. Am I right about this?

If so, then very well. Consciousness, as you define it, includes within it the idea of free will. My response, then, is that consciousness, as you define it, has not yet been established. And it certainly is not a suitable argument for the existence of free will because it begs the question.

Earlier you suggested that your free will is immediately apparent to you. Then you said that consciousness is immediately apparent to you. Likewise, that I am conscious -- in a "thin" sense -- is immediately apparent to me (whether you believe me or not). I know that I am sitting at a keyboard typing. But It is not immediately apparent to me that I am here of my own 'true' volition. Nor is it immediately apparent that I am absolutely correct in my assessment of where I 'truly' am and what I'm 'truly' doing. Nor is it immediately apparent to me what I 'truly' am.

That's what I mean when I say that I'm aware of my consciousness in a "thin" sense. The brainwashed man might be aware of his consciousness in this thin sense; he might observe the world around him. But he would not be 'truly' aware of his consciousness in the thick sense that includes knowing for a fact that he is free (even if he believed in this thick consciousness).





****We should keep in mind that the initial question of this post is whether free will is a (necessary) illusion. I don't believe free will is an illusion. I believe it's real in some very significant ways. I think we often, or at least occasionally, make free choices and/or express ourselves freely. But I also think it's worth trying to find a proof of this belief in the face of the initial post's charge of illusion. And your appeal to freewill as a condition for the possibility of consciousness falls short.

Conrau K wrote: "And to address your analogy about the clock. A clock does not apply these logical processes."

A computer does not apply logical processes either, as I have pointed out. Neither, for that matter, does an abacus, though one can calculate with one. Conventionally, each embodies an isomorphism conceived of and implemented by the designer (who DOES apply logical processes in so doing). A digital (or analogue) computer is automated whereas the logical/mathematical operations performed using an abacus must be carried out manually. Other than that, they are both machines and not qualitatively different with respect to consciousness or reason: they possess neither.

Conrau K wrote: "The web application, while governed by a series of programmed rules, functions to detect an invalid argument. Unlike the digital clock, its function is to reason, to perform truth valuations of arguments and locate counterexamples. Thus while a digital clock and this web-application rely on logic built into their system, the web-application performs reason."

A digital clock and a software program both take input, and both are designed to implement physical processes isomorphic to logical processes. In this sense, both perform truth valuations of arguments. For example, a clock set to alarm at a given time compares two variables, the alarm-set time and the current time, looking for a match. If the argument is true the alarm goes off: if the argument is false it doesn't. Any remaining differences are quite superficial (in the current context), and again, for reasons indicated quite clearly in the message to which you responded, neither the software, nor the computer which runs it, nor a digital clock nor a mechanical clock, nor an abacus, nor a waterfall, perform reason.

Conrau K wrote: "I would also add that having free will subverts reason. If I have free will, then I might mistakenly maintain an argument like p = ~p. I might deny modus ponens (p implies q; p; therefore q). For example, "If it rains, the road will be wet; it is raining; I refuse to believe that the road is wet." That is totally unreasonable, yet free will allows this to occur. It is determinism, therefore, which codifies reason and ensures that [no] departure occurs from reason."

I can write a computer program to take input about the weather conditions, and then state (on screen) "If it rains the road will be wet; it is raining; therefore the road is not wet". I can write a computer program to make any error of fact or logic in its stated assertions. Yet the program is said to be deterministic.

Additionally, I could design a computer that does not properly implement the principles of Boolean logic, thus enshrining error in the hardware. Furthermore, a computer whose hardware malfunctions may make errors and have NO chance to correct them nor even any awareness of them, because it has no consciousness and no free will: it is not reasoning, but merely mindlessly carrying out physical processes. So, for example, if a chip develops a fault so that a register or memory bit is improperly reset during interrupt calls, then when the "reasoning" program returns it may now err egregiously since a critical value that had previously been established as a "1" is now a 0. This could create all kinds of errors, as some concurrent programs (or subroutines) might refer to the old value in stack calls, while others might refer to the new one by reading the register or memory location again; and various purely hardware processes might also make use of this critical but erroneously changed value, without any "awareness" of this by any software -- or vice-versa.

Of course, it remains true that sentient beings make errors of logic. Is this because they have free will, or because (according to you) they do not? As you can see, determinism is no guarantee of accuracy in reasoning. Neither is free will, but the latter is a necessary condition for reason to exist, whereas a "mechanical" process (whether digital or analogue) does not and cannot constitute reason.

It also does not follow from the existence of free will that someone might mistakenly maintain an argument like p = ~p.

Speaking of faulty inference engines, I have noticed (from this and other threads in which we have interacted) that you have a strong tendency to assert strict logical entailment where none exists. You remind me of a rather fatuous psychologist I once met who argued that because some individuals sneeze at painted wooden roses, "therefore" there are no such things as physical allergies. He seemed to think, or at least stubbornly asserted, that because some allergies are psychosomatic in origin, that all must be.

You also seem to have little or no ability to imagine the logical consequences ACTUALLY implied by the arguments of others, often ignoring implicit conclusions, then falsely claiming later that they never made them or are contradicting themselves.

From my experiences with you, I have to conclude that you are habitually superficial, erroneous, and I fear, (as-if) deliberately obfuscatory. I will not continue to waste a great deal of time deconstructing your inane rubbish, when it clearly proceeds from a pseudo-sentient that isn't even marginally debating in good faith. When I have wrapped up our latest conversations here and in the other thread to my satisfaction, I will place you on my ignore list.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
****We should keep in mind that the initial question of this post is whether free will is a (necessary) illusion.

Quite so. And I think I have a much better treatment of the question, now. Unfortunately, at the moment I am busy responding to blockhead (Conrau K) both here and in another thread. Hopefully I will not be so fatigued or irritated by the time I finish that I am unwilling or unable to post new commentary addressing the current thread question today. (He keeps demanding that I make his head explode. Unfortunately, I don't even possess this power with respect to the corporeals, much less with respect to mere text on the screen tied together by a consistent name and certain defective pseudo-personality traits. How can I make a head which does not exist explode? Perhaps you can do something with him.)

Originally posted by Mark Adkins
Conrau K wrote: I achieved this result in the exact same way as the computer, following the same rules.

Really? I thought you claimed to be a human being? And human beings do not get the result "in the exact same way" nor does the computer follow any "rules" of reasoning. But I have already adequately explained this, and as usual you simply ignore that it has an ego, according to you? (Note: this reference stems from another thread).

Really? I thought you claimed to be a human being? And human beings do not get the result "in the exact same way" nor does the computer follow any "rules" of reasoning.

Please explain why. From your last posts, you clearly do not understand what the computer does at all. For the formula "p implies q", my answer on paper is identical to that presented by the computer. The steps the computer did are exact replicas of mine. We both derived the answer through application of logic. Please show where we differed.

And as I expected, you refused to engage directly with my arguments, and failed to offer a provisional definition of "reason". Rather pointless than to continue arguing.

Does this make it "creative" according to your definition? And if so, does that imply that it has an ego, according to you? (Note: this reference stems from another thread).

According to my definition, no. It is not creative. Nor is it an ego.