Originally posted by knightmeisterI think that what LJ was pointing out is that the relationship between increased speed and increased crashes is an empirical relationship, not a relationship of logic. Even if it were an example of nomological necessity, it would not be an example of logical necessity.
You brought up compatabilism again which is fair enough but it's not the kind of freedom which God intends for us in my opinion.
What you seem to basically assert is that either free will cannot exist or that free will is basically identical to compatabilist freedom.
I need to clarify this. Do you think that God had two options?...
a) to cr ...[text shortened]... sed universe straight out of logan's run would be just as alive and meaningful as this one).
The fact that I am unable to jump off a tall building and (sans some supporting apparatus, such as a parachute) float gently to the ground, rather than to fall with increasing acceleration, is based on gravity, not on any rules of logic. This can been seen by the fact that on a world with a different gravity, I could well float gently to the ground—while all of the rules of logic still hold. Gravity is a physical, not a logical, constraint.
Given character traits, analogous to the givenness of gravity, may constrain my perceived choice-set (or choice-possibility set). That does not mean they inhibit my ability to choose among available options within that choice-set.
For example, the incest taboo appears to be naturally stronger among those who are raised as siblings from an early age (e.g., from birth till six years old: the “Westermarck Effect” ). Such “siblings” (whether or not they are actually biologically related) have less tendency to be sexually attracted to one another in adulthood. Conversely, biological siblings who were separated at an early and never knew one another have a greater propensity for sexual attraction. [Note, that this is cast in terms of lesser or greater tendencies; the example is not undermined by the possibility of social/cultural effects that subsequently moderate these tendencies one way or the other. Many character traits (such as the emotional disgust-response) may have both an instinctual and a socialized component.]
So, according to the Westermarck Effect, it might never enter my mind to have sexual intercourse with my sister; I might react to the suggestion with instinctive disgust. That option is not part of my perceived choice-set. That does not mean that my ability to “freely” choose a sexual partner from the perceived choice-set is impaired in any way. Nor would it if the Westermarck Effect were perfect in all cases for all people.
If God had created us such that we were universally disgusted by, say, child-rape, all that would constrain would be our behavioral choice-set. Such a constraint is not really different—in terms of our ability to choose—from physical constraints such as the need to eat food in order to survive, or the fact that we are not born with wings.
All choice is constrained choice—constrained by physical and existential conditions, the make-up of our brain-minds, both our ability to reason and predict outcomes (to make reasoned choices), our instinctive tendencies and other given individual character traits. The more the options in our available choice-set, the less constrained choice seems—but there is still a definite choice-set.
The notion of a “free will” that entails totally unconstrained choice is at least fantasy; it also seems to me to be incoherent.
[And one of the problems (perhaps the decisive one) with libertarian free-will theory is the notion that my decisions are not constrained by both external conditions and internal, psychological conditions: ability to reason and predict consequences, character dispositions, education, etc. If all of the conditions of a situation remain the same, then either the decision will be the same or it will be simply random and unreasoned.]
There is no logical necessity that our ability to choose entails that child-rape (or any other specific behavior) be in our real choice-possibility set.
Originally posted by vistesdFree will is not about the "number" of choices that we have or don't have it's partly about the ability to be self directing and in charge of our own lives within those choices. Free will is about being truely alive and free to be autonomous in a way that animals (driven by instinct) and robots (driven by programming ) are not. It's about having the ability to align oneself with the will of God or not do so. Surrendering to the will of God and living a life of truth and love is then a virtue and meaningful in a way it wouldn't be if we were merely programmed to do so.
I think that what LJ was pointing out is that the relationship between increased speed and increased crashes is an empirical relationship, not a relationship of logic. Even if it were an example of nomological necessity, it would not be an example of logical necessity.
The fact that I am unable to jump off a tall building and (sans some supporting appara ...[text shortened]... entails that child-rape (or any other specific behavior) be in our real choice-possibility set.
The car analogy is relevant because of the realtionship between speed and danger. It is illogical (and inaccurate) to suggest that there is no relationship between the two.
Originally posted by vistesdThe notion of a “free will” that entails totally unconstrained choice is at least fantasy; it also seems to me to be incoherent. ------------------------------visted----------------------
I think that what LJ was pointing out is that the relationship between increased speed and increased crashes is an empirical relationship, not a relationship of logic. Even if it were an example of nomological necessity, it would not be an example of logical necessity.
The fact that I am unable to jump off a tall building and (sans some supporting appara ...[text shortened]... entails that child-rape (or any other specific behavior) be in our real choice-possibility set.
Agreed. (but I have not claimed this either)
Originally posted by knightmeisterSurrendering to the will of God and living a life of truth and love is then a virtue and meaningful in a way it wouldn't be if we were merely programmed to do so.
Free will is not about the "number" of choices that we have or don't have it's partly about the ability to be self directing and in charge of our own lives within those choices. Free will is about being truely alive and free to be autonomous in a way that animals (driven by instinct) and robots (driven by programming ) are not. It's about having the ab ...[text shortened]... It is illogical (and inaccurate) to suggest that there is no relationship between the two.
So—if I really don’t have any desire to cause suffering to my fellow beings, if I actually desire to search out the truth and to love, then it is somehow meaningless or devoid of virtue?
Now your point seems to be that I have to desire to commit acts of moral wickedness, but to refrain by surrendering my will to God instead—and that a world set up any other way would, say a world in which I did not desire to commit moral wickedness or inflict suffering, would not be satisfactory to God?
I didn’t say anything about programming; I talked about available choice-sets, not about programmed choices within them. You seem to think that restricting those choice-sets with regard to moral wickedness, and causing others to suffer for our own gratification, is somehow wonderfully different from restricting them in other areas. You seem to treat moral wickedness (such as child-rape) as the one subset of our choice-set that could not be dispensed with from the get-go without some terrible consequences.
All of our choices, by the way, are not between what we want to do versus what we should do, or think we should do. Many (I would venture most) of our choices are between what we want to do and what we want to do more. For example, it is not really more loving for me to care for my wife, because I “should”, when I would really rather do something else. It is more loving that I would rather care for my wife than do any of those other things, whatever they may be. You seem to be insisting on a scenario in which my choice to care for my wife is meaningful, or virtuous, only if I don’t really want to—at least, not as much as I might want to do something else. That’s just silly. Where did you get the idea that virtue only derives from doing what I don’t want to do?
Let me put it to you this way: in 14 years of marriage (“in sickness and in health”, etc., etc.) it has never even crossed my mind to ask whether or not there is something else I would rather do than love my wife, or someone else with whom I’d rather spend my time, etc., etc. I’m not bragging; that’s just the nature of our relationship. I have never thought to make a list of reasons why I would rather be with her, under whatever circumstances, than with someone else or somewhere else. And if I did really want to do something else, that’s what she would want me to do—she would not think it more “loving” for me to stick around of I didn’t want to; she would not feel more “loved” if I cared for her only because I thought that I should. So all those other possible choices just don’t appear in my choice-set. I simply love my wife because I want to, and that seems more loving to her than if I did it for any other reason—“surrendering my will” would not seem very loving to her. It doesn’t to me either.
Your position here seems to be that God must necessarily—either as a matter of logical necessity or a matter of practical necessity—set up a world in which we must overcome real temptation to do evil, in order to live virtuous and meaningful lives. Or that God’s ego is such that he would not be satisfied with our choosing to love him (and others) if it did not require such overcoming in order to do so.
There is neither logical necessity nor practical necessity that I desire to do evil—that such an option is within my recognized choice-set—for me to either have real choice among those items that are within my perceived choice-set, or for me to lead a virtuous, loving and meaningful life.
Originally posted by knightmeistercar analogy is relevant because of the relationship between speed and danger. It is illogical (and inaccurate) to suggest that there is no relationship between the two.
There is a basic principle to understand about the relationship between allowing for the freedom of a person and their development and the potential for suffering.
If you don't accept the principle you will find the God /+ suffering debate to be clearly in favour of Atheism. If you do accept it you will find Theist arguments about suffering more pla ...[text shortened]... ren learning to ride bikes is one of these things , another is sentient beings with free will.
There may be an empirical relationship between speed and danger; there is no logically necessary relationship. Therefore, while asserting that there is no relationship might be inaccurate (and even unreasonable in the face of empirical evidence) it is not strictly illogical.
This is a technical issue, but an important one when one asserts certain “necessary” relationships. There is simply no logically necessary relationship between (non-fantastical) freedom and suffering. Nor is there—so far as I can see—any empirical/practical necessity.
Gee, KM, I think we’ve been going at this for years now (not just you and I, but you and others such as LJ). Basically, your argument boils down to: “free will” entails a propensity for moral wickedness (and resulting suffering) which really serves the greater good, so that it would be a worse creation without the propensity for moral wickedness (and the resultant suffering). And that really boils down to: “God would only create the best of all possible worlds; this must be the best of all possible worlds; this world includes the propensity for moral wickedness and suffering; therefore, the best of all possible worlds must include the propensity for moral wickedness and the resultant suffering, because God would only create the best of all possible worlds . . .” And round and round and round.
But there is no logical “must” between the best of all possible worlds, on the one hand, and any propensity for moral evil (and the resultant suffering) on the other. Period. If no one had the propensity for child-torture, this would be a better world, period. All supernaturalistic flights of fancy notwithstanding. The only way that anyone can argue that this would be a worse world without the propensity for child-torture (and other evils that cause suffering) is to make things up.
And that’s all this is really about, I think: desperate attempts to reconcile an omnipotent, omniscience and omnigood creator god-concept with a created world in which there is both moral and natural evil (which has absolutely nothing to do with “free will” of any kind), and the resultant pain, agony and suffering. It doesn’t work; they are not reasonably reconcilable.
Your bike-riding analogy does not work simply because human parents are not omnipotent-omniscient beings who can create a world in which their children can grow to adulthood without the risk of suffering. If your God is also not such an omnipotent-omniscient being, then he cannot create such a world either. But there is no logical reason (nor any practical reason that I can see) why such a world would not be better, or more pleasing to an omnigood god.
Now, neither moral nor natural evils (and the resultant suffering) argue for atheism per se. They simply make the kind of god-concept that you seem to be arguing for contradictory and incoherent.
I would much rather mourn all the suffering that results from moral and natural evils, and attempt to alleviate them where I can, than waste a single breath defending the fact of such evils in order to defend a particular god-concept.
I acknowledge the fact of such suffering as is caused by child-torture and the agonizing deaths of children in natural disasters. I will not use the fact of such suffering to defend any concept of divine being—whether dualistic (“god” ) or non-dualistic (Tao, Brahman, etc.). As a non-dualist, I do not claim the same attributes for Tao or Brahman (or “God”, or whatever name I might choose to use) that some dualistic theists claim for their god; but I do not “worship” Tao or Brahman either. What some theists (anyway) seem to mean by “worship” has no place in my spirituality.
I am not perfect (spiritually or morally) by any means. But I will not sully myself by claiming that the agony of a child drowning in a tsunami is in any way “for the best in the best of all possible worlds”, in order to defend my own spiritual/religious beliefs. I will not sully myself by embracing the notion that my “free will” depends on the suffering of such a child, nor—especially—be thankful for it. I will not sully myself by worshipping a god who requires such agony in order that people submit their wills to him. Frankly, I would not so sully God (and that is a point that many theists seem to miss).
You seem to be a good person, KM. Do not sully yourself with these specious arguments. Do not sully God with them.
Originally posted by knightmeisterDoh!! It's not up to me to demonstrate this. We already know that there is a direct relationship between increasing speed and cars crashing. The faster you go the more risk there is.
But -- and this is what I was pointing out -- your support for this claim really sucked: you made the claim that it is logically impossible; then you implied it is like god's helping us to make cars that go really fast but never crash. I mean, WTF? Look, if you say that it's logically impossible, then you should be able to actually demonstrate the cont ...[text shortened]... peed. The fact that you and I both know you can't just makes your point look more pedantic
The "D'oh!" is properly leveled here at you. If what you described were logically impossible, then you should be able to derive a logical contradiction (P and not-P) from the conjunction of the following propositions: 1. God helps the human race build some cars; 2. Said cars go "really fast"; 3. Said cars never crash. So, let's see it, KM. Demonstrate the logical contradiction, P and not-P, that derives from these propositions.
However, you think it's perfectly logical to suggest otherwise when all the evidence is contrary to this. Therefore the onus on you is to show how cars that go faster are actually safer or can be made safer as a result of an increase of speed. The fact that you and I both know you can't just makes your point look more pedantic
Yikes. In the future you may want to refrain from stating this or that is "logically impossible" until you figure out what such a statement is taken to mean under normal convention.
Whatever, I'm ready to move on. Crazy me!! Here I was thinking that you actually meant that the aforementioned state of affairs is logically impossible when you, uh, said it is logically impossible; I should have known that, when interpreted in knightmeisterese, you really just meant that it would be challenging and unlikely, based on practical considerations.
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Originally posted by knightmeisterWhat you seem to basically assert is that either free will cannot exist or that free will is basically identical to compatabilist freedom.
You brought up compatabilism again which is fair enough but it's not the kind of freedom which God intends for us in my opinion.
What you seem to basically assert is that either free will cannot exist or that free will is basically identical to compatabilist freedom.
I need to clarify this. Do you think that God had two options?...
a) to cr sed universe straight out of logan's run would be just as alive and meaningful as this one).
No. I don't think your conception of freedom cannot exist. However, I think that if it did exist (it doesn't, but...), it would make no sense to call it freedom because 1. it wouldn't admit of any genuine relationship between the agent and what are supposedly the agent's own actions and 2. it would consist of arbitrary, meaningless actions because it actually requires that whenever one acts "freely", one does so on insufficient reason. Again, in my estimation, freedom has nothing to do with the "ability to do otherwise"; it is supposed to be about autonomy, or self-governance. In my opinion, your view simply wouldn't constitute this even if it were instantiated, largely for the two reasons I cited above.
I need to clarify this. Do you think that God had two options?...
a) to create creatures that could make choices but were not capable of surprising God in any way due to the fact that all their choices were determined and therefore predictable (compatabilism) ....OR...
b) to create creatures that could make surprising choices and were not 100% predictable or determined (free will)
He's supposedly omnipotent, right? So, I'm sure he had lots of options open to him under his capabilities. I'm not really sure what you are asking here. On the face of it, neither a) nor b) seems logically impossible to bring about. So I would say both options would be open to an omnipotent creator, yes. Although I do have to say this concerning b): if these so-called choices are not determined (I'm guessing that would mean they are metaphysically random, as in, antecedents are not causally sufficient to elicit them), then it makes less sense to me to think of them as genuine choices. Considered choice is supposed to be about acting from reason; but, if the choice is metaphysically random, then no set of reasons was sufficient to elicit the choice. If the choice is supposed to be referenced back to the agent in a genuine way, doesn't it make sense to think the choice should be determined by (at least proximately) those things that make the agent who she really is, including her character traits, evaluative commitments, motives that have the support of her reason, etc? If you recall bbarr's forceful hypothetical, if all my psychology and environment, etc, are identical at t0 and t3, and yet some different choice can just somehow pop up (out of seemingly nowhere) at t4 (vice t1), then, I mean, what the hell? Under those circumstances, how are we to say justifiably that I was a genuine source of the "choices" at either t1 or t4? Your view severs the connection between choice and sufficient reason and between choice and those things that make the agent who she is.
Even you indirectly admit that a compatabilist universe might not be totally free of suffering.
I will directly admit that, and that point is just completely trivial. In case you haven't noticed, I think the universe in which we live IS a "compatibilist universe", and yet I also think a good amount of suffering exists in this universe. So of course it is only consistent of me to admit this.
This means that you yourself might well believe that a compatabilist universe that is utteryl sanitised is a logical contradiction.
Uh, no it doesn't. That I admit that a compatibilist universe may well contain suffering does not mean that I admit that a compatibilist universe without suffering is logically impossible. Those are very different claims.
And, you're really just missing the point as it relates to this thread. I simply don't need to show that god could have created an entirely-suffering-free universe while still providing for human freedom. Again, the argument from evil carries its weight if one can just show that unnecessary suffering exists (in this context, since we are supposing that free will is such a principal good and one necessary for other important goods, unnecessary suffering would be suffering not necessitated by the provision of human freedom). And I think it is quite easy to show that god could still have provided for freedom in possible worlds that contain less suffering than ours. And, for instance, this is what I think my earlier "character" objection shows (as well as the "natural" sources of suffering objection).
If so then it leaves me wondering why you are giving me such a hard time , because although you don't go as far as me , you do at least agree with the principle
I think I would largely agree that the potential for suffering would likely attend the existence of libertarian freedom. Do I think this somehow resolves the problem posed by the suffering that exists in this world? No way, not in the least.
But, anyway, I guess this is sort of how I would expect you to proceed:
The first observation is that your conception of freedom entails that god cannot perfectly know our future willings. This claim certainly seems reasonable to me since your concept entails that our willings are metaphysically random. Now, if god cannot perfectly know the content of our future willings, I think you could argue around to the claim that there must be at least the potential for the content of our future willings to include stuff that would go against god’s wishes. This would include the potential for stuff like suffering that comes at the hands of bad choices we may make. So, the potential for suffering must attend the existence of libertarian freedom.
This argument seems to me like it has promise. However, note that it will require you to admit that god doesn’t know perfectly our future willings. I know in the past you’ve basically wanted to have your cake and eat it too on the issue, but there is no set of magical hoops you will be able to jump through (god’s timeless time machine blah blah blah nonsense) to make it reasonable for you to say that god both does and doesn’t perfectly know our future willings.
Originally posted by vistesdGood post, I think it has a lot of good stuff in there.
I think that what LJ was pointing out is that the relationship between increased speed and increased crashes is an empirical relationship, not a relationship of logic. Even if it were an example of nomological necessity, it would not be an example of logical necessity.
The fact that I am unable to jump off a tall building and (sans some supporting appara ...[text shortened]... entails that child-rape (or any other specific behavior) be in our real choice-possibility set.
Originally posted by LemonJelloyou should be able to derive a logical contradiction (P and not-P) from the conjunction of the following propositions: 1. God helps the human race build some cars; 2. Said cars go "really fast"; 3. Said cars never crash. So, let's see it, KM. ------------------lemon-------------
[b]Doh!! It's not up to me to demonstrate this. We already know that there is a direct relationship between increasing speed and cars crashing. The faster you go the more risk there is.
The "D'oh!" is properly leveled here at you. If what you described were logically impossible, then you should be able to derive a logical contradiction (P and not- ...[text shortened]... meant that it would be challenging and unlikely, based on practical considerations.[/b]
Living in God's will = happiness (H)
Not living in God's will = unhappiness (U)
Task - Create Sentient being (S) that has real choice of H or U
Logical impossibility of S being created without U being a potential option. Take away U , also take away S. Without U , S cannot surrender to the will of God but instead is forced to live in the will of God.
My point is that God could have created a universe where we weren't properly sentient and choosing and and we all followed H in a ptre-programmed way , but then we wouldn't be having this debate then would we?
Originally posted by LemonJelloAnd, you're really just missing the point as it relates to this thread. I simply don't need to show that god could have created an entirely-suffering-free universe while still providing for human freedom. ----------------------lemon--------------------------------------
[b]What you seem to basically assert is that either free will cannot exist or that free will is basically identical to compatabilist freedom.
No. I don't think your conception of freedom cannot exist. However, I think that if it did exist (it doesn't, but...), it would make no sense to call it freedom because 1. it wouldn't admit of any ge ...[text shortened]... y that god both does and doesn’t perfectly know our future willings.[/b]
Yes you do if you want to uphold your claim that my position is false. The overwhelming evidence around us is that there is a direct relationship between freeedom of choice and autonomy and the risk of things going wrong. For example , human beings obviously have more choices and more freedoms than animals (even in your compatabalist universe). But with that freedom comes the greater risk of destruction and badness that humans are capable of.
Human beings are capable of a level of creativity , thought , and freedom of choice and self governance that no animal has , but with it comes the ability to create destruction and war , and environmental damage. With human imagination comes the risk of great evil and bloodshed. The cleverer someone is the greater the risk their intelligence can be used for destruction (eg Openheimer).
So , lemon , the evidence is that there is a link between a risk and freedom. All the evidence before us suggests that if freedom , choice , imagination and autonomy are increased , up goes the risk of potential harm as well. From sky diving to parenting , it's there right in front of you.
All this suggests that a sanitised , risk free universe would be very unlikely to contain the kind of freeedom and autonomy that makes us being human and alive. Aldous Huxley knew this when he wrote Brave New World , it's there in "invasion of the Body Snatchers" (remake version) + logan's run. This theme exists in philosophy , art and literature.
The weight of evidence is on my side NOT yours so therefore the onus is on YOU not me. If I claimed that it was possible to create humans that could imagine and dream but could never have nightmares you would place the burden of proof on me. My claim is based on the evidence all around me. Cars that go fatser ARE more risky. It's a fact. Human beings that don't take risks DO live less fulfilling lives. Human beings ARE more destructive than animals because they have more freedom and imagination than animals.
No, no .no lemon , all the evidence is with me , the onus is on you. Please evidence this abstract unknown imaginary sanitised risk free universe of yours that still has all the meaning , imagination , freedom and aliveness of this one. I do not have to evidence anything , the universe itself is my evidence.
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Originally posted by knightmeister…I UNDERSTAND that you would LIKE to think that your beliefs are 100% neutral and objective devoid of any bias whatsoever. …. (my emphasis)
What I WANT has nothing to do with what I believe ---------------------------------------hamilton----------------------------------------------------
I understand that you would like to think that your beliefs are 100% neutral and objective devoid of any bias whatsoever. I would say that if you believe this about yourself then the science of psychol y , hand on heart , that if I made a point that had something to it you would accept it as so?
You do not “UNDERSTAND” correctly: What I “LIKE” has nothing to do with it.
…I would say that if you believe this about yourself then the science of psychology would probably not support you and you will have great difficulty finding any evidence to support this..…
It is you that is making the existential claim here that there generally exists significant emotional bias in my process of forming beliefs therefore, unless sufficient evidence can be shown that such significant emotional bias exists in me, we should regard the probability of such significant emotional bias existing in me to be small. All I have to do to logically justify my claim that there probably is no such general significant emotional bias existing in me is to point out that there is insufficient evidence that there is such general significant emotional bias existing in me -I do NOT have to show sufficient evidence that there is NO such general significant emotional bias existing in me to do this.
…ALL the research and evidence about the human mind predominantly shows that we ALWAYS UNDERESTIMATE the levels to which human beings will go to indulge in wishful thinking.. . .… (my emphasis)
Total claptrap. Show me a website that shows this to be true that “ALL the research and evidence about the human mind predominantly shows that we ALWAYS UNDERESTIMATE the levels to which human beings will go to indulge in wishful thinking”. You appear here to be trying to misrepresenting science to support your own beliefs.
I would add that I have no doubt that many human beings will indulge in wishful thinking but there is no evidence that we ALL do all the time. It is possible for a person to generally be capable of thinking objectively without “wishful thinking”.
Originally posted by Andrew HamiltonYou do not “UNDERSTAND” correctly: What I “LIKE” has nothing to do with it. -------hamilton----------------------
[b]…I UNDERSTAND that you would LIKE to think that your beliefs are 100% neutral and objective devoid of any bias whatsoever. …. (my emphasis)
You do not “UNDERSTAND” correctly: What I “LIKE” has nothing to do with it.
…I would say that if you believe this about yourself then the science of psychology would probably not support you and y ...[text shortened]... ossible for a person to generally be capable of thinking objectively without “wishful thinking”.
Of course it doesn't. How silly of me to suggest it. I'll back off on this one , me thinks you are protesting too much.
Originally posted by Andrew HamiltonTotal claptrap. Show me a website that shows this to be true that “ALL the research and evidence about the human mind predominantly shows that we ALWAYS UNDERESTIMATE the levels to which human beings will go to indulge in wishful thinking”. You appear here to be trying to misrepresenting science to support your own beliefs.
[b]…I UNDERSTAND that you would LIKE to think that your beliefs are 100% neutral and objective devoid of any bias whatsoever. …. (my emphasis)
You do not “UNDERSTAND” correctly: What I “LIKE” has nothing to do with it.
…I would say that if you believe this about yourself then the science of psychology would probably not support you and y ...[text shortened]... ossible for a person to generally be capable of thinking objectively without “wishful thinking”.
I would add that I have no doubt that many human beings will indulge in wishful thinking but there is no evidence that we ALL do all the time. It is possible for a person to generally be capable of thinking objectively without “wishful thinking”.
--------------------hamilton-------------------------------------------------
Your first paragraph dismisses my point out of hand and sounds like a kneejerk emotional reaction to me. We often react emotionally when we are challenged on something we don't want to be. ("Total" claptrap???)
Your second paragraph shows signs of you calming down a bit and in the end you sound like you don't disagree with me that much. You agree with me that many humans do indulge in wishful thinking. So let's clear this up then . I'm guessing that you believe that those people who hold beliefs which you disagree with are deluding themselves (eg theists) whilst your beliefs are totally objective and devoid of bias. If so , then this would be a very convenient and emotionally satisfying belief for you to hold. You could then comfort yourself in the safe knowledge that anyone who came up with counterarguments to your position was obviously biased. (the old "theists are potty , atheists are logical" dogma) You should be suspicious of such a belief if indeed you hold it.
(BTW- You know as well as I do that human beings are very good at believing and seeing what they want to see for spurious reasons. You and I are no exception to this , the only thing that prevents a man form doing this is a committment to truth and a lot of painful self knowledge. )