Originally posted by zeeblebotNope.
revisionism.
Finally, it is important to remember that no war has ever been brought to an end simply by indiscriminate bombing and mass killing of civilians. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that such strategies typically strengthened resistance.
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/650
Another vital lesson - one that has taken even air specialists by surprise - relates to the behaviour of civilian populations under air punishment. It had generally been assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep civilian reactions. ... The progress of this war has tended to indicate that this expectation was unfounded. ... These facts are significant beyond their psychological interest. They mean that haphazard destruction of cities - sheer blows at morale - are costly and wasteful in relation to the tactical results achieved. Attacks will increasingly be concentrated on military rather than on random human targets. Unplanned vandalism from the air must give way, more and more, to planned, predetermined destruction. More than ever the principal objectives will be critical aggregates of electric power, aviation industries, dock facilities, essential public utilities and the like." -- Major Alexander Seversky, US Army Air Force, Victory Through Air Power (NY, 1942).
After the war, the German Minister for Armaments Production, Albert Speer, professed shock that "vast but pointless area bombing" was being continued in favor of highly effective precision bombing.[10] According to Speer, the failure to continue regularly attacking Schweinfurt allowed the Reich to escape a "further catastrophic blow" because "armaments production would have been crucially weakened after two months and after four months would have been brought completely to a standstill."[11] "What really saved us," Speer continued, "was the fact that from this time on the enemy to our astonishment once again ceased his attacks on the ball-bearing industry."
http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaster/Reading/war.crimes/World.war.2/Bombing.htm#AMERICAN OPPOSITION TO AREA BOMBING
In the case of the air war against the Third Reich, bombing only caused serious economic disruptions in the final year of the war, roughly from June 1944 to May 1945. By this time a German military defeat was pretty much a foregone conclusion. Based on such results, it is impossible to demonstrate that the bombing campaign would have achieved an economic breakdown of Germany since by the time such destruction was being caused, the fronts were already collapsing in both east and west. The Soviet Union, for all intents, had won the land war by the middle of 1944 and the successful Normandy invasion delivered the coup de grace. To make a case for the bombing campaign being decisive the reverse would have to be expected. That is, the fronts would have had to collapse after the industrial damage was done.
http://www.onwar.com/articles/9809.htm
See also
K Galbraith, "The Affluent Society", chapter 12. Book first published 1958.
Originally posted by AThousandYoung1. Finally ....
Nope.
Finally, it is important to remember that no war has ever been brought to an end simply by indiscriminate bombing and mass killing of civilians. Indeed, there is abundant evidence that such strategies typically strengthened resistance.
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/650
Another vital lesson - one that has taken even air specialists by ...[text shortened]...
K Galbraith, "The Affluent Society", chapter 12. Book first published 1958.
A. Japan was not occupied by ground forces when it capitulated.
2. Another vital lesson - ...
A. see Japan, above. also, Germany was under siege, but Germany mounted minimal guerilla resistance after the war (VERY minimal, maybe even nonexistent).
3. After the war, ... Speer, .... the enemy ceased his attacks on the ball-bearing industry."
A.
The Ball-Bearing Attack
The German anti-friction bearing industry was heavily concentrated. When the attack began, approximately half the output came from plants in the vicinity of Schweinfurt. An adequate supply of bearings was correctly assumed to be indispensable for German war production.
In a series of raids beginning on August 17, 1943, about 12,000 tons of bombs were dropped on this target -- about one-half of one per cent of the total tonnage delivered in the air war. In an attack on August 17 by 200 B-17's on Schweinfurt, the plants were severely damaged. Records of the industry taken by the Survey (and supplemented and checked by interrogation) show that production of bearings at this center was reduced sharply -- September production was 35% of the pre-raid level. In this attack 36 of the 200 attaching planes were lost. In the famous and much-discussed second attack on October 14, 1943, when the plants were again severely damaged, one of the decisive air battles of the war took place. The 228 bombers participating were strongly attacked by German fighters when beyond the range of their fighter escort. Losses to fighters and to flak cost the United States forces 62 planes with another 138 damaged in varying degree, some beyond repair. Repeated losses of this magnitude could not be sustained; deep penetrations without escort, of which this was among the earliest, were suspended and attacks on Schweinfurt were not renewed for four months. The Germans made good use of the breathing spell. A czar was appointed with unlimited priority for requisitioning men and materials. Energetic steps were taken to disperse the industry. Restoration was aided by the circumstance -- which Survey investigations show to have been fairly common to all such raids -- that machines and machine tools were damaged far less severely than factory structures. German equipment was redesigned to substitute other types of bearings wherever possible. And the Germans drew on the substantial stocks that were on hand. Although there were further attacks, production by the autumn of 1944 was back to pre-raid levels. From examination of the records and personalities in the ball-bearing industry, the user industries and the testimony of war production officials, there is no evidence that the attacks on the ball-bearing industry had any measurable effect on essential war production.
4. In the case of ...
A. see 1 and 2 above.
5. K. Galbraith.
A. no supporting text to counter.
Originally posted by zeeblebot1. A. Japan was not occupied by ground forces when it capitulated.
1. Finally ....
A. Japan was not occupied by ground forces when it capitulated.
2. Another vital lesson - ...
A. see Japan, above. also, Germany was under siege, but Germany mounted minimal guerilla resistance after the war (VERY minimal, maybe even nonexistent).
3. After the war, ... Speer, .... the enemy ceased his attacks on the ball- se of ...
A. see 1 and 2 above.
5. K. Galbraith.
A. no supporting text to counter.
I agree, nuking the civilians, threatening/initiating genocide, seemed to work. This is not the same thing as conventional strategic bombing.
2. A. see Japan, above. also, Germany was under siege, but Germany mounted minimal guerilla resistance after the war (VERY minimal, maybe even nonexistent).
I don't see the relevance to Major Seversky's comments.
3. A. The Ball-Bearing Attack...
Again, I don't see the relevance. I already pointed out that Albert Speer said that if the ball bearing attacks had continued it would have crippled the Reich. The problem was that these attacks were not continued. Instead the Allies chose strategic bombing, and the war dragged on another three years.
4. A. see 1 and 2 above.
I don't see the relevance.
5. A.
I haven't read that textbook myself, to be honest, so we'll ignore that source. It's not reliable, so has no need to be countered (unless someone actually has the book and can verify).
1. you said, "before it was proven that targetting civilians doesn't work and precision strikes are needed (a United States Air Force concept by the way)". Nothing about conventional vs. nuclear. see also 3 below. and, it is not "proven" at all.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II
(and see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_Campaign_of_World_War_II )
Harris, Air Officer Commanding Bomber Command, said "for want of a rapier, a bludgeon was used". He felt that as much as it would be far more desirable to deliver effective pin-point attacks, as the capacity to do so simply did not exist, and since it was war, it was necessary to attack with whatever was at hand. He accepted area bombing knowing it would kill civilians. However, Harris did authorize several precision bombing missions, such as attacks on Tirpitz, the Ruhr dams, and Dortmund–Ems Canal.
An elderly lady in front of the bodies of school children in Braunschweig, Germany, after a bombing raid
During the first few months of the area bombing campaign, an internal debate within the British government about the most effective use of the nation's limited resources in waging war on Germany continued. Should the Royal Air Force (RAF) be scaled back to allow more resources to go to the British Army and Royal Navy or should the strategic bombing option be followed and expanded? An influential paper was presented to support the bombing campaign by Professor Frederick Lindemann, 1st Viscount Cherwell, the British government's leading scientific adviser, justifying the use of area bombing to "dehouse" the German workforce as the most effective way of reducing their morale and affecting enemy war production.[112]
Mr. Justice Singleton, a High Court Judge, was asked by Cabinet to look into the competing points of view. In his report, delivered on 20 May 1942, he concluded, "If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months’ continuous, intensified and increased bombing, affecting, as it must, her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale)".[113][114][115] In the end, thanks in part to the dehousing paper, it was this view which prevailed and Bomber Command would remain an important component of the British war effort up to the end of World War II. A very large proportion of the industrial production of the United Kingdom was harnessed to the task of creating a vast fleet of heavy bombers—so much so other vital areas of war production were under-resourced. Until 1944, the effect on German production was remarkably small and raised doubts whether it was wise to divert so much effort – the response being there was nowhere else the effort could have been applied, as readily, to greater effect.
2. contrast guerrilla activity in postwar Germany vs postwar Iraq.
3. the page says why the ball-bearing attacks were stopped. it was extremely expensive militarily for the bombers to leave their fighter escorts to extend the range of bombing missions. the allies were quite right in their decision, and even if we think they weren't, we should give them the benefit of the doubt. any post-analysis is going to be made on limited information. post-analysis performed now is not going to be much different in value from post-analysis performed a thousand years from now.
4.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II
Effectiveness
Strategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds because it does not always work predictably. The radical changes it forces on a targeted population can backfire, including the counterproductive result of freeing inessential labourers to fill worker shortages in war industries.[120]
German soldier plots coordinates on a map in the Duisburg-Wolfsburg anti-aircraft division
Much of the doubt about the effectiveness of the bomber war comes from the oft-stated fact that German industrial production increased throughout the war. While this is true, it fails to note production also increased in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. And, in all of those countries, the rate of production increased much more rapidly than in Germany. Until late in the war, industry had not been geared for war and German factory workers only worked a single shift (incredibly, German apprenticeships for aircraft electrical fitters still lasted four years at the wars end). Simply by going to three shifts, production could have been tripled with no change to the infrastructure. However, attacks on the infrastructure were taking place. The attacks on Germany's canals and railroads made transportation of materiel difficult.
The attack on oil production, oil refineries and tank farms was, however, extremely successful and made a very large contribution to the general collapse of Germany in 1945. In the event, the bombing of oil facilities became Albert Speer's main concern; however, this occurred sufficiently late in the war that Germany would soon be defeated in any case. Nevertheless, it is fair to say the oil bombing campaign materially shortened the war, thereby saving many lives.
German insiders credit the Allied bombing offensive with severely handicapping them. Speer repeatedly said (both during and after the war) it caused crucial production problems. Admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the U-Boat arm, noted in his memoirs that failure to get the revolutionary Type XXI U-boats (which could have completely altered the balance of power in the Battle of the Atlantic) into service was entirely the result of the bombing.Effectiveness
Strategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds because it does not always work predictably. The radical changes it forces on a targeted population can backfire, including the counterproductive result of freeing inessential labourers to fill worker shortages in war industries.[120]
German soldier plots coordinates on a map in the Duisburg-Wolfsburg anti-aircraft division
Much of the doubt about the effectiveness of the bomber war comes from the oft-stated fact that German industrial production increased throughout the war. While this is true, it fails to note production also increased in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. And, in all of those countries, the rate of production increased much more rapidly than in Germany. Until late in the war, industry had not been geared for war and German factory workers only worked a single shift (incredibly, German apprenticeships for aircraft electrical fitters still lasted four years at the wars end). Simply by going to three shifts, production could have been tripled with no change to the infrastructure. However, attacks on the infrastructure were taking place. The attacks on Germany's canals and railroads made transportation of materiel difficult.
The attack on oil production, oil refineries and tank farms was, however, extremely successful and made a very large contribution to the general collapse of Germany in 1945. In the event, the bombing of oil facilities became Albert Speer's main concern; however, this occurred sufficiently late in the war that Germany would soon be defeated in any case. Nevertheless, it is fair to say the oil bombing campaign materially shortened the war, thereby saving many lives.
German insiders credit the Allied bombing offensive with severely handicapping them. Speer repeatedly said (both during and after the war) it caused crucial production problems. Admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the U-Boat arm, noted in his memoirs that failure to get the revolutionary Type XXI U-boats (which could have completely altered the balance of power in the Battle of the Atlantic) into service was entirely the result of the bombing. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Europe), however, concluded the delays in deploying the new submarines cannot be attributed to air attack.
Originally posted by zeeblebotOK, I revise my statement. Conventional area bombing of civilians does not help the attacker.
1. you said, "before it was proven that targetting civilians doesn't work and precision strikes are needed (a United States Air Force concept by the way)". Nothing about conventional vs. nuclear. see also 3 below. and, it is not "proven" at all.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_bombing_during_World_War_II
(and see also http://en.wikipedia ...[text shortened]... the delays in deploying the new submarines cannot be attributed to air attack.
Harris was British; that's why I said it was a USAF idea. Harris felt strategic bombing would help, but I don't see any science behind his assertion. I do see a lot of discussion of the fact that the RAF felt bombing civilians was a good idea, but again, no evidence that they were right.
Originally posted by AThousandYounghttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dehousing
OK, I revise my statement. Conventional area bombing of civilians does not help the attacker.
Harris was British; that's why I said it was a USAF idea. Harris felt strategic bombing would help, but I don't see any science behind his assertion. I do see a lot of discussion of the fact that the RAF felt bombing civilians was a good idea, but again, no evidence that they were right.
For the general tactic, see House demolition
On 30 March 1942 Professor Frederick Lindemann, the British government's leading scientific adviser, sent to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill a memorandum which after it had become accepted by the Cabinet became known as the dehousing paper.[1]
The paper was delivered during an internal debate within the British government about the most effective use of the nation's limited resources in waging war on Germany. Should the Royal Air Force (RAF) be scaled back to allow more resources to go to the British Army and Royal Navy or should the strategic bombing option be followed and expanded? The paper argued that, from the analysis of the reaction of the British population to the Blitz, the demolition of people's houses was the most effective way to affect their morale, (more effective than killing relatives). So given the known limitations of the RAF in locating precision targets in Germany, and providing the planned resources were made available to the RAF, destroying about thirty percent of the housing stock of Germany's fifty-eight largest towns was the most effective use of the aircraft of RAF Bomber Command, because it would break the spirit of the Germans. After a heated debate by the government's military and scientific advisers, the Cabinet chose the strategic bombing campaign over the other options available to them.
...
Contents of the dehousing paper
The following seems a simple method of estimating what we could do by bombing Germany
Careful analysis of the effects of raids on Birmingham, Hull and elsewhere have shown that, on the average, one ton of bombs dropped on a built-up area demolishes 20–40 dwellings and turns 100–200 people out of house and home.
We know from our experience that we can count on nearly fourteen operational sorties per bomber produced. The average lift of the bombers we are going to produce over the next fifteen months will be about 3 tons. It follows that each of these bombers will in its life-time drop about 40 tons of bombs. If these are dropped on built-up areas they will make 4000-8000 people homeless.
In 1938 over 22 million Germans lived in fifty-eight towns of over 100,000 inhabitants, which, with modern equipment, should be easy to find and hit. Our forecast output of heavy bombers (including Wellingtons) between now and the middle of 1943 is about 10,000. If even half the total load of 10,000 bombers were dropped on the built-up areas of these fifty-eight German towns the great majority of their inhabitants (about one-third of the German population) would be turned out of house and home. Investigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale. People seem to mind it more than having their friends or even relatives killed. At Hull signs of strain were evident, though only one-tenth of the houses were demolished. On the above figures we should be able to do ten times as much harm to each of the fifty-eight principal German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.[2]
Originally posted by zeeblebotInvestigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dehousing
For the general tactic, see House demolition
On 30 March 1942 Professor Frederick Lindemann, the British government's leading scientific adviser, sent to the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill a memorandum which after it had become accepted by the Cabinet became known as the dehousing paper.[1]
The pape ...[text shortened]... German towns. There seems little doubt that this would break the spirit of the people.[2]
That's the only actual support for your argument in all that copy-paste, and it's already addressed by Major Seversky:
It had generally been assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep civilian reactions. ... The progress of this war has tended to indicate that this expectation was unfounded.
Yes, they thought it would shatter morale as the dehousing paper shows, but it did not do so according to Major Seversky.
Originally posted by AThousandYoung[/i]the british actually did an INVESTIGATION, where, as far as we can tell, Seversky, Galbraith, and ATY are relying upon their IMPRESSIONS.
[b]Investigation seems to show that having one's home demolished is most damaging to morale.
That's the only actual support for your argument in all that copy-paste, and it's already addressed by Major Seversky:
It had generally been assumed that aerial bombardment would quickly shatter popular morale, causing deep civilian reactions. ... ...[text shortened]... morale as the dehousing paper shows, but it [i]did not do so according to Major Seversky.[/b]
Originally posted by AThousandYoungyou'll have to choose for yourself the part you think is irrelevant, since i've already chosen for myself prior to pasting.
Are you able to single out the most relevant parts of your copy pastes? It's really annoying to read through so much irrelevant spam every time you post.
Originally posted by zeeblebotNo, you are making a strategic mistake here.
you'll have to choose for yourself the part you think is irrelevant, since i've already chosen for myself prior to pasting.
I don't have to do that. Neither do all those people reading our discussion.
But when they realize that they need to wade through all that crap in order to discuss anything with you, every post, they'll realize you probably don't know what you're talking about, and I do.
And thus, you lose in this struggle to persuade the RHP public.
Originally posted by zeeblebotJohn Kenneth Galbraith headed the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey in World War II - a study that took place AFTER the strategic bombing campaign, as opposed to the British "investigation" that "seems" to suggest that bombing civilians would destroy morale...especially blowing up their homes...which took place BEFORE the campaign.
[/i]the british actually did an INVESTIGATION, where, as far as we can tell, Seversky, Galbraith, and ATY are relying upon their IMPRESSIONS.
4. The mental reaction of the German people to air attack is significant. Under ruthless Nazi control they showed surprising resistance to the terror and hardships of repeated air attack, to the destruction of their homes and belongings, and to the conditions under which they were reduced to live. Their morale, their belief in ultimate victory or satisfactory compromise, and their confidence in their leaders declined, but they continued to work efficiently as long as the physical means of production remained. The power of a police state over its people cannot be underestimated.
5. The importance of careful selection of targets for air attack is emphasized by the German experience. The Germans were far more concerned over attacks on one or more of their basic industries and services -- their oil, chemical, or steel industries or their power or transportation networks -- than they were over attacks on their armament industry or the city areas
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs02.htm
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS-PTO-Summary.html