Please turn on javascript in your browser to play chess.
Debates Forum

Debates Forum

  1. Standard member Bosse de Nage
    Zellulärer Automat
    31 Mar '10 09:56
    ... the philosophical trend, not the tendency for colonial powers to eliminate natives.

    eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The alternate most often offered is physicalist and the position is thus often called 'eliminative materialism'.

    http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html

    Views?
  2. Standard member Palynka
    Upward Spiral
    31 Mar '10 10:03
    Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
    ... the philosophical trend, not the tendency for colonial powers to eliminate natives.

    eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The a ...[text shortened]... minative materialism'.

    http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html

    Views?
    I'm a bit confused, isn't this just a new way to express non-dualism of the mind?
  3. Standard member Bosse de Nage
    Zellulärer Automat
    31 Mar '10 10:11
    Originally posted by Palynka
    I'm a bit confused, isn't this just a new way to express non-dualism of the mind?
    Does that entail such statements as 'there are no mental states'?
  4. Standard member Palynka
    Upward Spiral
    31 Mar '10 10:19
    Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
    Does that entail such statements as 'there are no mental states'?
    Well, it seems to me it would entail that the adjective "mental" is just a grammatical convenience but not a irreducible concept.
  5. Standard member Bosse de Nage
    Zellulärer Automat
    31 Mar '10 10:22
    Originally posted by Palynka
    Well, it seems to me it would entail that the adjective "mental" is just a grammatical convenience but not a irreducible concept.
    I can appreciate that 'entities such as beliefs, desires, sensations', along with categories such as space and time, are not things in themselves (unless they are orthogonal to time and space ...), but perhaps they have never been strictly held as such and the eliminati are therefore barking up the wrong tree.
  6. Standard member Palynka
    Upward Spiral
    31 Mar '10 10:27 / 1 edit
    Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
    I can appreciate that 'entities such as beliefs, desires, sensations', along with categories such as space and time, are not things in themselves (unless they are orthogonal to time and space ...), but perhaps they have never been strictly held as such and the eliminati are therefore barking up the wrong tree.
    Are you saying we actually are all eliminati and they're just stating the obvious?

    It seems to me that a dualist must reject the main conclusion of eliminativism and a non-dualist must accept it. Personally, I don't like the prophecies about the developments of science (which seems to me as a crude appeal to authority) so it seems to me that non-dualism is a much more intellectually honest way to put it.

    (again, I might be missing something here)
  7. Donation bbarr
    Chief Justice
    31 Mar '10 10:45 / 1 edit
    Originally posted by Palynka
    I'm a bit confused, isn't this just a new way to express non-dualism of the mind?
    Not quite. Non-dualism (in the substance, not property sense), or monism about the mind is just the claim that there is fundamentally one type of stuff of which the mind is composed. Materialism or physicalism about the mind entails monism, but monism is compatible with idealism. Eliminativism says something more: that the basic ontology of our common sense understanding of the mind, which includes things like beliefs, desires, intentions, representations, sensations, etc., is fundamentally confused, and ultimately will be replaced wholesale by some other ontology couched in the terms of some future physical science. So, it is not even as though our common sense ontology will be explained by showing that beliefs, for instance, are identical to some physical state or process, for that would still entail that beliefs exist. Rather, eliminativism claims that our common sense ontology is so confused that we will not even be able to map it to some more basic physical ontology. In this respect eliminative materialism is a non-reductive theory.
  8. 31 Mar '10 11:03
    What's the difference between this and materialism?
  9. Standard member Palynka
    Upward Spiral
    31 Mar '10 12:20 / 1 edit
    Originally posted by bbarr
    Not quite. Non-dualism (in the substance, not property sense), or monism about the mind is just the claim that there is fundamentally one type of stuff of which the mind is composed. Materialism or physicalism about the mind entails monism, but monism is compatible with idealism. Eliminativism says something more: that the basic ontology of our common sens ...[text shortened]... ore basic physical ontology. In this respect eliminative materialism is a non-reductive theory.
    Thanks, I think I see the difference now.

    It still strikes me odd to claim that the common sense ontology has no mapping into some physical ontology. I understand that we can expect our definition of such common sense concepts to be refined by future science, but where does the claim that it is "so confused" come from? It strikes me as a purely prophetical statement about scientific progress.

    Also, can Bayesian views of beliefs (as concerning subjective probabilities) be denied by this?
  10. 31 Mar '10 17:32
    and people get paid money for this!
  11. Standard member smw6869
    Granny
    31 Mar '10 18:01
    Originally posted by Palynka
    Thanks, I think I see the difference now.

    It still strikes me odd to claim that the common sense ontology has no mapping into some physical ontology. I understand that we can expect our definition of such common sense concepts to be refined by future science, but where does the claim that it is "so confused" come from? It strikes me as a purely prophetica ...[text shortened]... lso, can Bayesian views of beliefs (as concerning subjective probabilities) be denied by this?
    "Also, can Bayesian views of beliefs (as concerning subjective probabilities) be denied by this?"

    Ahhhhh, so, you had to bring up Bayesian, didn't you?

    *sigh*

    GRANNY.
  12. Subscriber AThousandYoung
    Poor Filipov :,(
    01 Apr '10 03:14 / 6 edits
    Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
    ... the philosophical trend, not the tendency for colonial powers to eliminate natives.

    eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The a minative materialism'.

    http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html

    Views?
    It's self-evident to me that sensations exist. It's possibly the only thing I can know with certainty. Everything else follows from that.

    I tried to read that essay, but it was gibberish to me. The sentence about alchemical essences being replaced by chemical elements almost connected with me, but I tried looking up the concept of alchemical essences and couldn't find anything about it.

    Oh well.

    Here is their sample argument:

    1) Folk psychology is not significantly different from obsolete scientific theories like Alchemy, Phlogiston etc.

    2) Alchemy, Phlogiston, etc. are false, do not apply to reality, and the entities they describe do not exist.

    Therefore,

    3) It is possible that folk psychology is false, does not apply to reality, and the entities it describes don't exist.


    It seems to me that phlogiston does exist; it's simply described nowadays as combustible chemical potential energy, and it's now understoof that it has negligable mass; though as it is released, mass is often transferred from object to air. No? Earth, Air, Fire and Water are Solid, Gas, Plasma, Liquid now, and are now understood not to be elements but instead states of matter.

    Maybe this isn't a discussion I should get too involved in. I'd probably annoy people.
  13. Standard member Bosse de Nage
    Zellulärer Automat
    06 Apr '10 09:46
    Originally posted by AThousandYoung
    It's self-evident to me that sensations exist. It's possibly the only thing I can know with certainty. Everything else follows from that.

    I tried to read that essay, but it was gibberish to me. The sentence about alchemical essences being replaced by chemical elements almost connected with me, but I tried looking up the concept of alchemical ess ...[text shortened]...
    Maybe this isn't a discussion I should get too involved in. I'd probably annoy people.
    I don't disagree with you, to be honest.

    It's bizarre, I think, for people to argue from the viewpoint of an as yet unattained plane of science. I get a strong impression of animus, of wish fulfilment, emanating from these writers ... they want 'folk psychology' to die. Sound like frustrated technocrats in search of a benign Futurist dictator ...
  14. Standard member Palynka
    Upward Spiral
    06 Apr '10 10:19
    So we all agree then?
  15. Standard member Bosse de Nage
    Zellulärer Automat
    06 Apr '10 10:34
    Originally posted by Palynka
    So we all agree then?
    Seems so.

    How would you sum up our agreement?