Debates
31 Mar 10
31 Mar 10
... the philosophical trend, not the tendency for colonial powers to eliminate natives.
eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The alternate most often offered is physicalist and the position is thus often called 'eliminative materialism'.
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html
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31 Mar 10
Originally posted by Bosse de NageI'm a bit confused, isn't this just a new way to express non-dualism of the mind?
... the philosophical trend, not the tendency for colonial powers to eliminate natives.
eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The a ...[text shortened]... minative materialism'.
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html
Views?
31 Mar 10
Originally posted by PalynkaI can appreciate that 'entities such as beliefs, desires, sensations', along with categories such as space and time, are not things in themselves (unless they are orthogonal to time and space ...), but perhaps they have never been strictly held as such and the eliminati are therefore barking up the wrong tree.
Well, it seems to me it would entail that the adjective "mental" is just a grammatical convenience but not a irreducible concept.
31 Mar 10
1 edit
Originally posted by Bosse de NageAre you saying we actually are all eliminati and they're just stating the obvious?
I can appreciate that 'entities such as beliefs, desires, sensations', along with categories such as space and time, are not things in themselves (unless they are orthogonal to time and space ...), but perhaps they have never been strictly held as such and the eliminati are therefore barking up the wrong tree.
It seems to me that a dualist must reject the main conclusion of eliminativism and a non-dualist must accept it. Personally, I don't like the prophecies about the developments of science (which seems to me as a crude appeal to authority) so it seems to me that non-dualism is a much more intellectually honest way to put it.
(again, I might be missing something here)
31 Mar 10
1 edit
Originally posted by PalynkaNot quite. Non-dualism (in the substance, not property sense), or monism about the mind is just the claim that there is fundamentally one type of stuff of which the mind is composed. Materialism or physicalism about the mind entails monism, but monism is compatible with idealism. Eliminativism says something more: that the basic ontology of our common sense understanding of the mind, which includes things like beliefs, desires, intentions, representations, sensations, etc., is fundamentally confused, and ultimately will be replaced wholesale by some other ontology couched in the terms of some future physical science. So, it is not even as though our common sense ontology will be explained by showing that beliefs, for instance, are identical to some physical state or process, for that would still entail that beliefs exist. Rather, eliminativism claims that our common sense ontology is so confused that we will not even be able to map it to some more basic physical ontology. In this respect eliminative materialism is a non-reductive theory.
I'm a bit confused, isn't this just a new way to express non-dualism of the mind?
31 Mar 10
1 edit
Originally posted by bbarrThanks, I think I see the difference now.
Not quite. Non-dualism (in the substance, not property sense), or monism about the mind is just the claim that there is fundamentally one type of stuff of which the mind is composed. Materialism or physicalism about the mind entails monism, but monism is compatible with idealism. Eliminativism says something more: that the basic ontology of our common sens ...[text shortened]... ore basic physical ontology. In this respect eliminative materialism is a non-reductive theory.
It still strikes me odd to claim that the common sense ontology has no mapping into some physical ontology. I understand that we can expect our definition of such common sense concepts to be refined by future science, but where does the claim that it is "so confused" come from? It strikes me as a purely prophetical statement about scientific progress.
Also, can Bayesian views of beliefs (as concerning subjective probabilities) be denied by this?
31 Mar 10
Originally posted by Palynka"Also, can Bayesian views of beliefs (as concerning subjective probabilities) be denied by this?"
Thanks, I think I see the difference now.
It still strikes me odd to claim that the common sense ontology has no mapping into some physical ontology. I understand that we can expect our definition of such common sense concepts to be refined by future science, but where does the claim that it is "so confused" come from? It strikes me as a purely prophetica ...[text shortened]... lso, can Bayesian views of beliefs (as concerning subjective probabilities) be denied by this?
Ahhhhh, so, you had to bring up Bayesian, didn't you?
*sigh*
GRANNY.
01 Apr 10
6 edits
Originally posted by Bosse de NageIt's self-evident to me that sensations exist. It's possibly the only thing I can know with certainty. Everything else follows from that.
... the philosophical trend, not the tendency for colonial powers to eliminate natives.
eliminativism - The view that, because mental states and properties are items posited by a protoscientific theory (called folk psychology), the science of the future is likely to conclude that entities such as beliefs, desires, and sensations do not exist. The a minative materialism'.
http://philosophy.uwaterloo.ca/MindDict/eliminativism.html
Views?
I tried to read that essay, but it was gibberish to me. The sentence about alchemical essences being replaced by chemical elements almost connected with me, but I tried looking up the concept of alchemical essences and couldn't find anything about it.
Oh well.
Here is their sample argument:
1) Folk psychology is not significantly different from obsolete scientific theories like Alchemy, Phlogiston etc.
2) Alchemy, Phlogiston, etc. are false, do not apply to reality, and the entities they describe do not exist.
Therefore,
3) It is possible that folk psychology is false, does not apply to reality, and the entities it describes don't exist.
It seems to me that phlogiston does exist; it's simply described nowadays as combustible chemical potential energy, and it's now understoof that it has negligable mass; though as it is released, mass is often transferred from object to air. No? Earth, Air, Fire and Water are Solid, Gas, Plasma, Liquid now, and are now understood not to be elements but instead states of matter.
Maybe this isn't a discussion I should get too involved in. I'd probably annoy people.
06 Apr 10
Originally posted by AThousandYoungI don't disagree with you, to be honest.
It's self-evident to me that sensations exist. It's possibly the only thing I can know with certainty. Everything else follows from that.
I tried to read that essay, but it was gibberish to me. The sentence about alchemical essences being replaced by chemical elements almost connected with me, but I tried looking up the concept of alchemical ess ...[text shortened]...
Maybe this isn't a discussion I should get too involved in. I'd probably annoy people.
It's bizarre, I think, for people to argue from the viewpoint of an as yet unattained plane of science. I get a strong impression of animus, of wish fulfilment, emanating from these writers ... they want 'folk psychology' to die. Sound like frustrated technocrats in search of a benign Futurist dictator ...