Okay, here is a line of questioning I put forward once before in the forums, but never got satisfactory answers to. It is mainly directed at theists who think that a holy book, such as the Bible or Quran, contains directives from God that should be obeyed.
Suppose that God says that action X is good and action Y is bad, whatever X and Y are. Is that sufficient to make X and Y good or bad?
This is the general question I would like you to answer.
Now, let's say that X was something that just about everyone on earth considers bad, like torturing a child for fun, and Y was something that just about everyone on earth considers good, like spending your life selflessly helping other people.
If God now declared that X was good, and Y was bad, would that make X good and Y bad?
Or would it work backwards, such that, if God declared X was good and Y was bad, would that make God bad?
Following on from that, would God only be good if and only if he agreed, and/or declared, that X, and things like X, were bad, and Y, and things like Y, were good?
In short, would God be good because he more or less embodies our natural ideals of goodness (at least those that most of us agree on) or would He be good regardless of the character (in our eyes) of the acts he declared to be good or bad?
You see, if God's goodness depends upon his comandments being good, then, if they were evaluated by most ethical people as bad, then
God would be bad. So, if you regarded, say, the Bible as God's inerrant word, and you come across a passage like Though shalt not suffer a witch to live, and you think it would be very bad to summarily dispatch witches, then you would be committed to the view that God is bad.
If, however, you believed that whatever God declared good (implicitly, by commanding it) was good, such as not allowing witches to live, then you would avoid this implication.
However, if so, then answer this question: How does something become good or bad in virtue of being commanded? It seems to be that, no matter how powerful the person doing the commanding, things remain good or bad regardless. You don't logically change whatever makes something good or bad by stipulative declaration. Not even God can do that, because no one can do that, just as no one can make a triangle with four sides. You can forbid a lover's kiss, and extol the slaughter of innocents, and do so at the top of your voice with infinite gravity, but that does not change the loveliness of the former or the enormity of the latter. Things are good or bad in virtue of their own properties, relations to other things, and interpretations by us. There is no way their goodness of badness can be altered by fiat.
If you care to differ, please do, but supplies some strong arguments, as I think you may really need them.
Aiden
Aiden,
I have time only to answer a simplified version of the dilemma, one encountered by theists daily:
Are good actions good because God says they are good, or does God say good actions are good because they are good?
Either alternative seems to leave the theist in a pickle.
A) If good is good only because God says so, then we run to into the problem of arbitrary morality. As you said, what if God declares (or declared) that torturing children was good?
B) If God says good is good because it simply is good, then the standard of goodness is above God and He is subject to it.
When I first became a Christian I had a good long think about this dilemma. I concluded (A). My reasoning:
First, God will not suddenly change His moral commands. He told us that. So what He has declared good is good, and what He has declared bad is bad, with no danger of that suddenly reversing tomorrow.
Second, while the charge can be levelled that morality is arbitrarily determined by this God, it must be remember that the same God who authored morality is the God who authored the universe. That is, He who commanded good and bad also created the world to match.
I decided that if God had chosen some other moral command(s), He would also have created and ordered His universe differently, to match.
I no longer think this is entirely acceptable, and I hope soon to see replies to my post which will show up any faults in that position.
Now I think (B), that good is good, and God's declaration of good is His recognition and approval. Does this mean morality is a higher thing to which God is subjected? Not exactly.
I think this is related to the old, ridiculous challenge: could God create a rock so big that He Himself would be unable to move it? The paradox is that if God can create it, then He is not omnipotent because He can't move it. If He can move anything He creates, then He is not omnipotent because He cannot create something He can't move.
This is childishly simple to answer. It's like asking if God can create a triangle with four sides. Of course, He can't. The phrase 'a triangle with four sides' is just non-sense. Omnipotence means the power to do all things, but creating a triangle with four sides simply is not a thing. It is an inherent contradiction (I think that's the glossary word, someone please correct me if not). The point is that if you say 'God can create a triangle with four sides,' you're not actually saying anything about God. To paraphrase C. S. Lewis, non-sense does not cease to be non-sense just because it is prefixed by the words 'God can ...'
This is the case with the question of whether God can create a rock so heavy that He Himself cannot move it (or soup so hot that He can't eat it, or a book so long that He can't finish reading it). The phrase 'so heavy that God cannot move it' is just non-sense, an inherent contradiction, a logical impossibility.
It is the same with morality. Bennett once provided a logical proof for the 'inter-subjectivity' of a universal moral standard. Inter-subjectivity amounts practically to objectivity. I have not yet done Bennett the courtesy of examining his proof as carefully as I should. If I grant his proof, then that strengthens my case that morality is not actually a standard above God. Rather, the phrase 'God could have declared a different morality' is non-sense in the same way as 'God can make a boulder so big that He Himself cannot move it.'
This is how I see the case now.
A few notes: 1) I have assumed some details about God which are peculiar to Christian doctrine and may not represent the beliefs of non-Christian theists. 2) I have not delved into all the details of your post, Aiden, but have instead addressed only this simpler form of the dilemma. If you feel my answer to the simpler dilemma does not adequately begin to answer your questions, then I apologize to you and hope that you have more success in getting a response this time than you did last time. 3) I invite Bennett, and anyone else, to clear up any misunderstandings I may have about his intersubjectivity proof, or about any other matter of philosophy and logic. 4) It may be that I have merely pushed the question of a standard-above-God back a step by moving from morality-above-God to logic-above-God. If that's the case, then my tentative response is: fine; God is a rational being, if all rational beings are bound by logic, then so is God; and that does not bother me. Note this is a tentative response. 5) In fact, I hold this entire post to be a tentative statement of my position, or perhaps I should say a statement of my tentative position. I am not a trained logician.
Anyone who has read this gets my thanks for your patience. May God bless you all.
-Larry
Originally posted by huntingbearAt least in Old Testament times, the God of Israel was pleased and honored when believers killed an animal and, instead of using it for food, burned it on an altar. Modern people tend to see this as, at a minimum, a wasteful practice. And groups such as P.E.T.A. would probably also declare it immoral.
First, God will not suddenly change His moral commands. He told us that. So what He has declared good is good, and what He has declared bad is bad, with no danger of that suddenly reversing tomorrow.
Originally posted by Paul DiracThe question of whether certain people agree with God's moral proclamations is separate from the question of whether God will change His moral proclamations. Since I was addressing the latter question, and you are addressing the former, I can not consider your post a reply to mine. Further, the question you address does not seem, to me, relevant to Aiden's questions, which are the topic(s) of this thread.
At least in Old Testament times, the God of Israel was pleased and honored when believers killed an animal and, instead of using it for food, burned it on an altar. Modern people tend to see this as, at a minimum, a wasteful practice. And groups such as P.E.T.A. would probably also declare it immoral.
I want to apologize to you, Mr. Dirac, for not following up with your analogy about the neighbor woman and myriad 'biographies' of her in that other thread. I thought the whole analogy method was cumbersome and it would be inefficient compared to simply discussing whether and why the Bible should be considered reliable history. That is too big a topic for me ever to tackle on-line. If you are truly interested, I can PM some relevant reading on the topic to get you started.
Of course, none of this is relevant to Aiden's topic either, but I figured a) while I've got your attention, and b) while we're already discussing things irrelevant to the topic of the thread, I may as well get that off my chest. Again, my apologies for ignoring your follow-up in that other thread. God bless you.
-Larry
Originally posted by huntingbearOriginally posted by huntingbear
Aiden,
I have time only to answer a simplified version of the dilemma, one encountered by theists daily:
Are good actions good because God says they are good, or does God say good actions are good because they are good?
Either alternative seems to leave the theist in a pickle.
A) If good is good only because God says so, then we run to into the pro ...[text shortened]... cian.
Anyone who has read this gets my thanks for your patience. May God bless you all.
-Larry
Aiden,
I have time only to answer a simplified version of the dilemma, one encountered by theists daily:
Are good actions good because God says they are good, or does God say good actions are good because they are good?
Ok so we have here the slightly amended version of "Euthyphro's Dilemma." For those who have not read it before and are interested, check out Plato's Euthyphro to see how Socrates and Euthyphro debate this question from within the Greek mythological framework (that is replace "God" with "the gods"😉. It's a quick read.
Originally posted by huntingbear
Now I think (B), that good is good, and God's declaration of good is His recognition and approval.
So you have chosen the second position. God is recognizing a standard of good/evil that is somehow not been created or dictated by God (Otherwise we would be choosing the first position.).
Now if such a standard exists then it must be that good/evil exist independently of God.
Originally posted by huntingbear
Does this mean morality is a higher thing to which God is subjected? Not exactly.
Now this appears to be a different sort of question. All that we have been able to determine from your choice is that some standard of morality exists independently of God. If you mean that God's actions can be judged by this universal moral standard then I think you are right.
Originally posted by huntingbear
I think this is related to the old, ridiculous challenge: could God create a rock so big that He Himself would be unable to move it?
Now you basically rebutt this paradox by showing that it contains an inherent logical contradiction. I agree. But where is this leading us?
Originally posted by huntingbear
It is the same with morality.
How so?
Originally posted by huntingbear
Bennett once provided a logical proof for the 'inter-subjectivity' of a universal moral standard. Inter-subjectivity amounts practically to objectivity. I have not yet done Bennett the courtesy of examining his proof as carefully as I should.
So now you are appealing to some one with the last name Bennett. I did a quick google search of "Bennett" and "morality." I eventually stumbled across one Dr. William Bennett. Is this the Bennett to whom you are referring? Please clarify as I know of no Bennett in particular. Apparently, he has not reached the status of say Nietzche, Hume, Decartes, or Plato.
Originally posted by huntingbear
If I grant his proof, then that strengthens my case that morality is not actually a standard above God.
Maybe. Unfortunately we don't know what proof you are appealing to. Unless you show us Bennett's "proof" and subject it to our scrutiny then it does not help illuminate your position. Thus far your postion seems to reduce to "I think the answer is the second position, but this does not mean that God is necessarily bounded by this independent universal code of morality. I know this because some one with the last name Bennett has a proof that says so. At least I think it does because I really haven't looked at it carefully." This is not helpful. Please do us the courtesy of presenting the proof or at the very least carefully explain how he reaches the conclusions he does and how exactly they apply to your position in regards to Euthyphro's Dilemma.
Originally posted by huntingbear
Rather, the phrase 'God could have declared a different morality' is non-sense in the same way as 'God can make a boulder so big that He Himself cannot move it.'
Uhm... I guess this is a reponse to the opening post. It must be so because it is irrelevant to some one positing the second position. If God created the moral code as the above implies then we would be arguing the first position.
Now if we take the second position that God did not create or dictate what good and evil are, then we must ask ourselves, "Can we also appeal to this code?" That is, do we need God to live morally? It seems that we should be able to unless God made us such that we could not understand this code. Then God would become necessary as an translator of the moral code to us. But then we must ask why should we believe that God is telling us the true moral code. We have no way to judge otherwise. This line of thought reduces to "Something is good, because God says so." which is nearly identical to the first position.
The Euthyphro Dilemma is an excellent place to start discussing whether God is necessary for morality.
All right my apologies to the the opening poster if I have further derailed your intentions for this thread.
Originally posted by huntingbearI think it is relevant if we are taking the second position, huntingbear. Again, I think that one can conclude from this position that a good/evil standard can be appealed to independently of God. If so then Paul Dirac is simply pointing out that the actions of the OT god do not line up well with what many people would consider good/evil. I agree with him. In fact, I'd extend the same judgement to the god(s) (trinity) of the NT.
The question of whether certain people agree with God's moral proclamations is separate from the question of whether God will change His moral proclamations. Since I was addressing the latter question, and you are addressing the former, I can not consider your post a reply to mine. Further, the question you address does not seem, to me, relevant to Aide ...[text shortened]... st. Again, my apologies for ignoring your follow-up in that other thread. God bless you.
-Larry
Originally posted by telerionFound it. What follows is bbarr's:
Unfortunately we don't know what proof you are appealing to. Unless you show us Bennett's "proof" and subject it to our scrutiny then it does not help illuminate your position.
First, let us suppose:
(1) S is throughout a fully reflective agent.
This idea here in not that we are always fully reflective, nor that given limitations on information and time we ought to be. We are interested in what is involved in being fully reflective because the capacity for full reflection (or autonomy) is a basic feature of our being agents, or, in other words, creatures who form beliefs and intentions based upon reasons. Fully reflective activity is the paradigm case of human action. My argument will be that this reflectivity is the source of the categorical imperative.
Next, let us suppose that our fully reflective agent is confronted with some desire:
(2) S is faced with the desire, D, that favors his now performing action A. (I want now to flay Floyd)
Since S is fully reflective he is reflectively aware that (2). We understand S’s potential A-ing on the basis of his awareness that (2) to be an exercise of his agency, and not merely the output of some causal process. That is, we are assuming for this discussion that agent’s actions are explained by reference to their reasons for acting, and not by some third-person account of the causal processes eventuating in their action. Anyone who is not a thorough skeptic about morality will have to make a similar assumption. So, given that S’s sees the question of whether to A in virtue of (2) is an exercise in practical rationality, he needs to determine whether D provides him a good reason for A-ing. That is,
(3) S is faced with the question: Should he now act on D? Should he endorse his now acting on D? (Does wanting to flay Floyd give me a good reason to flay Floyd?)
As a fully reflective agent, S will only A because of D if he sees D as providing a good reason to A. That is, S must either endorse A-ing in virtue of D or not endorse A-ing in virtue of D. But what is involved in the endorsement of A-ing in virtue of D? Well, at a minimum, taking D to be a good reason for A-ing commits S to the endorsement of a general principle, a hypothetical imperative, that D is a good reason for A-ing. More specifically, endorsing A-ing in virtue of D commits an agent to endorsing A-ing in virtue of D in circumstances exactly like these. So,
(4) If S reflectively endorses A-ing in virtue of D now, then S endorses a general principle P, of hypothetical form, that endorses so acting. (Yes, my wanting to flay Floyd is a good reason to flay Floyd, so it’s a good rule that if someone (like me) wants to flay Floyd (in circumstances just like this) they ought to flay Floyd).
Now, since S is fully reflective, he is aware of both endorsing A-ing in virtue of D and the hypothetical imperative P. Also, since S is fully reflective, he is faced with the question of whether he ought to endorse being a person who endorses P. If he can’t endorse being that sort of person, the hypothetical imperative P will lose its endorsement as well, and this loss of endorsement will iterate to the desire, D, for A-ing. So, failing to endorse being a person who endorses P leaves one without any reason for A-ing.
The endorsement of being a person who endorses the hypothetical imperative P will commit him to an endorsement of some practical identity, or a description of himself under which he acts, trivially, the description of being a person who endorses the hypothetical imperative P. Notice that the reflective demands presented thus far apply to any desire for any end. So, if our fully reflective agent S is to ever act, he must endorse some practical identity. So,
(5) S must endorse some practical identity or other that grounds or supports the hypothetical imperative P and thus his A-ing in virtue of D. (I endorse being the type of person who thinks wanting to flay Floyd provides a good reason for flaying Floyd).
Since S is fully reflective, he is aware of this entire complex of reflective endorsement leading to his endorsement of a conception of himself; an endorsement of his practical identity. But this entire complex of reflective endorsement is itself is something that S can either endorse or reject. So, the demands of full reflection do not stop with (5). Again, if S rejects this complex, if he cannot endorse being the type of person who would through reflection be led to endorse being the type of person who would act according to the hypothetical imperative P and thus find D a good reason for A-ing, then he cannot A in virtue of D. To do so would be for S to act without a reason he ultimately endorses, and to act without a reason one endorses is not only irrational, it is a fundamental failure of agency. In fact, to act without a reason one ultimately endorses is to fail to act at all, for it is the having of reasons that distinguishes an agent’s actions from the mere moving of his body. To act, then, it is necessary for S to endorse his reflective nature as a deeper, or more fundamental conception of his practical identity. In other words, he must endorse his being essentially autonomous. So,
(6) S must endorse his reflectivity itself; his nature as a reflective or autonomous creature, as a conception of his practical identity. (I endorse being, fundamentally, a reflective or autonomous person).
Notice that (6) is not saying that S must only endorse his reflectivity on this particular occasion, but that he must endorse it generally. The reason for this is the same reason that took us from (3) to (4), namely that reflective endorsement as a matter of necessity involves endorsement of a general principle. Notice also that no further question can arise for the S about whether or not to endorse his endorsement of his reflectivity or autonomy. To raise such a question he would have to employ the very faculty at issue, so raising this question presupposes his endorsement of reflective endorsement itself, and hence his being a reflective or autonomous creature. So what has this shown? It has shown that in order for S to act at all he must endorse being a reflective creature, an autonomous creature; in short, he must endorse, and thereby value, his personhood. Now given that S has been led to valuing his personhood, what good reason does he have for not valuing it in that of another? How could S simultaneously value his own personhood and fail to value the personhood of another without being inconsistent? Any supposed difference between S and another in virtue of which one could claim that S’s failing to value another’s personhood was not inconsistent would have to be a merely contingent difference. And reflection upon that difference would lead S, via an argument similar to the one just presented, to realize that that difference can only be valued if personhood itself if already valued. So the value of personhood (reflectivity, autonomous agency) is fundamental, in that a fully reflective agent can value nothing unless he also values personhood. So failing to value personhood is to fail to be fully reflective, and failing to be fully reflective is to be, to that extent, irrational.
Your question: "Suppose that God says that action X is good and action Y is bad, whatever X and Y are. Is that sufficient to make X and Y good or bad?
This is the general question I would like you to answer. "
My answer: I do not think that God ever said something was good or bad. So for me this whole line of reasoning is not relevant.
I have several reasons to believe God doesn't differentiate in "good" and "bad". Here's one of them:
Since God is all there is and all that is not then saying something is bad is saying God is bad. There's just no point in doing that.
PS: I do believe in God
Otto
Originally posted by QuirineNow I think we encounter the first question that must be asked when debating anything about the nature of "God."
Your question: "Suppose that God says that action X is good and action Y is bad, whatever X and Y are. Is that sufficient to make X and Y good or bad?
This is the general question I would like you to answer. "
My answer: I do not think that God ever said something was good or bad. So for me this whole line of reasoning is not relevant.
I have several ...[text shortened]... d is saying God is bad. There's just no point in doing that.
PS: I do believe in God
Otto
Question:
What is this "God" thing you are talking about?
Theists have such widely varying definitions or descriptions of what "God" is that we cannot assume that we are having a discussion about the same sort of thing.
In this case Quirine's "God" seems to be a very different thing from any sort of xtian god (up to this point it seemed we were discussing some version of the xtain god). Clearly, there are things which the xtian god is not. For example, he is not Satan, George W. Bush, or sin. Meanwhile, Quirine has defined his god to be "all there is", whatever that means (Does this mean "God" is the universe?) .
Huntingbear, I'll get back to you on Bennett's deal after I have had some time to really go over it. However, after a first read through I don't see how it has anything to do with your position on Euthyphro's Dilemma.
It makes no reference to a god. In fact, agent S appears to be quite different from any version of the xtian god I've come across. Below (1) Bennett implies that S's are basically humans. So how can you use it to discuss the relationship between your "God" and some independent moral standard?
I guess after reading it, I just don't see how this strengthens your postion. Would you mind explaining?
Originally posted by telerionWhoa! My proof, back from the graveyard of abandoned threads!
Huntingbear, I'll get back to you on Bennett's deal after I have had some time to really go over it. However, after a first read through I don't see how it has anything to do with your position on Euthyphro's Dilemma.
It makes no r ...[text shortened]... see how this strengthens your postion. Would you mind explaining?
A few points:
First, my proof is meant to show that any fully reflective and fully rational agent is committed to valuing the capacity for rational agency, and hence committed to valuing themselves and others. It is an expression of the Kantian idea that, at bottom, morality derives from rationality (specifically, from practical rationality, or principles of rational action).
Second, if the proof is sound (i.e., if it really is a proof), then it shows that a non-relativistic secular morality is possible. It shows that no divine agent is needed to ensure that people have a reason to do what is morally required. The reason is that it is irrational to act immorally.
Third, the proof is relevant to Huntingbear's position because this proof (and the more general view of which it is an expression) is consistent with his theism. If it is the case that moral truths are, at bottom, rational truths, then the fact that God is bound by moral truths doesn't threaten the glory or majesty or power of God. Being bound by moral truths is no different than being bound by principles of rationality, on this view. Hence, just as God can't create a round square, or bring it about that 2 + 2 = 5 (regardless of what Descartes claimed), so God can't act contrary to the moral law, since He is presumably perfectly rational. Once you see the moral truths as arising from truths of rationality, then the claim that God is bound by moral truths ceases to seem a threat.