Originally posted by MacSwainNo, I basically agree with you. I think. About the insipidness of the Phoney War. But the BEF that deployed to Belgium in 1940 was way better off for having had 12 months to mobilize - although it then got trounced. Were they "great strides"? I don't really know for sure in terms of the British strength and readiness relative to the changes in German strength and readiness over those months. All I know is that Chamberlain personified Britain's All Mouth And No Trousersness diplomatically, but I am not sure he had much choice as the British military was All Mouth and No Trousers at that time too. With the BEF performing so badly in 1940, why is it that you think it could have done any better in 1938?
And....what great strides were made during the intervening time, (which was most accurately called}, "The Phoney War", "Twilight War" (by Winston Churchill), der Sitzkrieg (in German - the sitting war), The Bore War and "la drôle de guerre" (the boring war) preceding the Battle of France in May 1940?
Originally posted by MacSwainThe way he played subordinates off against each other to maintain his own grip on power for so long... NO, not "stupid". Not by any stretch of the imagination. In that respect, he was similar to Soeharto. No one calls Soeharto stupid.
Stupid...YES!!
As for overruling Generals and all that - Barbarossa, Stalingrad etc. - yes, stupid.
But isn't "insane" a better word because it can encompass both his evil genius and his deluded stupidity?
Originally posted by MacSwainStupid? No, I don't think so. To be so Charismatic, Supreme orator, Natural leader, Beguiling manipulator (your words) he cannot be stupid. He have to be quite intelligent.
Well...we will just have to agree to disagree on this one.
Charismatic...extremely so! Supreme orator...magnificent! Natural leader...certainly! Beguiling manipulator...no doubt! Arrogance...by the bushel!
Stupid...YES!!
Idiot? Yes, but a very intelligent one. No oxymoron there.
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Originally posted by FMFFrance and the USSR had a mutual agreement to defend Czechoslovakia if attacked. On virtually the eve of Munich, the Soviets conveyed to the French and the British that they were willing to fight to defend Czechoslovakia. Arrangements were being made with Roumania (which was still in the Allied sphere at that time though one of the results of Munich was to change that) to ferry large numbers of Soviets troops on Romanian railroads to aid the Czechs. Your off-hand comment regarding the Soviets is not supported by the historical record (which now includes documents Shirer did not have i.e. internal memos to and from Stalin). In fact, the Soviet policy towards the Nazis was "containment" as opposed to British and French "appeasement" as shown by their very active support of the Spanish government against the Fascists (who had German and Italian troops and, more importantly, planes in support) in contrast to Western "neutrality".
Interesting post. But I am not sold on it yet. The French Army, alone, was indeed bigger than the German Army in 1938, but France was just finishing the building of the Maginot Line and its military mindset was wholly defensive. France sat through the Phoney War until it was attacked in 1940; I contend that it would have been even more inclined to sit out a Phon at "Neville Chamberlain could have avoided" would have had the same sequence of conquests?
Militarily, the chances that the Germans could wheel around their forces to make a "blitzkrieg" type attack on France rather than Czechoslovakia in October 1938 was non-existent. The Germans did not innovate their campaigns but planned them out in minute detail. Hitler wanted the Sudetenland for many reasons, but one was that it had a number of huge modern armament factories. I don't think there's any reasoned doubt he would have struck into Czechoslovakia absent Munich and gambled that the West would do nothing. And if he was wrong, his strategic position would have been far worse than it was 1 year later.
EDIT: Based on the new evidence from Soviet archives, the scholarly consensus now runs something like this: Stalin wanted to avoid war in 1938, if possible, but was prepared to participate in a Soviet-Western war against Germany if necessary. At the same time, Stalin, deeply suspicious of Anglo-French motives and maneuvers, was determined not to be left fighting Hitler on his own. There was, therefore, little prospect of Stalin unilaterally declaring war on Germany in support of Czechoslovakia, should the latter have chosen to stand and fight. Substantial military supplies and other forms of assistance short of war were by no means ruled out, however, depending on the course of the Czechoslovak-German war.
http://www.historycooperative.org/cgi-bin/justtop.cgi?act=justtop&url=http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/110.3/br_171.html
It should be obvious that Munich greatly reinforced Stalin's fear that the French and British were willing (indeed anxious) for the USSR to face the Nazis alone.
Even in early 1940, the German General Staff had no operational plan to attack France and the one they first came up with was merely a replay of WW1.
When Hitler ordered the attack on France in the same year, the officers of the Ober-kommando des Heeres (OKH, High Command of the Army) tried to block the plan. They did so not because they were against the attack in general but because they thought this attack came too soon. They felt much safer in a defensive position where they could stop the French offensive which they thought would come. But Hitler never thought defensively. After he put pressure on the operations department they for-warded a plan for “Case Yellow” – the attack on France. The plan clearly sheds light on the so often glorified professionalism of the Wehrmacht High Command: It simply resembled a modified Schlieffen-Plan (from WWI), with a heavy right wing again breaking through the neutrality of Belgium and the Netherlands to outflank the French Armies on the seaward side and a straight drive through upper France by other units. Even if the plan succeeded, France would not be defeated.
http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7901
In fact, a somewhat junior staff general named Von Manstein came up with the plan that ultimately routed the French i.e. an armored thrust through the Ardennes after the movement into Belgium to the north had drawn in the bulk of the French and British armies. This plan didn't exist in October 1938 and it's hard to see how a straight up attack on Belgium and/or the Maginot Line would have resulted in anything but a bloody stalemate. And this would have left Czechoslovakia unconquered with Soviet troops ready to defend it if your "Hitler changes his mind" scenario had been implemented.
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Originally posted by FabianFnasAgreed....as I see it written - Idiot is better for choice! Hence forth I will use your word.
Stupid? No, I don't think so. To be so Charismatic, Supreme orator, Natural leader, Beguiling manipulator (your words) he cannot be stupid. He have to be quite intelligent.
Idiot? Yes, but a very intelligent one. No oxymoron there.
Hitler was extremely large Idiot 😏
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Originally posted by FMFForget about Chamberlain and the Brits. The real failure here was on the part of France. France had a very important mutual defense alliance with Czechoslovakia that was a committment by both countries to come to the defense of the other should either be attacked by Germany. Both countries knew the importance of this. They signed it with the understanding that if one country were to fall to Germany then most likely the other one was doomed as well. The Soviet Union also had a mutual assistance pact with Czechoslovakia but it seems that that pact hinged on France living up to her end of the bargian in the other treaty.
It's a pretty cliched "factoid"... if it weren't for Neville Chamberlain and his piece of paper in 1938, 55,000,000 lives could have been saved!
Hardly anybody in Europe says this or thinks it. But for some reason people in American public life use it all the time it to try to insult one another in a kind of hairy-chested, ahistorical, Hitler Card Up The Slee ...[text shortened]... Neville-Chamberlain-could-have-done and how exactly do you think it might have panned out?
So the real failure her lies squarely on the shoulders of France who failed to live up to an alliance that they forged with Czechoslovakia over a decade before. No doubt France would have expected the Czechs to do their part had France been attacked first.
Perhaps France and the Soviet Union should have heeded the words of Otto von Bismark when he he said in 1868 after defeating Austria in a war mostly fought in Bohemia:
"Whoever is master of Bohemia is the master of Europe. Europe must therefore, never allow any nation except the Czechs to rule it, since that nation does not lust for domination. The boundaries of Bohemia are the safeguard of European security, and he who moves them will plunge Europe into misery."
And so it came to pass.
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Originally posted by UllrWell said.
Forget about Chamberlain and the Brits. The real failure here was on the part of France. France had a very important mutual defense alliance with Czechoslovakia that was a committment by both countries to come to the defense of the other should either be attacked by Germany. Both countries knew the importance of this. They signed it with the understandin security, and he who moves them will plunge Europe into misery."
And so it came to pass.
If I can be permitted to add an extension, in the form of a "what if," to your piece.
What if Neville had been hawkish, moving all available ground and air resources quickly to France. Joining in with Czechs & French efforts. Think of Spitfires near Germany greatly lessening range so as sorties would reach Germany and challenge Luftwaffe dominance.
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Originally posted by MacSwainI am now about to address the what if scenario.
Well said.
If I can be permitted to add an extension, in the form of a "what if," to your piece.
What if Neville had been hawkish, moving all available ground and air resources quickly to France. Joining in with Czechs & French efforts. Think of Spitfires near Germany greatly lessening range so as sorties would reach Germany and challenge Luftwaffe dominance.
So to answer the original post. What should and could Neville Chamberlain have done?
He could have reminded France of their obligation to Czechoslovakia and encouraged (even demanded) with British support to live up to that obligation. What would have happened in such a scenario.
Well lets first start with a comparison of Czechoslovakian forces with Germany in 1938. Lets start with the assumption that Czechoslovakia would have to go it alone against Germany. First of all understand that this is not a defenseless nation we are talking about. The Czechs were well aware of the potential threat of Germany and had taking steps to defend themselves and train an effective army. They had also proven to be quite capable soldiers in WWI with the Czechoslovak legion in Russia.
First of what did the German army have at its disposal to invade in 1938? When you analyze this you will see that they were not ready in 1938 for a general European war. At the time of Czechoslovakia's captiulation they had on paper:
1. Approximately 36 infantry divisions (not motorized) - including 1 mountain division
3. 10 motorized infantry divisions
4. 3 armored divisions with a fourth division being formed.
Germanys weapons and equipment were not up to snuff. The Czech LT34, 35 and 38 type tanks had superior armor and firepower than what the Germans had in the field at the time. Remember one of the strategic advantages that Germany gained from taking Czech territory was the Skoda tank works and their technology plus industrial output. The more modern machineguns, pistols, and submachinguns that the Germany army would yield during the war were still under development and not available. Heavy mortars and effective anti-tank capabilities were non existant. Czech artillery was superior. The areas that Germany had technological advantages were airpower and more motorized infanty divisions.
The Czech army in 1938:
1. 20 infantry divisions
2. 2 motorized infantry divisions
3. 4 mobile divisions that included 434 tanks.
4. 19 divisional equivlent broken up into 12 Border Section and 7 Defensive Groups. Mostly to man border fortifications.
Clearly Germany would defeat Czechoslovakia in a matter of time. How long it would take is the question. But the Czechs were prepared and trained to put up a fight and they had rough terrain and defense of their home territory on their side. The quality of their armaments and training were considered equivalent to the Germans.
So take this information and consider what would have happened had France decided to honor its mutual defense pact with Czechoslovakia. Suddenly Germany has to commit a fair portion of its 49 divisions at the time to the defense of its western borders. The Soviet Union, it appears, were prepared to honor its mutual assistance treaty with them provided that the French did not back down. By late September 1938 preparations were being made to send 450 Soviet Union fighters and 600 bombers to the defense of Czechoslovakia. On 24th of September the Romanian government agreed to allow the Soviet Union a corrider to send troops and air forces through. Bucharest gave permission for the Soviets to use a railway to allow the movement of two divisions including 300 tanks and 700 artillery pieces through. The Romanians even setup an airfield for the Soviets to use for refueling.
The Soviets were ready to fight and the Czechoslovakians were ready to fight. It was the French that failed with the encouragement of Chamberlain.
I think had they lived up to their agreement that there is a very good chance with their help, British support, and Soviet military intervention that Czechoslovakia would have survived and this would have dealt a huge strategic blow to Hitler that very wall might have prevented the catastrophy of WWII.
Originally posted by UllrRecc'd 🙂
I am now about to address the what if scenario.
So to answer the original post. What should and could Neville Chamberlain have done?
He could have reminded France of their obligation to Czechoslovakia and encouraged (even demanded) with British support to live up to that obligation. What would have happened in such a scenario.
Well lets first start ...[text shortened]... lt a huge strategic blow to Hitler that very wall might have prevented the catastrophy of WWII.
Originally posted by no1marauderExcellent posts (Recc'd).
Even in early 1940, the German General Staff had no operational plan to attack France and the one they first came up with was merely a replay of WW1.
But - and please do not interpret the brevity of this response as glib or truculent - why aren't you talking about France's (and Great Britain's) plans - and readiness - to invade Germany as of October 1938? Isn't that the issue when discussing the "Neville Chamberlain Thing" rather than Germany's plans to invade Belgium and/or France?
Originally posted by UllrYep, Recc'd.
I am now about to address the what if scenario.
So to answer the original post. What should and could Neville Chamberlain have done?
He could have reminded France of their obligation to Czechoslovakia and encouraged (even demanded) with British support to live up to that obligation. What would have happened in such a scenario.
Well lets first start ...[text shortened]... lt a huge strategic blow to Hitler that very wall might have prevented the catastrophy of WWII.
Originally posted by Ullr
I am now about to address the what if scenario.
So to answer the original post. What should and could Neville Chamberlain have done?
He could have reminded France of their obligation to Czechoslovakia and encouraged (even demanded) with British support to live up to that obligation. What would have happened in such a scenario.
Well lets first start ...[text shortened]... lt a huge strategic blow to Hitler that very wall might have prevented the catastrophy of WWII.
Originally posted by UllrDo you know whether there were high ups in the French government handling foreign policy and/or military policies/strategy in the 1938-40 period who later played prominent roles in the fascist Vichy administration?
Forget about Chamberlain and the Brits. The real failure here was on the part of France.