Originally posted by bbarrBut Nietzsche would only have contempt for analytic philosophy no? He'd probably consider it quintessentially English... and wonder how anyone could be so vulgar as to put Russell and Wittgenstein on the same page!
Nietzsche wasn't particularly rigorous, which is why many analytic philosophers (including myself) don't find his work compelling. This is not to say that his work included nothing of value. I still like the Apollonian/Dionysian distinction.
He'd also probably also be rather rude and obnoxious regarding the idea of walking off with an Apollonain/Dionysian distinction as if it were some tool to be pulled out in implementing some solution or in definining some schematic of philosophical positions, i.e. symptom of a herd mentality ["the eager pack lift up their pictures, they carry all they lack...and the tickler takes his tickle back"] which misses the stuff of a wild dynamic. Grazing on what one likes!
In short, Nietzsche would violently repudiate the analytic idea of "rigor" and likely refuse to acknowledge it as philosophy.
Originally posted by zeeblebotNot really. In a former incarnation I read most of what he published.
most everybody's probably going on that one quote ... i know i am ...
Incidentially, there are some quite funny stories about Russell "teaching" Wittgenstein. I'm not sure Wittgenstein thought he was up to the job. I'm not sure Russell did either.
Originally posted by XHerakleitosBut in the absence of arguments, why ought we take these responses (Or Nietzsche's preferences generally) seriously? Repudiation, like offense, can go both ways.
But Nietzsche would only have contempt for analytic philosophy no? He'd probably consider it quintessentially English... and wonder how anyone could be so vulgar as to put Russell and Wittgenstein on the same page!
He'd also probably also be rather rude and obnoxious regarding the idea of walking off with an Apollonain/Dionysian distinction ...[text shortened]... ntly repudiate the analytic idea of "rigor" and likely refuse to acknowledge it as philosophy.
Originally posted by dottewellWittgenstein is on my list for his "Philosophical Investigations" and "On Certainty".
I am interested to know why a few people have put Wittgenstein in alongside modern Continental philosophers.
Are we talking Tractatus Wittgenstein, "later" Wittgenstein, or both? Because if both them I am confused.
Originally posted by bbarrHe was on my list of one for the same works, plus BlB, BrB and CV. That list of one was not a joke; for me, if you take Wittgenstein at his word (and understand his project, dare I say) - he is a uniquely all-or-nothing philosopher.
Wittgenstein is on my list for his "Philosophical Investigations" and "On Certainty".
I found myself sharing that viewpoint and that is precisely why I stopped my studies. Who wants to be a cheerleader?
It in interesting to me that people believe they can see Wittgenstein as a great philosopher but also see others - even metaphysicians - as equally great. I wonder what they take from Wittgenstein's later writings.
Originally posted by bbarrPrefernces? Mere repudiation without "argument"? I don't share your assumptions. I was synoptically attempting to animate Nietzsche with respect to a take on the issue. Was neither annoucing my preferences nor intimating Nietzsche amounts to a schtick geared about mere preference or sterile repudiation.
But in the absence of arguments, why ought we take these responses (Or Nietzsche's preferences generally) seriously? Repudiation, like offense, can go both ways.
There's definitely reasoning and a story behind Nietzsche's "opinion", which can be elaborated argumentatively.
Also, there is a sense in which no "argument" between Nietszche and the Anglo writers can even proceed, since their styles stem from such different first principles.. such different interpretations of the past and the significance of the history (not to mention one's relationship thereto). That's not to say no dialouge nor labour is possible...but most "argument" isn't really philosophical in the sense that there's a lamentable tendency to beg questions and simply assume the validity of archai which are being questioned themselves in the midst of such an encounter.