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Originally posted by bbarrBbarr, when I saw you were the last poster, I developed an expectation (in the time it took the hella fast DSL to load this page 😛) that the heavy artillery was coming. The first sentence:
Part of the notion of a right is that their existence implies the existence of a moral obligation.
is pretty clear, and was implied by most posts in here. However, it is good that it is explicitly stated. The second sentence disappoints me. It is of course logically necessary in view of the first one, and I accept it as true. But it is really just a rhetorical device to make it look like the third sentence:
Are you similarly skeptical with regard to the existence of moral obligations?
has been legitimately argued, when really you are merely making it look like I'd be a fool to answer you in anything but the negative. In fact, until someone shows me a moral obligation, I suspect that they are unnecessary concepts. I think Occam could bust out his razor, eliminate 'moral obligations', and replace them with something a little better defined.
Originally posted by StarValleyWy'Tis cool. I'm having a lot of trouble with it myself, and my alternative is by no means complete. I asked my sister and her friend this question. SHe fled for the bathrrom, he, having more fortitude, talked just now. What in particular do you find frightening about Skinner?
Ok... I think I am beginning to get it a little. You know what? I think this is like me an math. I want to say this so it doesn't sound silly. I read your above post 4 times. I concentrated real hard and I know that it has valid content. I just am not capable of understanding it. So, I will study it some more. In the mean while... I think we have a cla ...[text shortened]... h" and it sounded a bit like your first paragraph. That is one scarry (as in frightening) dude.
Originally posted by royalchickenI'm not trying to bait you, I was just curious. I don't think that it makes sense to talk either of rights or obligations as 'things in the world', somehow on an ontological par with tables and chairs. At its worst, rights talk is just nonsensical. At its best, rights talk is just shorthand for making claims about how it is ultimately rational to go about treating one another. This doesn't mean that there aren't such things as objective moral truths, in my opinion, just that these truths are ultimately truths about how it is rational to act.
Bbarr, when I saw you were the last poster, I developed an expectation (in the time it took the hella fast DSL to load this page 😛) that the heavy artillery was coming. The first sentence:
[b]Part of the notion of a right is that their existence implies the existence of a moral obligation.
is pretty clear, and was implied by most posts in he ...[text shortened]... razor, eliminate 'moral obligations', and replace them with something a little better defined.[/b]
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Originally posted by bbarrI know I wasn't being baited; I just don't think a rhetorical trick suffices where a dialectical one is needed. However, I agree with you here..."how it is ultimately rational to go about treating one another" is what I called 'courtesy' in the MOAP (mother of all posts). I disagree about ultimate moral truths; we discussed this during our game, you just rained down the checkmate before we came to a conclusion. Name an ultimate moral truth.
I'm not trying to bait you, I was just curious. I don't think that it makes sense to talk either of rights or obligations as 'things in the world', somehow on an ontological par with tables and chairs. At its worst, rights talk is just ...[text shortened]... se truths are ultimately truths about how it is rational to act.
You are the fifth person today who has proven himself more interesting than studying for finals.
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Originally posted by royalchickenI am caught in a moral dilema😛 I must admit that I have not studied skinner in detail, but am aware that his work is the basis of some of the weird racist organizations in our happy world. My dilema is that Noam Chomski is probably the most critical reviewer:
'Tis cool. I'm having a lot of trouble with it myself, and my alternative is by no means complete. I asked my sister and her friend this question. SHe fled for the bathrrom, he, having more fortitude, talked just now. What in particular do you find frightening about Skinner?
The New York Review Of Books
Volume 17, Number 11 · December 30, 1971
Review
The Case Against B.F. Skinner
By Noam Chomsky
Beyond Freedom and Dignity
by B.F. Skinner
Knopf, 225 pp., $6.95
A century ago, a voice of British liberalism described the "Chinaman" as "an inferior race of malleable orientals." During the same years, anthropology became professionalized as a discipline, "intimately associated with the rise of raciology." Presented with the claims of nineteenth-century racist anthropology, a rational person will ask two sorts of questions: What is the scientific status of the claims? What social or ideological needs do they serve? The questions are logically independent, but the second type of question naturally comes to the fore as scientific pretensions are undermined. The question of the scientific status of nineteenth-century racist anthropology is no longer seriously at issue, and its social function is not difficult to perceive. If the "Chinaman" is malleable by nature, then what objection can there be to controls exercised by a superior race?
And I really hate the thoughts of posting anything to do with him.😠 Oh well.🙄
Thanks. The only aspect of Skinner's work with which I was familiar are the behaviour experiments. However, don't discount the fundamental inequalities of people yet...just realize that race is not a logical way to recognize these differences because races of people have too many members.
The "all men created equal" business is really just an implication that some index of value, when applied to people, comes up equal. Taking an abstract view, and defining things by their function, and not their substance, this 'value-index' can be interpreted to mean that I cannot act in a certain (say, negative) way toward one person and exempt another from this action. This provides the moral imperative that Bennett wanted, and directly implies that people have rights.
So they are interchangeable. Thus, until someone (Bennett) provides a justification of moral obligations, I don't logically have to believe that all men are of equal value. Whether I do or not is a matter of believe and not part of the discussion.
I have arrived, through free thought, and not what I've been fed in school, at the conclusion that race, gender, etc. are not legitimate ways of breaking up the human race in terms of showing individual inequalities.
Originally posted by royalchickenHonest questions are not rhetorical tricks, Mark. It would have been a rhetorical trick if I had followed up the last sentence in my first post with something like: "So you must think there is nothing wrong with skinning puppies with potato peelers purely for fun, you sicko." See the difference? My question was meant to clarify the object of your skepticism. The question above is actually an ad hominem attack meant to sway the readers of the thread. In fact, the closest thing to a rhetorical trick so far in our discussion is your characterization of my question as a 'rhetorical trick'.
I know I wasn't being baited; I just don't think a rhetorical trick suffices where a dialectical one is needed. However, I agree with you here..."how it is ultimately rational to go about treating one another" is what I called 'courtesy' in the MOAP (mother of all posts). I disagree about ultimate moral truths; we discussed this during our game, ...[text shortened]... You are the fifth person today who has proven himself more interesting than studying for finals.
Here is one objective moral truth: One ought not treat others soley as a means to the satisfaction of one's ends, but rather as ends in and of themselves.
This is a paraphrase of Kant's second formulation of the Categorical imperative. I don't think that a violation of this dictum is irrational for the same reasons that Kant did, but I do think that for the overwhelming majority of people it would be irrational for them to violate it. Remember, I think that moral claims can be reduced to claims about what it is rational to do. So all I would have to show is that it is a fact that for most people violating this rule would be irrational in order to show that it is a fact they ought not violate it.
How do you suppose I could go about showing this?
Originally posted by bbarrFirst of all, the rhetorical trick was the bit about people threatening me. Never make a debate in any way personal for fear that emotion could get involved. It didn't, in this case, because I have a very undemonstrative personality, but the comment preceding your (perfectly good) question sullies it a little bit. Enough of THAT.
Honest questions are not rhetorical tricks, Mark. It would have been a rhetorical trick....characterization of my question as a 'rhetorical trick'.
How do you suppose I could go about showing this?
One ought not treat others soley as a means to the satisfaction of one's ends, but rather as ends in and of themselves.
You've mentioned this one to me before. At risk of sounding ignorant, I'm first going to be frank and admit I haven't read Kant. I don't think that is a serious impediment to this discussion however. I don't know if I agree with you, but let's give it a go, based on your initial beliefs, which, FWIW, I find acceptable.
1."Remember, I think that moral claims can be reduced to claims about what it is rational to do."
2. A majority violating this is irrational---> they ought not violate it
3. (My own) Objective moral truths are those statements which one ought not violate.
Thus in order to show that Kant's locution is an OMT (objective moral truth), we need show that, as you said, that a large-scale violation is irrational. (I'm going to post this now to get feedback, then contiune. This is tying in nicely with what I said about courtesy.)
Originally posted by royalchickenThe only quibble with your formalization above is that there is an ambiguity in 2. I did not mean that the dictum is such that if it were violated by a majority of people then it would be irrational for the individuals therein. Rather, I meant that the dictum is such that for a majority of persons, a violation of the dictum by a member of that majority would be irrational for that person. I am not claiming that the dictum is such that violating it becomes irrational once some numerical threshold on the number of violations is breached. I think that majority humans are psychologically constituted in a manner such that violating this dictum would be irrational for any individual with that psychological constitution.
First of all, the rhetorical trick was the bit about people threatening me. Never make a debate in any way personal for fear that emotion could get involved. It didn't, in this case, because I have a very undemonstrative personality, but the comment preceding your (perfectly good) question sullies it a little bit. Enough of THAT.
[b]One ought not ...[text shortened]... s now to get feedback, then contiune. This is tying in nicely with what I said about courtesy.)
I will not end up claiming that there is any dictum that every person has a reason to follow. I do think that for the vast majority of persons, however, there are characteristic goals, motives, and social needs that make the violation of the dictum above irrational.
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Originally posted by bbarrThat is what I meant, I should have phrased it better. Sorry about that ambiguity. It should read:
The only quibble with your formalization above is that there is an ambiguity in 2. I did not mean that the dictum is such that if it were violated by a majority of people then it would be irrational for the individuals therein. Rather, I me ...[text shortened]... al needs that make the violation of the dictum above irrational.
2. For some undefined majority of humans, a member of that majority violating this edict is acting in an irrational way ------> no-one in that majority should violate this edict.
However, this leads to some other questions which need be taken into account in the formalization. Mainly, in order to maintain any kind of logic here, we must define what circumstances must conspire to pu one in or out of that majority. Otherwise constructing an argument will be very difficult.
Bennett, I apologize but I have to go and wash some dishes if I want my sister to drive me to school tomorrow. I hope we continue this conversation. Perhaps another game?
Mark,
When I attacked you with the remark about "not having earned any rights", did it make you angry? I was trying for a humorous exchange wherein you respond "You are just making a personal attack, etc. etc.". Then I respond... "You have every 'right' to be angry". Oh, well. I'll get you one of these days. Bad humor being very common, it's just a matter of time!😵
Originally posted by richjohnsonFrom your first post
Perhaps you should reread my post. I completely agree with your statement 'you have no rights if there is no law'.
I would not call 'the right of the dominant male to mate with the females' a right, not unless you consider it a bully's right to take lunch money from smaller kids just because he's intimidated them all into submission.
RC ...[text shortened]... e 1st amendment, this right is not absolute. You can't yell "FIRE" in a crowded theater.
I think you are confusing rights with laws.
But then you said yourself that you agree that there are no rights without laws. Therefore rights are defined by laws. Right?
Therefore the origin of laws is the origin of rights. Right?
[The whole animal kingdom bit was to throw you off... 😛]
By discussing who promises rights, doesn't define rights. You still haven't defined them, you have only discussed attributes of rights.
Royalchicken,
To get back to my post a little while ago, I apologize for the ambiguity of my use and definition of the term 'rights.' In point of fact, I thought about a definition for a long time, and couldn't come up with anything that was neither tautological nor dogmatic, so I took the easy way out by not even bothering to define them.
The purpose of my post was to highlight what I believe to be an error in the opinions of some who think that rights are derived from governmental power, rather than preexisting as some form of moral obligation and defended by the laws and government. I continue to maintain this position.
As to the infinitely more difficult question of trying to define the term 'rights,' I believe that can only be done in the context of actions, and then only on those actions that can actually occur. (This brings to mind the hilarious discussion in Monty Python's 'The Life of Brian,' where the radical anti-Roman group is debating the right of one of their members to be a woman, despite the obvious fact that he is a man.) Another example: Someone can say that we all have the fundamental right to time travel; the fact that it is currently (and for the foreseeable future, pardon the pun) impossible implies that right is meaningless, because there is no action that can be taken based upon that right.
I still haven't defined what a right is, because to be honest, I'm still not sure of the answer. But I do believe that limiting the discussion to available actions should be a necessary criteria for formulation of that definition.
-mike
Originally posted by legionnaire
To get back to my post a little while ago, I apologize for the ambiguity of my use and definition of the term 'rights.' In point of fact, I thought about a definition for a long time, and couldn't come up with anything that was neither tautological nor dogmatic, so I took the easy way out by not even bothering to define them.
And I apologize for jumping on you like that. I think we have yet to come up with an unambiguous definition (and it will remain so until other suggestions appear, or Bennett comes back so we can finish what we started earlier).
The purpose of my post was to highlight what I believe to be an error in the opinions of some who think that rights are derived from governmental power, rather than preexisting as some form of moral obligation and defended by the laws and government. I continue to maintain this position.
It looks as though you believe there to be some universal source of rights, then. I don't necessarily disagree, but I think the onus is on you to say what this is. What we are all trying to work out is: "Where do preexisting moral obligations come from?"
As to doing it in the context of actions, I think you have a point that has already been kind of unconsciously assimilated in this discussion, because our discussions about moral obligations have talked thus far only of methods by which it is most moral to interact.
I'd love to hear more from you on this issue.
~Mark