Theodore Drange proposed a version of the nonbelief argument in 1996. He considers the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief to be unhelpful in the argument, arguing instead that the mere existence of nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God. A semi-formal presentation of the argument is as follows:[20]
If God exists, God:
wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;
can bring about a situation in which all humans believe God exists before they die;
does not want anything that would conflict with and be at least as important as its desire for all humans to believe God exists before they die; and
always acts in accordance with what it most wants.
If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).
But not all humans believe God exists before they die.
Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3).
Drange's argument is directed primarily to Christians, and the philosopher Laura Garcia has replied from that perspective. She says that Drange's argument hinges on the idea that belief in God's existence is, according to Christians, necessary for salvation. According to Garcia this idea is mistaken: "many Christians deny this claim and the Catholic Church explicitly rejects it."[21] But as Garcia notes, Drange has answered that for many Christians—in particular, evangelical Christians—his point should remain convincing, and that there are in any case other good things that belief in God can bring for humans, which a good God would desire, such as peace of mind and a sense of meaning in life.[22]
I wonder if the various premises in this argument, when denied, lead to a different version of religious belief. For example, denying "But not all humans believe God exists before they die," leads to universalism.
Theodore Drange proposed a version of the nonbelief argument in 1996. He considers the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief to be unhelpful in the argument, arguing instead that the mere existence of nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God. A semi-formal presentation of the argument is a ...[text shortened]... example, denying "But not all humans believe God exists before they die," leads to universalism.
I recall we already had some discussion on this one, Thread 143255.
I really don't care at all for Drange's formulation of the argument (or at least what is informally presented here; perhaps his presumably more careful formal presentation, which I have not seen, is better).
However, there should be a forceful problem of ignorance against certain strains of theism. I'm not going to attempt any sort of formal presentation here either, but the idea is as follows. It would be applicable basically to a theist who holds that God is such that it is His explicit design intention that His creatures at least be in a position to freely accept/reject a relationship with Him. This in turn requires that these creatures hold the belief that God exists in the first place, the formation of which is predominantly outside the active control of these creatures. Thus, this design intention requires that the world be as such that these creatures on the whole have sufficient reasons to think God exists; and the world in a significant way fails to be as such. This is presumably a problem for the theist, in light of the further fact that God is also supposed to be as such that He can always successfully execute on his design intentions. This should be a forceful argument provided that the theist has these mentioned commitments; and this argument can be made immune to tiresome human free will objections, since the belief formation at issue is not the province of human free will.
Originally posted by LemonJello This is presumably a problem for the theist, ...
I feel compelled to point out that logic is rarely a problem for a the theist. Most theists just ignore it altogether, or the more sophisticated theists, simply plead ignorance ie they recognise that there may be logical issues that contradict their beliefs but rather than give up their beliefs they have faith that the arguments are mistaken and God knows the answers.
Originally posted by LemonJello I recall we already had some discussion on this one, Thread 143255.
I really don't care at all for Drange's formulation of the argument (or at least what is informally presented here; perhaps his presumably more careful formal presentation, which I have not seen, is better).
However, there should be a forceful problem of ignorance agai ...[text shortened]... ree will objections, since the belief formation at issue is not the province of human free will.
I tend to agree with you, but question this one statement; "...this design intention requires that the world be as such that these creatures on the whole have sufficient reasons" [to believe God exists].
My questioning comes from doubt that belief formation is always traceable to and dependent on reasons to believe. I wonder whether belief that God exists could be "installed" in humans without reasoning being needed by the humans [although reasoning could follow along]. This would satisfy the requirement. It would help advance my wonderment if I could demonstrate a universal belief that does not require reason to attain. Perhaps the idea that I am?
Originally posted by JS357 I tend to agree with you, but question this one statement; "...this design intention requires that the world be as such that these creatures on the whole have sufficient reasons" [to believe God exists].
My questioning comes from doubt that belief formation is always traceable to and dependent on reasons to believe. I wonder whether belief that God exists ...[text shortened]... monstrate a universal belief that does not require reason to attain. Perhaps the idea that I am?
That comment is a fair one. The argument would only need to posit that such a design intention requires that the world be as such that on the whole there are antecedents sufficient to bring about belief in these creatures (allowing that this could happen through any number of different unspecified causal trajectories). Again, the problem would be that the world upon inspection significantly fails to be as such.
One comment, however, is that we would need to retain the idea that such unspecified causal trajectories do not materially involve the creatures' own volitional input. Otherwise, the objections from human free will would be forthcoming. So, it would need to still be impressed that such belief formation is predominantly not the province of human free will. On the other hand, one counter-objection could still be that such a God would have the ability to simply implant such belief in all his creatures, regardless.
I have not heard of this argument but I and many others have used similar.
I think it discounts the possibility of certain gods.
I would go further and say it discounts the possibility of any god worth worshipping.
Of course the theist would point to
God:
wants all humans to believe God exists before they die;
and say that god wants humans to have faith in him before they die
and therefore cannot give them solid 100% proof
Theodore Drange proposed a version of the nonbelief argument in 1996. He considers the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief to be unhelpful in the argument, arguing instead that the mere existence of nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God. A semi-formal presentation of the argument is a ...[text shortened]... example, denying "But not all humans believe God exists before they die," leads to universalism.
"If God exists, all humans would believe so before they die (from 1).
But not all humans believe God exists before they die.
Therefore, God does not exist (from 2 and 3)." -Theodore Drange/JS357
Interesting propositions; all three flawed by the same omission: God has the same self awareness, self determination and volition format He's given us. What kind of God would coerce relationship with Himself? His omniscience knew some would believe and that others wouldn't (despite the unimaginable horror of the alternative eternal address). He patiently waits.
Theodore Drange proposed a version of the nonbelief argument in 1996. He considers the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief to be unhelpful in the argument, arguing instead that the mere existence of nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God. A semi-formal presentation of the argument is a ...[text shortened]... example, denying "But not all humans believe God exists before they die," leads to universalism.
The dependent assumption "god wants all humans to believe in him before they die" pivots on the meaning of the word "wants" and god's intended methodology of achieving that want. I think there is also the implicit assumption in your model that god not intervening to achieve his "wants" negates his existence and probably his right/claim to be a righteous god. One could go further with this and propose "I knew a man who didn't believe in god's existence, he died not believing, therefore god does not exist".
From observation of His forbearance with the United States of America, personal experience of His undeserved patience toward me and because I've been taught God's Attributes from the original languages of scripture by my Pastor/Teacher.
Theodore Drange proposed a version of the nonbelief argument in 1996. He considers the distinction between culpable and inculpable nonbelief to be unhelpful in the argument, arguing instead that the mere existence of nonbelief is evidence against the existence of God. A semi-formal presentation of the argument is a ...[text shortened]... example, denying "But not all humans believe God exists before they die," leads to universalism.
not only is this reasoning flawed because it hinges on the necessity of belief in god for salvation (which would mean heaven would be a place filled with let's say faithful racist wife beaters but not righteous atheist doctors) but also it diminishes the significance of belief. if all would believe at one point or another, god would either have to mess with free will, or to present each with proof of his existence, which would turn the "i believe" into an "i know".
there is no big deal in believing the obvious. it is a given.
Originally posted by Zahlanzi not only is this reasoning flawed because it hinges on the necessity of belief in god for salvation (which would mean heaven would be a place filled with let's say faithful racist wife beaters but not righteous atheist doctors) but also it diminishes the significance of belief. if all would believe at one point or another, god would either have to mess wi ...[text shortened]... "i believe" into an "i know".
there is no big deal in believing the obvious. it is a given.
So why do people continue to believe in gods when it's obvious they don't exist?
Originally posted by googlefudge So why do people continue to believe in gods when it's obvious they don't exist?
obvious? noah's flood is obvious it didn't exist.
a 6000 year old universe is obviously impossible.
a being outside our universe that created ours? why is it obvious it doesn't exist?
if the ants in your ant farm would achieve self awareness, would they find it obvious you don't exist? they can't "see" outside their jar. they have no direct contact with you other than you changing the temperature of their environment. perhaps you take one ant one day, have it scurry on your desk for a while, then put it back. would your ants find you obviously non-existent just because you chose to only show yourself to that ant? would that ant be considered obviously insane/lying?
Drange's argument from nonbelief
03 Dec '13 18:17
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