1. Cape Town
    Joined
    14 Apr '05
    Moves
    52945
    06 Apr '16 16:45
    Originally posted by apathist
    Yes. That's the Occam's Razor objection. The math is outrageous: how many probabilistic quantum events, with how many possible outcomes, occur every Planck moment in a single atom? Times how many atoms in our known universe? That's a lot of universes popping into existence every second - and each one exponentially starts spawning more.

    The point of this ...[text shortened]... rovide a deterministic explanation for the probabilistic outcomes which occur in THIS universe.
    The universes do not 'pop into existence' and you don't have a sort of primary universe you call THIS universe. It is more like a tree where at each quantum event there is a branch with two ways (not a trunk and a branch popping into existence). A better analogy would be this universe splitting into two.
    An even better way to see it is as all a single continuum and we are just a slice through that continuum from the past until the present (but our future includes many slices).

    Its just another dimension. The objections that it is complicated are similar to flat-world inhabitants denying the existence of 3D. Sure, one would want proof of the third dimension before accepting it, but the fact that the maths is harder doesn't rule it out.
  2. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    06 Apr '16 16:54
    Originally posted by twhitehead
    ... and you don't have a sort of primary universe you call THIS universe. ...
    I certainly DO have a sort of primary universe I call THIS universe. So do you, and so does everyone else.

    The odds of our universe being the very first original universe is exceedingly small, of course. So our universe isn't the "primary" universe in that sense. But this universe is the universe we live in. Isn't it?
  3. Cape Town
    Joined
    14 Apr '05
    Moves
    52945
    06 Apr '16 17:57
    Originally posted by apathist
    I certainly DO have a sort of primary universe I call THIS universe. So do you, and so does everyone else.

    The odds of our universe being the very first original universe is exceedingly small, of course. So our universe isn't the "primary" universe in that sense. But this universe is the universe we live in. Isn't it?
    You certainly DO NOT understand the many-worlds hypothesis and seem intent on continuing to not understand it.
  4. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    06 Apr '16 20:431 edit
    Originally posted by twhitehead
    You certainly DO NOT understand the many-worlds hypothesis and seem intent on continuing to not understand it.
    Your interpretation of the MWI is the problem. It makes no sense, and so of course I cannot understand it.

    I understand the MWI well enough, and the opening post nailed it.
    1) The MWI was invented to provide a deterministic explanation for quantum indeterminism.

    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/
    The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics holds that there are many worlds which exist in parallel at the same space and time as our own. The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics.

    2) This thread is meant to point out that MWI fails because it does not affect the fact that our world is fundamentally indeterminate.

    http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2010/10/many-worlds-interpretation-is-not.html
    The thing is, even though the MWI has restored determinism of a sort to the description of the universe, it completely fails to predict what we will see in our particular future. John Earman says that the MWI exhibits ontological determinism, but at the price of "radical epistemic indeterminism."

    I realize quotes from Stanford and a science blog can be debated. That's why I'm here.
  5. Cape Town
    Joined
    14 Apr '05
    Moves
    52945
    06 Apr '16 21:091 edit
    Originally posted by apathist
    Your interpretation of the MWI is the problem. It makes no sense, and so of course I cannot understand it.

    I understand the MWI well enough, and the opening post nailed it.
    The opening post is vague and you clearly have not understood it.
    Try reading the whole thing. Especially the 'Who am I section"

    2.2 Who am “I”?
    “I” am an object, such as the Earth, a cat, etc. “I” is defined at a particular time by a complete (classical) description of the state of my body and of my brain. “I” and “Lev” do not refer to the same things (even though my name is Lev). At the present moment there are many different “Lev”s in different worlds (not more than one in each world), but it is meaningless to say that now there is another “I”. I have a particular, well defined past: I correspond to a particular “Lev” in 2012, but not to a particular “Lev” in the future: I correspond to a multitude of “Lev”s in 2022. In the framework of the MWI it is meaningless to ask: Which Lev in 2022 will I be? I will correspond to them all. Every time I perform a quantum experiment (with several possible results) it only seems to me that I obtain a single definite result. Indeed, Lev who obtains this particular result thinks this way. However, this Lev cannot be identified as the only Lev after the experiment. Lev before the experiment corresponds to all “Lev”s obtaining all possible results.

    Although this approach to the concept of personal identity seems somewhat unusual, it is plausible in the light of the critique of personal identity by Parfit 1986. Parfit considers some artificial situations in which a person splits into several copies, and argues that there is no good answer to the question: Which copy is me? He concludes that personal identity is not what matters when I divide. Saunders and Wallace 2008a argue that based on the semantics of Lewis 1986 one can find a meaning for this question. However, in their reply 2008b to Tappenden 2008 they emphasise that their work is not about the nature of ‘I’, but about “serviceability”. Indeed, as it will be explained below, I should behave as if “Which copy is me?” is a legitimate question.


    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#2.2
  6. Cape Town
    Joined
    14 Apr '05
    Moves
    52945
    06 Apr '16 21:13
    Originally posted by apathist

    http://somewhatabnormal.blogspot.com/2010/10/many-worlds-interpretation-is-not.html
    The thing is, even though the MWI has restored determinism of a sort to the description of the universe, it completely fails to predict what we will see in our particular future. John Earman says that the MWI exhibits ontological determinism, but at the price of "radical epistemic indeterminism.".
    More accurately, the MWI says that we do not have a particular future. Instead, it predicts all our futures.
  7. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    07 Apr '16 22:08
    Originally posted by apathist
    What do you suppose would count as evidence of "true" probabilistic behavior? (I don't like the term "randomness" here - there is a crucial difference between those terms.)
    Humy, I asked you this question, am hoping you'll try to answer.
  8. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    07 Apr '16 22:16
    Originally posted by twhitehead
    The opening post is vague and you clearly have not understood it.
    Try reading the whole thing. Especially the 'Who am I section"

    [quote]2.2 Who am “I”?...
    You must be thinking of some other opening post. Anyway, the idea that you could be standing in a room full of copies of you, and you cannot tell which one you are, well that is amusing and sad.
  9. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    07 Apr '16 22:201 edit
    Originally posted by twhitehead
    More accurately, the MWI says that we do not have a particular future. Instead, it predicts all our futures.
    Our future is in this universe, even if MWI is correct. And the MWI does not allow us to predict what will happen in this universe. That is the point of the op.

    If instead you are right and MWI "predicts our future", then we could in theory predict quantum events deterministically right here in our universe. But we can't, as a matter of scientific fact.

    But you also claim that "the MWI says that we do not have a particular future". Since we do have a particular future - its the one that happens in our universe - the MWI fails again.
  10. Standard memberDeepThought
    Losing the Thread
    Quarantined World
    Joined
    27 Oct '04
    Moves
    87415
    08 Apr '16 01:37
    Originally posted by apathist
    Our future is in this universe, even if MWI is correct. And the MWI does not allow us to predict what will happen in this universe. That is the point of the op.

    If instead you are right and MWI "predicts our future", then we could in theory predict quantum events deterministically right here in our universe. But we can't, as a matter of scientific fact. ...[text shortened]... we do have a particular future - its the one that happens in our universe - the MWI fails again.
    I'm not seeing why you think the Many Universe Interpretation fails in any way.
  11. Standard memberlemon lime
    itiswhatitis
    oLd ScHoOl
    Joined
    31 May '13
    Moves
    5577
    08 Apr '16 03:29
    Originally posted by DeepThought
    I'm not seeing why you think the Many Universe Interpretation fails in any way.
    What exactly does the MWI accomplish? I'm assuming it could serve some purpose, perhaps work to patch up some holes in what we already know or understand... but is it actually a useful theory/interpretation, or just something that might be possible?
  12. Cape Town
    Joined
    14 Apr '05
    Moves
    52945
    08 Apr '16 08:09
    Originally posted by apathist
    You must be thinking of some other opening post.
    Yes, I incorrectly thought the link was in the opening post. You only gave the link later.
    Nevertheless, your opening post does not give a definition of what MWI is. You quoted a site later on, and that site clearly disagrees with your understanding of MWI.

    Anyway, the idea that you could be standing in a room full of copies of you, and you cannot tell which one you are, well that is amusing and sad.
    Which clearly demonstrates that you still don't understand what MWI says, and appear determined not to understand.
    The MWI says that if you are standing in a room, 5 seconds later there will be many many copies of you and all of them will have formerly been you. There will be no unique one that is special and is 'you' from the perspective of the original you in the scenario.
  13. Cape Town
    Joined
    14 Apr '05
    Moves
    52945
    08 Apr '16 08:11
    Originally posted by apathist
    Our future is in this universe, even if MWI is correct.
    No, it is not. In MWI, our future is in 'many worlds', hence the name.

    And the MWI does not allow us to predict what will happen in this universe. That is the point of the op.
    MWI predicts what will happen in all the universes. It is just not particularly useful.
  14. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    12 Apr '16 18:061 edit
    Originally posted by DeepThought
    I'm not seeing why you think the Many Universe Interpretation fails in any way.
    Determinism (causal determinism) is the concept that events are bound by causality in such a way that any state (of an object or event) is completely determined by prior states. (Paraphrased from Wikipedia.)

    Modern science has discovered, however, that quantum events are fundamentally indeterminate, or probabilistic.

    The Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) of quantum mechanics holds that there are many worlds which exist in parallel at the same space and time as our own. The existence of the other worlds makes it possible to remove randomness and action at a distance from quantum theory and thus from all physics. (That is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.)

    Let's say there is a particular quantum event - the measurement of the position of an electron in its shell around an atomic nucleus, for example - which has an indeterminate (or probabilistic) outcome. When measured, the electron will be found in one of two possible positions - call it position A or position B - with equal probability.

    Let's call our universe, prior to that measurement, universe Z. MWI says that when that measurement occurs, universe Z splits into two universes, one in which that electron turns out to be in position A (call that universe A), and the other in which that electron turns out to be in position B (call that universe B). This approach is supposed to resolve the probabilistic nature of that quantum event.

    Let's say we do that experiment, and it turns out that the electron is in position A. Therefore we are in universe A.

    We can tell which universe we are in simply by observing the position of that electron! We are in one of the new universes, but are not in the other. Why aren't we in universe B instead? Which universe we find ourselves in depends on a probability function exactly equal to the original quantum probability that the MWI was supposed to resolve.

    The apologetics for the MWI claim that actually we are also in universe B. Well, someone else must be in universe B because in fact, we are not - and this is very easy to prove. Just observe the position of the electron in order to determine which universe you are in!

    The MWI fails to provide a deterministic resolution for the indeterminate quantum event.
  15. Standard memberapathist
    looking for loot
    western colorado
    Joined
    05 Feb '11
    Moves
    9664
    12 Apr '16 18:111 edit
    Originally posted by twhitehead ...
    The MWI says that if you are standing in a room, 5 seconds later there will be many many copies of you and all of them will have formerly been you. There will be no unique one that is special and is 'you' from the perspective of the original you in the scenario.[/b]
    Again, the idea that you could be standing in a room full of copies of you, and you cannot tell which one you are, well that is amusing and sad.

    When there were no copies of you, and you were standing in the room all alone, could you tell which person in that room was you? If a copy of you walks in, suddenly you can't tell which of those two people you are?

    A person who says he cannot distinguish himself from others is either lying, insane, or perhaps a p-zombie.
Back to Top

Cookies help us deliver our Services. By using our Services or clicking I agree, you agree to our use of cookies. Learn More.I Agree