Philosophy Shmilosophy

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[b]…If I read your message correctly, you seem to consider your emotional disapproval as highly personal and arbitrary.
…

Absolutely correct -BUT don’t misunderstand what I am saying here; that does NOT imply anything about whether or not I or anyone else “should” or “shouldn’t” personally attach importance to emotional disapproval.
This se ...[text shortened]... vious’ design flaw.

Note that I don’t expect most people to agree with what I am saying here.[/b]

Sorry for the late reply.

First, I think it's inevitable that 'culture' plays a huge role in human moral concepts and I'm not a fan of evolutionary psychology, certainly not the popularised version of it, to explain human behaviour.

But I'm surprised you would consider morality as an evolutionary accident (even a flaw?). Why not consider it a useful adaptation?

With regard to moral philosophy (or any philosophy) being called “science”, this is an ancient term (e.g. Aristotle) that was applied to the pursuit of knowledge generally. Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics were considered as much science as his physics and his zoological pursuits. There was not then the split between philosophy and the “physical sciences”.

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Within the framework of a virtue-ethics in which eudaimonia—which I will translate as “flourishing well-being” (each of those terms is sometimes used to translate it, as sometimes “happiness” is as well; there is disagreement among philosophers as to the best translation)—is the ultimate good, being that which is not instrumental in the pursuit of any further good. For Aristotle, reason was the essential human faculty, but that did not lead him any reasoned rule-based ethics (or to dismiss other human faculties). Reason informs emotional responses and what we might call intuition, as well as our response to cultural norms.

I think that emotions have served a survival function in human evolution, both socially and individually, and are not strictly individual-idiosyncratic. Anger and fear, for example, are linked to the survival response to imminent danger (though they may be displaced). Children who are raised together at young ages have a tendency to feel disgust at the thought of incest, as another (disgust may also be linked to the vomit-response at eating poisonous foods). Joy is experienced in a state of well-being; other emotions signal some ill-being. (I really don't know anything about evolutionary psychology; I am drawing at least a bit from Antonio Demasio's research here, as I recall from reading.)

To have served such a survival function, emotional responses did not have to operate infallibly—only well-enough to support the survival of the species.

Epicurus held that the physical senses were always accurate, but that our identification of the source, our interpretation and our response could be in error (e.g., the picture in our brain may be accurate; it is our—perhaps reflexive—interpretation that leads us to be fooled by a mirage). I’m not convinced that such a strong statement can be made about emotions (I’m not sure that Epicurus’ “always” isn’t too strong with regard to physical sensation as well), but emotions normally do tend to be in response to some (at least potentially) identifiable cause of well- or ill-being. If emotional responses are inappropriately displaced, that too is potentially identifiable.

Appropriate emotional response would be part and parcel of a developed “virtuous character” from a virtue-ethics point of view. (“Virtuous”, here, does not mean “morally” good as opposed to morally evil, or right and wrong, in the conventional sense that we tend to use those terms. What is virtuous is what promotes and supports a generally eudaimonic life.)

When people speak of morality, they often seem to mean some fiat-based, or at least rule-based, system. (Nietzsche seems to have restricted his usage to that sense.) Divine-command morality is a religion-based fiat system.

People also seem to have a tendency to seek some kind of system that will ensure ethical/moral infallibility. I do not think that such a system can be had.

But I do think that virtue-ethics provides a valid framework for the ethical tendency toward eudaimonia, in which both reason and emotions are recognized. When human beings live in association (family, clan, community, society), then the individual’s eudaimonia cannot be pursued in isolation. The individual’s flourishing and well-being are enhanced or diminished by social behaviors and conditions that affect others’ eudaimonia. That may lead to social rules (and taboos) that are aimed at creating the greatest eudaimonic potential for the group’s members. But, such rules should then always be tested against that end, and not allowed to become simply a fiat-based system. Unfortunately, that seems often to happen.

I’m not a utopian. As I say, I don’t think that an infallible ethical system can be had. But, just as emotions do not have to be infallible to serve a valid function for the organism, an ethical system does not have to be infallible to be valid in application. I am not really that systematic, and I borrow from different ethical approaches. (I borrow from both Epicurus and the Stoics, for example, as well as virtue-ethics, as well as the likes of Chuang Tzu.)

In the end, I do think that philosophy has some valid, well-reasoned things to say about ethics. (I’m not a philosopher: I’m just a schlock who studies this stuff on my own, in the interest of my own eudaimonia.) This post reflects no more than where my thinking tends to be on the question at the present time.

Originally posted by DdV
Sorry for the late reply.

First, I think it's inevitable that 'culture' plays a huge role in human moral concepts and I'm not a fan of evolutionary psychology, certainly not the popularised version of it, to explain human behaviour.

But I'm surprised you would consider morality as an evolutionary accident (even a flaw?). Why not consider it a useful adaptation?

…Why not consider it a useful adaptation?…

Adaptation to what?

(Note that the fact that I personally don’t have any ‘moral’ concepts doesn’t in any way appear to effect how I behave so I don’t see why it should necessarily effect other people’s behaviour -if they had no ‘moral concepts‘, then they, just like I, would just accept that they want other people (and themselves) to behave kindly and fairly for subtle emotional (but not ‘moral&rsquo😉 reasons and there is nothing wrong with wanting something just because it is for emotional reasons)

Originally posted by Andrew Hamilton
[b]…Why not consider it a useful adaptation?…

Adaptation to what?

(Note that the fact that I personally don’t have any ‘moral’ concepts doesn’t in any way appear to effect how I behave so I don’t see why it should necessarily effect other people’s behaviour -if they had no ‘moral concepts‘, then they, just like I, would just accept that th ...[text shortened]... sons and there is nothing wrong with wanting something just because it is for emotional reasons)[/b]

Note that the fact that I personally don’t have any ‘moral’ concepts doesn’t in any way appear to effect how I behave so I don’t see why it should necessarily effect other people’s behaviour -if they had no ‘moral concepts‘, then they, just like I, would just accept that they want other people (and themselves) to behave kindly and fairly for subtle emotional (but not ‘moral&rsquo😉 reasons and there is nothing wrong with wanting something just because it is for emotional reasons.

Yes.

That is exactly what once seemed to me to be a problem (for me)—especially when I could not define some specific conceptual moral principle for this or that behavior. For example, the notion of, say, child torture just produced a reaction of disgust on my part. If one accepts (which I at least unconsciously did) the necessity of such well-defined moral principles—well then, my disgust is just not “enough”. Similarly that I experienced a greater sense of well-being/happiness in the face of others’ well-being, and hence worked socially to enhance that.

Then bbarr, on here, introduced me to virtue ethics (of which I have given a very sketchy version above). Ah! What I saw as a “problem” really isn’t a problem.

Now I just carry on pretty much as I suspect that you do.

Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Note that the fact that I personally don’t have any ‘moral’ concepts doesn’t in any way appear to effect how I behave so I don’t see why it should necessarily effect other people’s behaviour -if they had no ‘moral concepts‘, then they, just like I, would just accept that they want other people (and themselves) to behave kindly and fairly for subtle emotio ...[text shortened]... a “problem” really isn’t a problem.

Now I just carry on pretty much as I suspect that you do.

…If one accepts (which I at least unconsciously did) the NECESSITY of such well-defined moral principles—well then, my disgust is just not “enough”.
…[/b] (my emphasis)

I understand what you mean.
I think most human beings have an innate (and mainly unconscious?) predisposition to irrationally think it is somehow “necessary” to ‘justify’ the emotional disgust against, say, child torture, even though it isn’t logically “necessary” to ‘justify’ such disgust (nor any other emotion).
This naturally leads to the common dilution (‘dilution’ at least with my way of thinking) that our mere disgust of, say, child torture, is not “enough” hence the superstitious (‘superstitious’ at least with my way of thinking) concept of ‘morality’ is invented to ‘justify’ that disgust even though no ‘justification’ is actually required.

Rights are how many cultures (especially Western) describe what kinds of interactions between people are considered moral or immoral. It's a consensus of a society about right and wrong.

They may be absolute in the sense that our genes program us to feel a certain way but they have no physical reality. They are based on human conscience and sense of justice.