Originally posted by humy
[b"All 'scientific facts' can be validly viewed/defined as 'theories with proof they are true'."
All agreed?[/b]
Elizabeth Anscombe used say, "'Fact' is a weasel word. Is it a fact that it's easy to ride a horse?"
Don't be so sure anyone knows what a fact is, much less a 'scientific fact'.
I suppose you could say that it's a fact, or maybe a 'scientific fact,' that light bulbs go on when someone flips a switch, but there is hardly any theory which specifically addresses this case.
It's a fact that Goethe was one of the great minds of his or any generation, probably a genius. It's a fact the Ceasar conquered Gaul. But there is no theory which proves these things, and any putative theory which attempted to prove them would be ludicrous.
"Proof" in relation to an empirical hypothesis is not equivalent to proof in relation to a theorem of mathematics or logic or set theory. There is
evidence confirming or dis-confirming empirical hypotheses. Scientific truth is inherently revisable in light of future as-yet unseen evidence; a scientific theory may be said to be extremely well-established when the preponderance of evidence supports it and little or no credible evidence dis-confirms it. There may, however, be anomalies which suggest that the current best-available theory may not be complete (e.g., dark matter, dark energy). Proving a scientific theory
true must in any case be assumed to mean "the best available explanation, given the preponderance of evidence at hand" and distinguished from the proof of something like Pythagoras's theorem. There is no possible future evidence which could revise Pythagoras's theorem.
Evidence can be conclusive or even compelling in a court of law, for example: "guilt beyond a reasonable doubt," but the fact that the sun has risen every day for the last ten billion years is still no
proof that it
must rise tomorrow. It is
highly probable, but not
necessary, that it will rise again tomorrow. As soon as you uncouple necessity from proof, you haven't got a proof in the strong (logical/mathematical) sense anymore; you've got something colloquial.
If you are writing a book about statistics, colloquial usage is not clear and unambiguous enough. Be rigorous. I suggest you do some reading on the topic of induction, deduction, and probability.
PS You might want to do some reading on the following topics:
hard sciences/soft sciences
theoretical sciences/applied sciences
I think you will find that any simple definition of what science is, and for that matter of what of truth is, is bound to be inadequate/incomplete/misleading.