Originally posted by twhitehead No, I do not know what they mean and it would appear that you do not know either, hence my suggestion that a definition be given.
Moonbus specifically states that randomness "wouldn't be freewill--it would be caprice". That suggests that randomness is not a requirement in his understanding of 'free will' but it is in yours.
Lets stop the mind reading ...[text shortened]... d state your definition, and let them state theirs then we at least can communicate effectively.
Here's a definition of free will for you then: I wish for a some outcome, out of a number of outcomes, and bring it about independently of external constraints. On another day I might choose for another outcome. I will it. This is essentially Hume's position.
Originally posted by KazetNagorra Of course it may well be that the non-randomness of radioactive decay, if it is indeed not a truly random process, is beyond our capability to measure at this point.
Well yes, but that's true of any empirical result.
Originally posted by DeepThought Here's a definition of free will for you then: I wish for a some outcome, out of a number of outcomes, and bring it about independently of external constraints. On another day I might choose for another outcome. I will it. This is essentially Hume's position.
Would your own memories be considered 'external constraints'?
Would a fully deterministic brain mechanism not have free will?
Originally posted by twhitehead You cannot measure the exact position and velocity of an electron.
There is no such thing as "the exact position and velocity of an electron," so obviously one cannot measure it. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is simply a consequence of the formulation of quantum mechanics; wave functions live in a particular type of function space wherein the product of the variance of position and momentum cannot drop below a certain value.
Originally posted by DeepThought Well yes, but that's true of any empirical result.
Indeed. I therefore expect this matter to not be settled conclusively using empirical means although the occurrence of "true randomness" might be made more plausible in the future (by performing more precise measurements).
Originally posted by twhitehead Would your own memories be considered 'external constraints'?
Would a fully deterministic brain mechanism not have free will?
exactly.
Often the concept of 'free will' many people have is self-contradictory because it it taken to simultaneously mean BOTH the ability of someone to make a choice not determined by anything AND for that that same someone to determine his own choice. How can your choice be determined by self and yet not be determined? That is a contradiction. Talking about 'self determination' rather than 'free will' would make a bit more sense but, even with 'self determination', there are both conscious and unconscious outside influences on your choices you make.
Originally posted by KazetNagorra There is no such thing as "the exact position and velocity of an electron," so obviously one cannot measure it. The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is simply a consequence of the formulation of quantum mechanics; wave functions live in a particular type of function space wherein the product of the variance of position and momentum cannot drop below a certain value.
It would appear I was wrong. In my defence, the confusion appears to be common place.
Originally posted by twhitehead It would appear I was wrong. In my defence, the confusion appears to be common place.
Indeed - I think the confusion partially stems from the confusion physicists themselves had in the early days concerning the interpretations of the wave function.
Originally posted by KazetNagorra Of course it may well be that the non-randomness of radioactive decay, if it is indeed not a truly random process, is beyond our capability to measure at this point.
I think you are talking about "hidden variables". It seems that the possibility of local hidden variables has been ruled out (Bell's theorem).
And if there are non-local hidden variables, that seems to me to disprove reductionism!
Originally posted by apathist Free will is just volition.
Well then you have to define 'will'. Certainly nothing in the article in the OP really has any direct bearing on volition or lack thereof. It may have bearing on what types of 'will' may be possible.
Originally posted by apathist I think you are talking about "hidden variables". It seems that the possibility of [b]local hidden variables has been ruled out (Bell's theorem).
And if there are non-local hidden variables, that seems to me to disprove reductionism![/b]
I'm not talking about hidden variables. Bell's theorem rules out that (for instance) a particle has a definite momentum and position at the same time (as described by a hidden variable theory), but the absence of a definite momentum and position does not imply randomness.
Originally posted by twhitehead Well then you have to define 'will'. Certainly nothing in the article in the OP really has any direct bearing on volition or lack thereof. It may have bearing on what types of 'will' may be possible.
Volition is the act or an instance of making a conscious choice or decision.It is a voluntary decision. That's a standard type of definition.
More technically, volition (or will) is the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action. It is defined as purposive striving and is one of the primary human psychological functions.
That stuff is from wikipedia, but I see the same or similar wording in other standard, philosophy, and psychology dictionaries.
The definitions implicate some sort of top-down causation, don't they?
27 Mar '16 15:13
top-down causation
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