Spirituality
08 Jun 10
09 Jun 10
We should immediately institute a global eugenic program. Within a generation we could eliminate a whole host of unpleasant conditions, start selecting towards a true master-race and bring the global population down to a much more reasonable level. Anybody who resists should be painlessly terminated.
10 Jun 10
Originally posted by LemonJelloThanks.
This argument doesn't seem to flow very well. Let's say you even started with a stronger premise: say, that the infliction of harm is wrong and to be avoided at all costs. Then let's say you have a second premise that bringing a new person into existence will entail that at least some measure of harm results. How are we supposed to conclude from these ...[text shortened]... actually intending to achieve carries even greater reasons with more practical clout.
Benatar appears to espouse an utilitarian ethics that performs a cost-benefit (harm-benefit) analysis on the condition of being alive and finds an asymmetry in that the harm entailed by being alive will always outweigh the benefit.
I don't want to quibble over the accounting procedure (his book of over 200 pages deals exhaustively with potential defeaters) -- it's the basic principle I wish to scrutinize.
How valid is utilitarian cost-benefit analysis?
10 Jun 10
Originally posted by bbarrBenatar flatly states (through utilitarian moral calculus) that the harm of living always outweighs the benefit (because the condition of being alive is asymmetrical: living always entails harm but does not necessarily procure pleasure). Thus having children has the certain consequence of producing harm without the assurance of producing pleasure and is therefore unethical.
If you are interested in answering the question of the conditions under which it is reasonable to have a child, perhaps it is best to start with clear cases. Under what general conditions would it be clearly cruel, or callous, or egregiously self-absorbed to procreate? Harm may certainly have something to do with this, but it is extremely unlikely that that ...[text shortened]... y simple rule of the sort proposed would capture even some of our intuitions about such matters.
10 Jun 10
Originally posted by Bosse de NageThat simply doesn't make sense, even if the premise is correct.
Benatar flatly states (through utilitarian moral calculus) that the harm of living always outweighs the benefit (because the condition of being alive is asymmetrical: living always entails harm but does not necessarily procure pleasure).
I would go further and challenge the premise. Does living ever not procure pleasure? Does it always entail harm? I would challenge both as unsound.
10 Jun 10
2 edits
Originally posted by Bosse de NageI'm not sure I should comment without knowing more about the specifics of Benatar's argument. Just from the little bit you quoted to bbarr [you said Benatar flatly states "that the harm of living always outweighs the benefit (because the condition of being alive is asymmetrical: living always entails harm but does not necessarily procure pleasure)"], it does not sound like a very successful argument. That would be like saying the condition of playing the lottery is asymmetrical: playing always entails you cough up a buck but does not necessarily procure you money in return; so, the cost of playing the lottery always outweighs the benefit. But, in fact, some people win huge in the lottery. So I think something is wrong with this argument as is. Also, I would not think the sentiment "certain consequence of producing harm without the assurance of producing pleasure...is therefore unethical" jives well a general cost-benefit approach. For example, even if there is no strict guarantee of benefit, there can still be probability of benefit or even probability of overwhelming benefit or even overwhelming probability of overwhelming benefit (and even if the harm is inevitable, perhaps it is small in comparison to the potential benefit). So even in the absence of guarantee of benefit, can't the expected benefit still be attractive? I really don't get the argument as stated.
Thanks.
Benatar appears to espouse an utilitarian ethics that performs a cost-benefit (harm-benefit) analysis on the condition of being alive and finds an asymmetry in that the harm entailed by being alive will always outweigh the benefit.
I don't want to quibble over the accounting procedure (his book of over 200 pages deals exhaustively with p the basic principle I wish to scrutinize.
How valid is utilitarian cost-benefit analysis?
I'm guessing if we went into the specifics, Benatar's argument would have more force than this. But I honestly am not familiar with it, so I do not want to comment. Of course, you say you are interested in the general cost-benefit approach, not the specifics. I would say it is generally not the approach I would take, but honestly I do not want to give the impression that I would impugn its application in this case without knowing more about the details.
10 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by Bosse de NageWell, I don't think that is quite the claim being made in "Better to Not Have Been", or the earlier papers that informed the book. It isn't just straightforward utilitarianism, because Benatar thinks that there is some asymmetry between the goods and bads that can characterize a life. He would have to, lest the issue of whether to have a child turn just on adding up the probable goods and bads and deciding based on the sum. Then the issue of whether typical lives are overall bad would be a an empirical matter. Do most people think their lives were, overall, worth living? Suppose they say 'yes'. Then Benatar says, in the book, that they were deceived in their evaluations. So, another empirical matter, this one about our ability to evaluate our lives. But does Benatar have any evidence for this? I don't know, BDN, this just seems like bad philosophy to me. Start with some improbably simplistic account of what is good and bad, then add an equally simplistic deliberative procedure, and see what follows. Wow! Look at the really counterintuitive results! Well, of course the results are counterintuitive, because his premises are stupid.
Benatar flatly states (through utilitarian moral calculus) that the harm of living always outweighs the benefit (because the condition of being alive is asymmetrical: living always entails harm but does not necessarily procure pleasure). Thus having children has the certain consequence of producing harm without the assurance of producing pleasure and is therefore unethical.
10 Jun 10
Originally posted by bbarrI'm waiting for the book to arrive so I can read it with due diligence. The view I have put forward is doubtless a misrepresentation based on all the reviews I have been able to find, plus his responses to criticism. However it seems as though you have read BNTHBB, so may I ask: why are his premises stupid? (I found his premises, as reported, stupid, but could not adequately articulate my misgivings.)
Well, of course the results are counterintuitive, because his premises are stupid.
10 Jun 10
1 edit
Originally posted by LemonJelloI'd be content with your opinion on the worth of utilitarian ethics, leaving Benatar for another occasion.
I would say it is generally not the approach I would take, but honestly I do not want to give the impression that I would impugn its application in this case without knowing more about the details.
Oh, and what do you think of anti-natalism in general?
11 Jun 10
Originally posted by Bosse de NageI disagree. I think humans by nature are happy and kind - if they have sufficient resources, including human ones like parents, friends and educators.
To paraphrase David Benatar: the infliction of harm is generally morally wrong and therefore to be avoided; the birth of a new person always entails nontrivial harm to that person; therefore there exists a moral imperative not to procreate.
What do you think?