Aquinas gets his comeuppance?

Originally posted by vistesd
Ah, yes. But I too easily, lately, get lost among those dichotomized cabbages!

By the way, our friend bbarr knows where it’s at too. On here, he just plays in the “habitable role” of philosopher. He hasn’t always—or at least not so strictly (I’ve known him for some years here!)—but I think he came to the conclusion that that is the particular contribution he can make in this forum. Nevertheless, he can—

Lock eyebrows
with the lightning!

There are some things I can capture with words, and some things towards which I can gesture. Then there is the important stuff, about which I am silent. My biggest hope, regarding analytic philosophy, is that it can burn away the brush.

Originally posted by black beetle
I see😵

I think it's an Americanism--or else it's just something that my brother and I have done over the years with each other.... Be well, friend: I'm off for a bit.

Originally posted by bbarr
There are some things I can capture with words, and some things towards which I can gesture. Then there is the important stuff, about which I am silent. My biggest hope, regarding analytic philosophy, is that it can burn away the brush.

What time-zone am I in!? 🙂 I’ve got you in Seattle, and blackbeetle in Greece! (And me among them cabbages!)

But: Yep. I am not a philosopher (analytic or continental), and I have to get back to the poetry, perhaps in much the same way--the closer to a haiku-like expression, the sharper the spark. To clear my own mind.

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EDIT: Actually, it is the aesthetic realm that burns away the brush for me. Poetry, dance, music (sans lyrics)…

Originally posted by bbarr
There are some things I can capture with words, and some things towards which I can gesture. Then there is the important stuff, about which I am silent. My biggest hope, regarding analytic philosophy, is that it can burn away the brush.

As regards the analytic philosophy, I 'm looking for a way to go beyond catuskoti but until now I cannot find any. And everything beyond it, I cannot express it😵

Originally posted by vistesd
I think it's an Americanism--or else it's just something that my brother and I have done over the years with each other.... Be well, friend: I'm off for a bit.

In this case it's the latter; take care, my feer.
Namaste😵

Originally posted by vistesd
Any epistemology that treats concepts, which are decidedly not physical entities, as existent outside the mind, is absurd on its face.
Because I can conceive it, certainly does not mean that “it” exists—or, for that matter, is even necessarily coherent.

Concepts are mental formations that we form in our engagement with pre-conceptual reality. Such concepts may or may not reflect that reality—unicorns, for example.

Let me posit a dualist epistemology in contrast to your monistic one, and let's see which one makes most sense. I could spend lots of time paraphrasing it, but in the interest of saving time I'm just going to quote at length from Wolfgang Smith's The Quantum Enigma:

"To perceive the necessity of the hylomorphic conception one needs but to reflect upon the epistemological enigma: the problem of knowledge. We have maintained that the corporeal domain is known through sense perception and the physical through the modus operandi of scientific observation; but what does it mean "to know?" I have indicated that the process of knowing culminates invariably in an intellective act, but what is the nature of this act? Wherein does it consist?

"As Aristotle pointed out long ago, the act of knowing consists in a certain union of the intellect with its object. But how can the intellect be joined to the external thing? Such a union, clearly, can only be conceived in terms of a third entity or common element, which object and subject can both possess, each in its own appropriate mode; and it must be this tertium quid, precisely, that renders the object knowable.

"But only in part! For it is not, after all, the external object--lock, stock, and barrel--that "passes into the subject," but only what I have termed the tertium quid. This "third factor," moreover, answers to the question "What?": it is what we know. And yet it does not simply coincide with the object as such, for as just noted, the latter is perforce "more" than the tertium quid.

"Now the tertium quid, to be sure, is none other than the Aristotlian morphe, the form or quiddity of the existing thing. But inasmuch as the thing does not conicide with its morphe, one needs to postulate a second principle--an X, if you will--that distinguishes the two, or makes up the diference, so to speak. And this X--which is perforce unknowable and has no quiddity--is evidently tantamount to materia. One arrives thus, by way of epistemological considerations of a rather simple kind, at the basic conceptions of the hylomorphic paradigm.

"It is worth pointing out that the morphe or tertium quid needs likewise to be existentiated subjectively, which is to say, on a mental plane. It needs, as it were, to be clothed in mental images and thus, in a manner of speaking, "embodied." The human process of knowing is complex, as we have had ample occasion to note. But yet it is consummated in a single intellective act that is perfectly simple--and for this very reason eludes analysis. And it is here--in this enigmatic act--that the cognitive union takes place: that subject and object unite." (The Quantum Enigma, pp. 76-7.)

Note that nowhere in the above is God referenced, and yet from this base it is evident that to talk about anything, a dualistic epistemology is necessary. It seems to me that the only way to claim that this "doesn't really exist" is to deny the validity of language itself... in which case, why are you talking, or why should I trust you... or even myself? And doesn't that destroy science at the root? Science requires language, after all, just as any other communal human enterprise.

None of the above is to deny that there is a reality beyond what is experienced, that is in a sense more "real" than our experience, but that's just what Aquinas calls "God." Of course there's more than that to a proof, but that's the short of it. (And in this epistemology unicorns have forma, but no materia. )

The main divide between supernaturalist-dualists (theistic-dualists) and non-dualists is that the latter stop at the pre-conceptual—or at least acknowledge that anything subsequently spoken about it (as opposed to elicitive language that points to it—is just speculative. Even my (or anyone else’s) non-dualist metaphysics, even if it seems a more reasonable conceptual speculation.

Even non-speculative language requires an epistemology something like the one described by Smith above (regardless of whether you call the two principles involved forma and materia or yang and yin or some other pair of terms, as Smith points out further along in the same work). Even a Zen poet needs a tertium quid or two! Otherwise he association football mango tango red brush heathen fork James ocelot. (Well, it doesn't even rise to that level; it's more like uidosap idoj dklph802yu0n fdjiuj mdf l;fd kl;j - -jkfl;d jkl;ds.)

BTW: Part of the point of the “null hypothesis” is to point up the asymmetry in the arguments here. To put it crassly, the burden of proof—for good reason—is on the “alternative hypothesis”. I really have little need to construct a “proof” against the notion that there is a tiny unicorn in my refrigerator that only becomes observable when the door is closed… Whether there is epistemic warrant for dualistic-theism is another question. I am only a “strong atheist” with regard to certain concepts of “god”; though I am not convinced that there is any epistemic warrant for belief in the supernatural category that seems to underpin theistic dualism.

The apparent asymmetry disappears when we approach the question from the same level on both sides. Critiquing propositions that arise from a dualistic epistemology in an "experimental setup" assuming a monistic one hardly seems a fair starting point to me.

And dualism is tenable without direct reference to theism, as Smith demonstrates above.

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EDIT: Frankly, to present Aquinas (or Plato or Aristotle—or Epicurus or the Stoics or Sextus Empiricus, or&hellip😉 in terms that he/they “would have accepted” is quite beside the point, unless you want the discussion to be of the kind that Thomist scholars engage in, debating what the master “really meant”. Brilliant Aristotelian scholars disagree about the Aristotelian corpus (what, for example, is the “proper” translation of eudaimonia?). What Thomas means to you, however, and how that informs your beliefs—and how you think they are epistemically justified—that is what is important. And that is what you’re willing to subject to debate, or not.

The point I was trying to make was related to Nietzsche's below. To really test your own position, you have to phrase your opponent's arguments in the strongest possible terms--and to do so involves doing your best to understand them as their proponents do; otherwise you may end up building and demolishing straw men.

Suppose I were to decide to posit the “existentialism” (actually, the “circumstantialism” ) of Jose Ortega y Gassett (one of the few philosophers that I actually know quite well, at least in translation) as the deciding body of argument against Aquinas (and his “essence as existence” for God)? I actually spent a whole, largely sleepless, night pondering that as the best “strategy”—not in terms of “winning” a debate, but in terms of what I see as a strong philosophical alternative. Well, Ortega is not around to present “his” argument. All I can really do is present my argument in terms that are informed by Ortega—and giving proper due and recognition to the source.

That's a fair point. My form of most of these arguments is going to be slow in coming, though. I seem not to have as much time for reflection at my disposal as you do. I can understand if you find things moving too slowly for your taste.

(EDIT: hit the post-size limit again. The last part of my reply is in the next post.)

Originally posted by vistesd
Nietzsche once said something to the effect that having the courage mount an attack against one’s own convictions was more important that having the courage to defend one’s own convictions. That, to my mind, is really the only thing that makes these kinds of arguments (in the best sense of that word) on here engaging. I’m not interested in debating points. I am interested in arguments that make me rethink my position—whether it is strengthened or weakened as a result. And I no longer have time or patience for those who so cling to their convictions—for whatever reason—that they cannot take up Nietzsche’s gauntlet.

I think that story is in Beyond Good and Evil. Oddly, this is one thing Aquinas is known for (and something I strive for, but do not often attain): the ability to state his opponents' positions as well as or better than they could do it themselves.

I'm not interested in debating points as such either, but another saying of Nietzsche also applies here. Somewhere else (ISTR also in BG&E), he said, effectively, "If I make a schedule for myself in the morning, and follow it all day, the fact that I am following a schedule does not mean that my will is no longer free." I can consider all sorts of arguments at whatever level, but once I have considered and decided, I'm not bound to continually rehash the same things in the "internal forum," no matter how often I debate them, here or elsewhere. I have already considered and rejected many of the positions you and black beetle seem to be advocating; I see no need to go over what is old ground in my own mind. My inability here is not to grasp what you are saying; it's just that I've never had to put many of the conclusions I've reached in words with enough clarity to be comprehensible to others who may not share them (for which exercise I thank you, even if your participation is done 🙂 ).

Originally posted by pyxelated
Originally posted by vistesd
[b]Nietzsche once said something to the effect that having the courage mount an attack against one’s own convictions was more important that having the courage to defend one’s own convictions. That, to my mind, is really the only thing that makes these kinds of arguments (in the best sense of that word) on here t share them (for which exercise I thank you, even if your participation is done 🙂 ).

[/b]As a point of clarity: I am not a monist; I am a non-dualist. (To construe nondualism as strictly monism is a bit like construing Christianity as strictly evangelical Protestantism; nevertheless, some do use the terms interchangeably). That’s not an argument: I will simply apply Smith’s objection, as I understand it, to my own nondualistic stance.

I think Smith’s tertium quid applies within the Gestalt. “Gestaltic nondualism” is my (somewhat redundant) attempt to “decode” the generally culture-bound language of some of the systems. The explicate “figures”, as individually identifiable existents (and your point about forma and material is well-taken) arise from and in and of the implicate generative ground. But they are not separable from that ground. We only “see” (experience—and then are able to speak about) the figures against a ground. The figure may be singular (e.g., a tree) or collective (e.g., a forest); but as soon as one is aware of the singular tree, the forest becomes implicate ground; for the forest to be explicate figure, there must be some larger implicate ground. However, there is no ground vis-à-vis one can see (experience) the Whole; the Whole is, by definition boundless.

And that is where our everyday language, quite acceptable for conventional communication about the identifiable figures, it loses its ability to properly talk about the Whole (the figure/ground Gestalt) without positing a tertium quid. However, that limit of language (1) does not entail that there actually is a tertium quid; nor (2) reduce the usefulness of our language within the Gestalt—e.g., it does not prevent one from meaningfully expressing spatiality within the Whole, even though to say something like “outside the Whole” is absurd. Wittgenstein stressed that ordinary language becomes problematic when applied to metaphysical questions—in fact, confusion can easily arise when the terms of any one “language game” are applied to another.

Now, metaphysical dualism does not solve the problem: it just declares an end at one point further on. For, if there is any relationship (or, any information communicated) between “God” (to use that term for the “extra-universe” category) and the universe, there would have to be, on Smith’s analysis, another tertium quid. Metaphysical dualism simply banishes that by fiat (unless one wants to talk about an infinite chain); or, at least, dualistic theism banishes it by fiat—often with some discussion of the attributes of supernature that allow the dual categories to be identified without a tertium quid beyond god and the universe.

[Note: I think that is also an issue if one speaks of “multiple universes” rather than “manifold universes”.]

All of that can be expressed as well in the language of the gestalt. Most dualist-theists seem unwilling to posit either a “larger ground” or a tertium quid vis-à-vis which the supernatural-natural relationship can be comprehended without contradiction. I do not pretend, nor mean to imply, that my “implicate, generative ground” is any less a metaphysical speculation—but it, at the very least “multiplies” at least one less entity, one which I am still convinced is unnecessary.

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Re Nietzsche: You are absolutely correct. I no longer volunteer personal biographical stuff on here; nor do I debate it. I grew up Lutheran; I became Anglican; and was Christian until after the age of 40—and one who took it both seriously and studiously. Now as soon as I say that, there is generally a Christian who wants to either claim that I was never a “True Christian™” (or else I could never have left the fold), or wants to draw me into a debate about my reasons for leaving. So I have been, pretty rigorously for a layperson, on the other side of the dualist/nondualist divide. That, in fact, is the position that I challenged just as rigorously.

With that said, however, I think that there are nondualist streams within the Christian expressions as well (whether heterodox or not)—especially if one includes the, at the very least, panentheism of folks like Nyssa and, more so, Eckhart. [There is certainly a very, very strong nondualist stream within Judaism, where it is not heterodox at all (although Spinoza’s “pantheism” got him booted out; “pantheism” is another special case of nondualism that I do not hold), since it accords with the Shema.]

So, although I no longer call myself a Christian, nor any longer enter the intra-mural “lists” to debate Christianity with other Christians, I also do not call myself a Buddhist or a Taoist or a neo-Hasidic Reconstructionist (ala Rami Shapiro, etc.) or a … Sometimes I might use any of those as part of my personal spiritual aesthetics. So I am not “anti-Christian”. I am just a nondualist.

But, to quote Mr. Monk: "I might be wrong . . . but I don't think so." 😉

EDIT: My implicate/explicate language is unconventional (drawing from David Bohm's "implicate order" ); I should probably just use "implicit/explicit" in the future.

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Excellent discussion, for which I thank you! 🙂 I may well drop back in at some time, but, like you I guess, I am going to try to limit my time here. Be well!

LATE EDIT to the above post: Yes, I am in the same position as you in terms of having already considered and rejected some of the beliefs that you hold. I still find it useful to try to re-state my own from time to time, especially in the face of the kind of intelligent challenge that you offer. And I think that considering such an external challenge is also helpful: Aquinas may be right about the daily schedule (I think he is, depending on what kind of "free will" we're talking about); but I think that it is wise to re-examine the schedule from time to time, as long as one lives, so that one does not come to live (and think and believe) "by rote". Nevertheless, that does not mean (I agree with you here, too) that anyone need to perpetually respond to arguments from the other side, that one also now knows "by rote".

Let's call all this a "no fault" discussion; and, as I said, an excellent one for which I also thank you. Again: Be well.

Originally posted by pyxelated
Originally posted by vistesd
Any epistemology that treats concepts, which are decidedly not physical entities, as existent outside the mind, is absurd on its face.
[b]Because I can conceive it, certainly does not mean that “it” exists—or, for that matter, is even necessarily coherent.

Concepts are mental formations that we form in our ...[text shortened]... it again. The last part of my reply is in the next post.)

First things first. Kant understood knowledge as a set of reflections conceived in consciousness, which are evaluated and mutually related. So, how these reflections are born? According to Kant, they are born because of the power of the senses and of the power of the mind/awareness during our interaction with the physical world. Thanks to these reflections, these two forces recognize the properties of the objects that we perceive, and they transfer to our consciousness differ pieces of information regarding their properties. Therefore, Kant says that knowledge can be considered a set of pieces of information we gather thanks to our senses and our mind.
However, this approach was well known to the Greek philosophers: Plato describes in depth the genesis of knowledge as a holistic procedure that starts from the impact of the perceived physical objects on the basis of psyche and is fulfilled by means of conceptual perceptions that are described by means of language. Aristotle went further than his teacher and suggested that the starting point of knowledge is the effect of the perceived object on the perceiving force of the consciousness, which in turn brings up perceived icons (fantasies), which in turn trigger the awareness of the mind and thus the production of the concepts. So, Aristotle believes that the gathering of knowledge is a holistic procedure within Time, whose starting point lays in the genesis of perceived reflections within consciousness and gets its peak by means of the evaluation of the mind (noesis), from which all the concepts and the theories of reality arise.

Mind you, Aristotle’s “psyche” is not at all Aquinas’ (or Hinduism’s etc.) psyche, but an ontological (not a metaphysical) property of the human; if Aristotle was today alive, he would simply discard this notion and he would adopt in full the terms that are scientifically accepted as regards the function of the human senses and of the function of the brain/mind.

Back to Smith now. There is no similarity between a specific statement and the specific bit of reality to which the statement refers to; there is not, that is, an 1:1 correspondence between Language, the Three Worlds and the products of our interaction with these Worlds. Therefore our sentences cannot connect up with the world by means of a set of objectively existent structural similarities, and this is the case with Smith too, whose metaphysical approach as regards QM is widely rejected as a set of unjustified speculations. Smith, aware of the fact that he is too unable to provide a sufficiently substantial relation that would permit him to connect World and Language at a fundamental level, links thoughts not in the context of their causal relation but according an ill considered Aristotlean (in a Thomist, that is) approach. At your quoted post, Smith appears eager to promote his pseudo-Aristotlean, unjustified speculations and postulations based on his religious dogma, and this (you know the drill) is bad philosophy. And Smith’s thesis that you provided is easily debunked in full, as I will show you at my next post;

😵

Edit: “To perceive… …consist?”

There is no knowledge separated from perception, inference, recognition of likeness and testimony. These are the nature and the roots of knowledge, and they are dependent on the nature of the mind of the one who bears the knowledge.
Furthermore, Aristotle says clearly that the notion “I know” means “I know something by means of analyzing its causality”.


Edit: “As Aristotle… …object knowable.”

Not at all. And Smith appears a bit stranded. Aristotle never talked about “triton ti”, he just drove all the way down his unique concrete analysis discarding his teacher’s unjustified theology. It was Plato the one who mentioned it (Sophist: “Existence or reality must therefore be a triton ti (a tertium quid), apart from motion and rest, not the sum total of those two items.", and later Irenaeus used it as a basis for his theology etc. etc. Furthermore, since knowledge is related solely to perception, inference, recognition of likeness and testimony, the idea that “an unidentified third element that is in combination with two known ones” is clearly dismissed.


Edit: "But… …tertium quid.”

This is simply not tenable. Nothing “passes into the subject”. Smith’s understanding of the “object-subject” causal relation is based on faulty premises due to the fact that, for one, he perceives them as qualitatively distinct and independent objects and, for two, because he considers them independent and at the same time not independent of the cognizing mind, as it is implied by his using of “triton ti”. However “object-subject” causality can be related solely either from itself, or from other things, or from both themselves and other things, or from neither. Since none of the above four theses holds, the objects we interact with are causally produced, therefore: whenever an object involves a conceptually constructed property, then the object is conceptually constructed too. So, since the causal relation doesn’t exist independently from its own side, it is too conceptually construed. Construed solely by Us, that is, and not by Us and by “triton ti”.


Edit: "Now… …paradigm.”

Aristotle stated clearly (Meta ta Fysika, 1032b) that “…morphe is reality, and matter is potentiality”. According to his, the subjects of the seeming dualism “morphe-matter” are in clash because they have the same starting point but later on they are becoming different. Aristotle said that, during every being’s genesis, hence during the genesis of everything that adopts morphe, the being has as its basis a substance (matter) that, without it, its birth is impossible. To a living being, its morphe is its energy and matter is its active presence, its manifestation. Every being is morphe, and its reality is dependent to its matter; matter is the potentiality of morphe, and morphe is the ousia (susbstance), hence the fulfilled and fully manifested reality of the matter. So Aristotle simply said that the birth of any living being is the metavasis (transition) from the potentiality of its existence to its manifestation, to its active presence. Therefore morphe is not merely the shape but the power that provides the form of the being, hence it is nothing but a by-product of matter that is not yet manifested in form/ schema. It’s impossible, says Aristotle, to have morphe without matter, and at this point the seeming dualism regarding these properties of a living being is discarded (there is no such a thing as “mind” separated from “body”, there is just BodyMind in oneness). Smith’s conception is clearly irrelevant and alien to Aristotle’s approach, and it is also unjustified: his hylomorphic paradigm is purely metaphysical, so it is not a surprise it’s not accepted by the scientists..


Edit: "It is… …unite." (The Quantum Enigma, pp. 76-7.)

No. “Triton ti” is not existent.


Edit: “Note… …enterprise.”

No, a dualistic epistemology is not necessary at all. And, about the so called “validity of language”, you appear to have that ole idea of a “ready-made, created, objective world”! So kindly please tell me: are you aware of a single word that exists independently of the human interests and concerns? Language is a huge, as subjective as it gets structured pattern based on lesser subjective structured patterns (phrases, words etc.), and it’s all merely a product of our consensus that we are using for our convenience; by means of Language we are setting out to reflect everything we perceive during out interaction with the Three Worlds (the observer Universe, our inner world and the world of the ideas). So, what exact structure in the Language in whole or in its parts (words etc.) bares a structure that is intrinsic to something that is not strictly ascribed by us? I argue there is no such a structure. Therefore, the validity of the language is as conventional as it gets (as “language” I perceive and evaluate also Math and every other science).


Edit: “None… …no materia.”

There is no reality that can be perceived if it does not contain specific elements of reality, therefore what Aquinas calls “God” is not an observer but a product of his fantasy alone, brought up clearly on the basis of his blind religious beliefs. Unfortunately, Aquinas has nothing else.
And the so called “epistemology” you refer to, is not epistemology at all but theology that has to be accepted blindly as is, because the epistemic instruments you bring up are ill-considered and your epistemic objects -triton ti, God, unicorns- non-existent.


Edit: “Even… …jkfl;d jkl;ds.”

No. In the Zen realm of awareness too, every notion is understood according to a specific consensus, and it is used between people who are aware of this consensus. Of course, these people are aware of the fact that “their language” too is empty, so it’s only natural to them to freely override it.


I want to thank you for the opportunity you raised and the pleasure of such a conversation; keep it up and have a good time, my friend
😵

Originally posted by black beetle
First things first. Kant understood knowledge as a set of reflections conceived in consciousness, which are evaluated and mutually related. So, how these reflections are born? According to Kant, they are born because of the power of the senses and of the power of the mind/awareness during our interaction with the physical world. Thanks to these reflecti ...[text shortened]... s thesis that you provided is easily debunked in full, as I will show you at my next post;

😵

I'm not sure you have construed Kant correctly. He distinguishes between analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge, and a posteriori knowledge. The former types derive from our grasp of the content of concepts, not from any type of interaction between us and the world, the latter from our representations of the empirical world (not the physical world, if that is supposed to mean 'mind-independent). Kant eschewed talking about an sich reality; reality beyond our conceptualizations, because he thought that, by definition, we couldn't refer to such a reality. Our concepts of it would have no content. This is why Kant's view is considered a type of transcendental idealism, not just a species of empiricism.

Originally posted by black beetle
Edit: “To perceive… …consist?”

... [snip] ...

I want to thank you for the opportunity you raised and the pleasure of such a conversation; keep it up and have a good time, my friend
😵

Oh boy. Aristotle (in Greek, no less) and (shudder) Kant. I guess you'll be throwing German at me, too? 🙂 (Well, I have half a chance with that....)

Thanks for keeping this going. Answers will be forthcoming... but this is shaping up to be more of a 7/14 than 1/0 🙂

Originally posted by bbarr
I'm not sure you have construed Kant correctly. He distinguishes between analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge, and a posteriori knowledge. The former types derive from our grasp of the content of concepts, not from any type of interaction between us and the world, the latter from our representations of the empirical world (not the physical ...[text shortened]... nt's view is considered a type of transcendental idealism, not just a species of empiricism.

I agree.
But over here I wanted to construe his main thesis as it is depicted in his Critique, as regards the production of the pure mental concepts; he states that if the objects of the knowledge were irrelevant to the subject that knows and they were existing out there in separation from everything else and ready-made, it would be impossible to explain how exactly our evaluations can be indeed the ground of the potentiality for the achieving of the objective knowledge. Therefore, as regards the question how a gnostic (cognitive) subjective praxis implies objectivity to the epistemic objects, Kant states for one that the categories are conditions of the objectivity of knowledge and, for two, that the objective things are related to the subjective consciousness. Therefore, since objectivity is depended on conditions and that the nature as a whole cannot exist in separation of the conditions, Kant is sure that the sole way to achieve knowledge is the way to order (taxis) and to synthesis.
As regards the pure mental concepts per se, Kant says they are evaluated from two angles, matter and morphe. The cognitive concepts are related to empiricism, whilst the pure mental concepts in the realm of morphe are pro-empiricist (a priori elements of knowledge, hence categories). Going deeper to his analysis, he entered transcendental idealism, as you noted.
😵

Originally posted by pyxelated
Oh boy. Aristotle (in Greek, no less) and (shudder) Kant. I guess you'll be throwing German at me, too? 🙂 (Well, I have half a chance with that....)

Thanks for keeping this going. Answers will be forthcoming... but this is shaping up to be more of a 7/14 than 1/0 🙂

This is shaping up to be more of a 21/365 I reckon😵