Bbarr - Analyze This

Originally posted by Nemesio
Let's count the false analogies!

HA HA

jk

Shhh ... no1 might be reading this.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
No. That would be like saying that someone is malevolent for pointing out that if you don't drink [water], you get thirsty.

No, that would be like saying that someone is malevolent for pointing out that if you don't drink [water], you get thirsty, after having made the universe in which that rule held, when he could have made a universe without thirst in the first place.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
when he could have made a universe without thirst in the first place.

Who says he could've done that?

EDIT: I suppose he could've made a universe where no one had a choice about drinking, but this seems a better one to me.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Or like saying that a God who forces everyone to choose between worshipping him and suffering eternal torment is a benevolent one.

Except, of course, in the situation where worship of that God is the only possible conclusion. Meaning, not by threat of censure (or worse), but because anything less would be a lie.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
Who says he could've done that?

EDIT: I suppose he could've made a universe where no one had a choice about drinking, but this seems a better one to me.

Do people in hell ever want to leave?

Originally posted by Pawnokeyhole
Do people in hell ever want to leave?

In Christian theology - no.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
In Christian theology - no.

Then how can it be hell?

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
First, are Wagner's characterizations of the four theories of truth factually accurate, or does he mischaracterize them?

Additionally, is his analysis of the four theories correct or flawed? In particular, ought we reject subjectivisim and deflationary theory out of hand as he suggests?

In your professional opinion as an epistemologist, does W ...[text shortened]... ner know what the hell he is talking about? Would you allow him to guest lecture your classes?

Wagner’s mistakes are legion, and I don’t have time to address them all, but I’ll take the major ones in order:

First, subjectivism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, and multiculturalism are not epistemic terms at all (at least they are not offered in the literature as either theories of truth, or of knowledge, or of justification). There are pragmatist epistemic theories (e.g., P is true iff P would be assented to by an ideally rational agent under ideal epistemic conditions), but these are marginal positions in analytic philosophy and are absent from scientific practice or theories of scientific theory confirmation. The closest thing one finds to a “subjectivist” theory of truth is some pragmatist theory, but no pragmatist theory I’ve ever encountered has entailed that whether some P is true ends up a matter of taste opinion, because of the common inclusion of some variant of the two criteria mentioned above.

I’m unsure just what Wagner thinks deconstruction, postmodernism, and multiculturalism are, but even a cursory examination of the epistemology literature would disabuse him of the notion that these are endemic in the philosophical community, or are considered rival views of truth, knowledge or justification. Deconstructionism is, at bottom, a pluralistic view of textual interpretation; roughly that there are no privileged interpretations of texts. I guess if one takes this to entail that there is no true interpretation of a text, then one could take deconstructionism to entail skepticism within the domain of textual interpretation. Postmodernism is more a loose affiliation of sympathies and criticisms of the notion of objectivity (an orientation, really) then it is a philosophical view. That said, one could take postmodernism to entail that the correspondence theory of truth is incorrect (or, minimally, that we are never justified in claiming that our beliefs correspond to the world in the manner necessary for them to be true). Presumably, though, even the postmodernist would claim that consistency is a necessary condition for truth (whatever the term ‘true’ means according to postmodern theories). I have no idea why Wagner lumps multiculturalism together with these other views. Perhaps Wagner thinks that a commitment to the value of multiculturalism involves a commitment to the view that different cultural beliefs are all “equally true”. But this is a nonstandard view both among those in the academic community that value multicultural education and completely absent from the philosophical community.

It’s just plain false that pragmatism or skepticism has infected science.

Second, in addition to there being no “subjectivist” theory of truth, Wagner also seriously mischaracterizes deflationary theories of truth. Deflationary theories come in many varieties (e.g., disquotational theories, minimalist theories, no-theory theories, etc.). What these views have in common is not that they don’t think truth is a property, but that they don’t think that predicating ‘true’ of a proposition adds anything substantive to the proposition. Roughly, on these theories, ‘P’ is true iff P (e.g., ‘snow is white’ is true iff snow is white, to take Tarski’s famous example). Why Wagner thinks that this entails nihilism is beyond me. Normative claims are completely compatible with deflationary theories of truth (e.g., ‘We ought be compassionate’ is true iff we ought to be compassionate). Wagner seems to think that deflationary theories entail nihilism because they entail that no propositions are actually true. But this is false. Propositions are true, on the deflationary theory, if their propositional contents are the case. What the deflationary theory denies is that there is some mysterious sort of correspondence (or representation, or isomorphism, or description) that some propositions have to parts of the world and that secures the truth of those propositions. Wagner thinks that this entails nihilism because he is presupposing the truth of the correspondence theory.

I’ll write more later, but I have other work to do right now.

Originally posted by bbarr
Wagner’s mistakes are legion, and I don’t have time to address them all, but I’ll take the major ones in order:

First, subjectivism, deconstructionism, postmodernism, and multiculturalism are not epistemic terms at all (at least they are not offered in the literature as either theories of truth, or of knowledge, or of justification). There are pragmatist ...[text shortened]... of the correspondence theory.

I’ll write more later, but I have other work to do right now.

It’s just plain false that pragmatism or skepticism has infected science.
Unless you are using definitions of the two terms other than the philosophical definitions, I am curious to hear your justification for this one. With more rule than exception, science prefaces its findings in terms found on skepticisms' walls.

Originally posted by bbarr
Wagner’s mistakes are legion

It's just as I suspected. Just like every other CRISIS Magazine article that the resident Catholics have brought to the attention of the forums, it's factually and analytically garbage under any theory of truth except Catholicism.

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
[b]It’s just plain false that pragmatism or skepticism has infected science.
Unless you are using definitions of the two terms other than the philosophical definitions, I am curious to hear your justification for this one. With more rule than exception, science prefaces its findings in terms found on skepticisms' walls.[/b]

Describe your notion of skepticism. I imagine it means something quite different to you than it does to bbarr.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Describe your notion of skepticism. I imagine it means something quite different to you than it does to bbarr.

As stated, I assume from the position of philosophy, as that is the frame of his picture.

"In philosophy, skepticism refers more specifically to any one of several propositions. These include propositions about

1. the limitations of knowledge,
2. a method of obtaining knowledge through systematic doubt and continual testing,
3. the arbitrariness, relativity, or subjectivity of moral values,
4. a method of intellectual caution and suspended judgment..."

Originally posted by FreakyKBH
As stated, I assume from the position of philosophy, as that is the frame of his picture.

"In philosophy, skepticism refers more specifically to any one of several propositions. These include propositions about

1. the limitations of knowledge,
2. a method of obtaining knowledge through systematic doubt and continual testing,
3. the arbitrariness, ...[text shortened]... subjectivity of moral values,
4. a method of intellectual caution and suspended judgment..."

I guarantee you that what bbarr denotes by the term skepticism is not the disjunction of (1) through (4), or anything resembling that. I can't imagine how (3) even made the list.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
In Christian theology - no.

So it's a really bad place to be -- possibly the worst -- but they still don't want to leave?

Are they unaware of how bad it is to be there, or fully aware, or something in between?