Indeed it is. I should probably clarify first of all that the title of Bayesian Atheist is somewhat tongue in cheek. It refers to a conversation I had with bbarr and vistesd a while back in which I asked whether the use for Bayesian probability might offer cause for belief in things which could not be measured directly, but rather felt on some empathic or emotional level (I was giving vistesd's line of debate some attention that week) and if so, could there be such a creature as a Bayesian Atheist. RC, who had recently returned to the forums under his new username (chronic leaky) claimed to be the ghost of a Bayesian Atheist. I use the term now part in honour of RC and part because if there is to be any understanding of the conceptual world as opposed to the empirical one, a process of metaphysical probability would be nice.
Thus, when presented with the metaphysical concept of god, my credence in such a notion, based on conceptual frameworks and their credences rests in likelyhood of atheism.
Just when I was about to write a Nemesio-length whinge about not being called out, I find that terms are being used in honour of my (most likely) dead brother's memory. THe called-out have answered this call-out pretty well, but I might bake cookies for God in a while, too.
Originally posted by Starrman Indeed it is. I should probably clarify first of all that the title of Bayesian Atheist is somewhat tongue in cheek. It refers to a conversation I had with bbarr and vistesd a while back in which I asked whether the use for Bayesian probability might offer cause for belief in things which could not be measured directly, but rather felt on some empathic or ptual frameworks and their credences rests in likelyhood of atheism.
Part joke, part musing.
I still don't see how weak atheism can be something else than knife-edged in such a perspective.
Edit - And I do think along the lines of strength of belief as implicit assignment of probabilities. No joke.
Originally posted by Palynka In the sense that any form of evidence, no matter how small, should tip him towards either theism or strong atheism.
Consider this: You have to cross a mighty river. There are no bridges, but in two places, miles apart, the water is slow enough to swim through without fear of drowning. However, in the first place there is a 75% chance that you will get stung by jellyfish which will make you violently sick and in pain for weeks thereafter. In the second there is a 25% chance of bing eaten by a shark. Which do you choose?
Originally posted by Starrman Consider this: You have to cross a mighty river. There are no bridges, but in two places, miles apart, the water is slow enough to swim through without fear of drowning. However, in the first place there is a 75% chance that you will get stung by jellyfish which will make you violently sick and in pain for weeks thereafter. In the second there is a 25% chance of bing eaten by a shark. Which do you choose?
Jelly fish passage. I note that depends on how much I value the two events (being sick and dying).
Suppose you have a 99,9999% chance of being stung by the jellyfish and a 0,00001% change of being eaten by the shark. Which do you choose?
Note: A knife-edge situation would occur when the exact combination of probabilities leaves you indifferent. This is why it isn't very consistent as it's easy to "fall of the knife" on either side as more information is added.
Originally posted by Starrman Consider this: You have to cross a mighty river. There are no bridges, but in two places, miles apart, the water is slow enough to swim through without fear of drowning. However, in the first place there is a 75% chance that you will get stung by jellyfish which will make you violently sick and in pain for weeks thereafter. In the second there is a 25% chance of bing eaten by a shark. Which do you choose?
What if at point A there is a 75% chance of being eaten by a jelly fish and you have no idea whether there are sharks at point B?
What if you find the evidence for sharks at B 'unconvincing', even though 75% of the villagers at a nearby village swear that there are man eating sharks there and perform animal sacrifices to them on Sundays?
What if a number of highly respectable scientists have written articles in reputable magazines which state that a shark could not possibly live in that river (and no scientist has disputed these articles), even though 75% of the villagers at a nearby village swear that there are man eating sharks there and perform animal sacrifices to them on Sundays?
Originally posted by Palynka Jelly fish passage. I note that depends on how much I value the two events (being sick and dying).
Suppose you have a 99,9999% chance of being stung by the jellyfish and a 0,00001% change of being eaten by the shark. Which do you choose?
Note: A knife-edge situation would occur when the exact combination of probabilities leaves you indifferent. This is ...[text shortened]... consistent as it's easy to "fall of the knife" on either side as more information is added.
Personally I'd still go for jellyfish. My point is that the decision isn't a knife-edge one. In my example the resultant effects of the outcomes are more important in deciding than the odds of one or other. Why not so with the question of god? If the odds are close to the mid range, the resultant effects of choosing to believe in god may be enough to counter that choice. As with the river example, the stakes affect the decision as well as the probabilities.
Originally posted by twhitehead What if at point A there is a 75% chance of being eaten by a jelly fish and you have no idea whether there are sharks at point B?
What if you find the evidence for sharks at B 'unconvincing', even though 75% of the villagers at a nearby village swear that there are man eating sharks there and perform animal sacrifices to them on Sundays?
What if a numbe ...[text shortened]... swear that there are man eating sharks there and perform animal sacrifices to them on Sundays?
I think you're missing the point, whihc was simply that the decision isn't made purely on the probabilities, but on resultant effects of the choice.
Originally posted by Starrman Personally I'd still go for jellyfish. My point is that the decision isn't a knife-edge one. In my example the resultant effects of the outcomes are more important in deciding than the odds of one or other. Why not so with the question of god? If the odds are close to the mid range, the resultant effects of choosing to believe in god may be enough to cou ...[text shortened]... oice. As with the river example, the stakes affect the decision as well as the probabilities.
You risk your life everyday, when you drive, when you cross the street, when you go swimming in the ocean. It's all a question of probabilities and expected values.
Are the effects of believing in God really what's deterring you? I find that surprising.
Originally posted by Palynka You risk your life everyday, when you drive, when you cross the street, when you go swimming in the ocean. It's all a question of probabilities and expected values.
Are the effects of believing in God really what's deterring you? I find that surprising.
Ack, this is getting tangental again (and mostly my fault), my aim was to illustrate that it isn't a knife edge situation. Let me get back to the start. Beliefs are functions of probability. A choice to accept a belief however may be upheld on both the likelyhood of its occurrence and the stakes involved.
Dammit, I've just realised the problem; probability relies on a perfectly rational agent making rational decisions based on correct evidence. It doesn't take into account any preclusion to remain in a normative state unless sufficiently coerced, as I am suggesting.
I need more sleep, I can't even recall what I mean to say by the end of typing something.
Originally posted by Starrman Beliefs are functions of probability. A choice to accept a belief however may be upheld on both the likelyhood of its occurrence and the stakes involved.
At least now I see your objections about being knife-edged.
I'm not sure I agree about such considerations regarding beliefs. One cannot force himself to choose the most convenient belief through a rational decision, although that might happen subconsciously.
So I'm not so sure why the stakes involved matter in the formation of beliefs. One may also believe something and not act accordingly but that's another issue entirely.
Well Chronic Leaky might feel good about the goings on here, but I'm still equally lost about
how Bayesian calculations work generally and how they could be applied theologically.
Originally posted by Nemesio Well Chronic Leaky might feel good about the goings on here, but I'm still equally lost about
how Bayesian calculations work generally and how they could be applied theologically.
:'(
Nemesio
Do you want to do the cookie example?
Or are you struggling with the idea that the theorem expresses?
I followed some of the links from the Wikipedia article. The Prosecutor's Fallacy might be an interesting one to go over.
Calling Out Cribs and Starrman
03 Jul '07 11:30
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