Calling out Weak Atheists

Originally posted by Pawnokeyhole

It also seems to me that, to the extent that the commitment to P is strong, the expectation that P will increase, for reasons unrelated to evidence, so that the two come into alignment. To the extent that commitment to P is weak, expectations that P and beliefs in P can vary independently.

I think the first sentence is the idea behind the chosen working definition of belief. Analyzing whether those beliefs are justified boils down to determing whether the reasons that commitment and expectation are in accord are evidenciary.

I think the sencond sentence is false. I'd like to see an example demonstrating it.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung

I don't see how the conjunction of those four beliefs is a contradiction.

In my elaboration, I acknowledged that it wasn't.

Instead, I said the conjunction of the four propositions underlying the beliefs is a contradiction.

But no belief in a contradiction can ever be justified, because no contradiction is ever more likely true than false.

Thus, given several propositions that you justifiably believe, you cannot necessarily hold a justified belief in the conjunction of those propositions.

That is, given that you justifiably believe propositions A, B, and C, you are not entitled to claim that your belief of the proposition (A and B and C) is justified. This restriction is what I see as the flaw of the justification system under discussion.

Excellent topic Scrib - and very good insights too.

Weak atheists don't believe things in the absence of compelling evidence for their existence.

This seems to go beyond the claims of atheism by definition. It would appear to be the claim of the empiricist.

Would it be the case then that the "weak atheist" by your definition is a "empirical atheist" - someone who believes the sole source of knowledge is sensory experience - and has not "experienced" God?

The only evidence the "weak atheist" seems to be able to prove is his own existence.

Regarding contradictions: - one may claim to believe propositions that are contradictions (we all do to some extent) - but that is only to the extent that we do not understand the logical implications of the contradictory propositions - i.e. the exact contradiction has not been logically proven to us. But once one understands that two propositions are (or lead too) a logical contradiction - then we must reject one and accept the other - we can not believe both by definition of contradiction. Only one is logically true and the other is false.

Now maybe the weak atheist can not logically prove anything beyond his own existence. Therefore all propositions are possible. Then the belief in any proposition becomes a "leap of faith" - not based on logical proofs but inductive possibilities. Thus for the "weak atheist" the whole concept of belief is weak - it is NOT based on knowing the truth of any proposition, it is based on selecting propositions that are deemed more possible then others - or the belief only in the possibility of things.

Many theist also hold to the concept that what is true is only what can be experienced. Thus their concept of belief is just as weak as the "weak atheist." So the "weak theist" is in the same epistemological boat as the "weak atheist." They are simply looking in different directions (having different experiences). But neither can really justify any belief in any true propositions.

I just did a quick look for the meaning of the phrase "weak atheist" as I'd never heard it before this thread....

...and on "The Atheism Web" <http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/intro.html> I found this definition:

"Just lacking belief in Gods is often referred to as the 'weak atheist' position; whereas believing that gods do not (or cannot) exist is known as 'strong atheism'."

So, while the conversation on this thread is interesting, I think the phrase "weak atheist" has been given a very twisted treatment here...

Originally posted by echecero
I just did a quick look for the meaning of the phrase "weak atheist" as I'd never heard it before this thread....

...and on "The Atheism Web" <http://www.infidels.org/news/atheism/intro.html> I found this definition:

"Just lack ...[text shortened]... e "weak atheist" has been given a very twisted treatment here...

RWingett is the site's most outspoken Weak Atheist and he took no issue with the tenet that I stated. He would tell you that to be a Weak Atheist means something more than to lack a belief in God. For one, the Weak Atheist must "act as though" the claim of God's existence is false.

You'll note that one could both lack a belief in God and "act as though" the claim of God's existence is true. Such a person would meet your stated definition of a Weak Atheist, but not RWingett's.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I would like to engage in a brief epistemological exercise.

Weak atheists don't believe things in the absence of compelling evidence for their existence. So I ask them:

Are you conscious?
What evidence do you have for it?
Are other people conscious?
What evidence do you have for that?

If the evidence justifying your belief in your cons ...[text shortened]... of others' consciousness, as you have never experienced anybody else's consciousness?

Dr. S

If you should go to a priest and say: "I talk to God everynight."
The priest will answer: "Well done my son."
If you should go to the same priest and say: "God talks to me every night."
The priest will answer: "You need help my son."

Even priests will accept that if you hear God talking to you, you are in need of help.

When Moses came down off the mountain and said: "God spoke to me..."
Many a person in the crowd below said (the Roman Catholic church removed this from the scriptures though): "You are lying!" and "You are in need of help my son!"

If you don't hear God, you don't see God and you don't smell God you are healthy. If you do, then you need help.
It seems to me, weak and atheist as I am, that you are ill if you can sense God, then it doesn't make any sense believing in him, because that will just make me ill.

And it's better to be healthy when you're weak.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I would like to engage in a brief epistemological exercise.

Weak atheists don't believe things in the absence of compelling evidence for their existence. So I ask them:

Are you conscious?
What evidence do you have for it?
Are other people conscious?
What evidence do you have for that?

If the evidence justifying your belief in your cons ...[text shortened]... of others' consciousness, as you have never experienced anybody else's consciousness?

Dr. S

Maybe you've experienced what u think is an experience with god...
You sound like you've got a real bone to pick with aetheists;

Freud would read alot into your phrase 'weak aetheists' or are you implying that there are strong aetheists as well as weak?

Originally posted by Serendipity
Maybe you've experienced what u think is an experience with god...
You sound like you've got a real bone to pick with aetheists;

Freud would read alot into your phrase 'weak aetheists' or are you implying that there are strong aetheists as well as weak?

Yes, there are what is known as "strong" and "weak" atheists.

Strong atheists claim that god does not exist. They believe in the non-existence of god.

Weak atheists observe that since the theist has failed to provide any compelling evidence in his claim for god, that it cannot be believed. But as the reverse cannot be proven, they will not go so far as to claim that god does not exist.

You can view the many threads where the good Dr. and I have beaten this topic into the ground.

I suspect Dr. Scribbles is especially fond of using the term "weak atheism" because he interprets it as being a general slur on the position, with all the added connotations that the term "weak" carries with it. This is a tactic that is not lost upon atheists, who, for this reason, sometimes prefer to use the term "agnostic atheist" instead.

Originally posted by rwingett

I suspect Dr. Scribbles is especially fond of using the term "weak atheism" because he interprets it as being a general slur on the position, with all the added connotations that the term "weak" carries with it. This is a tactic that is not lost upon atheists, who, for this reason, sometimes prefer to use the term "agnostic atheist" instead.

No, I refer to Weak Atheism for accuracy. For my slurs on it, and on the alleged distinction between it and Strong Atheism, see my inventions Meek, Bleak, and Wrong Atheism.

Originally posted by Serendipity

You sound like you've got a real bone to pick with aetheists

I have only a specific bone to pick with a specific Weak Atheist regarding a subtle but important logical point of contention about his formulation of Weak Atheism. But alas, he and I agreed to a treaty, so until he breaks its terms, it will fester inside of me, with the rest of my bones.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
I don't make that claim. It's your error if you think what I do say entails that.

Proposition R: The ball is red.

I say:
Belief that the ball is not red is the same as to hold that "The Ball is red" is more likely false than true. (By def. of belief)
To hold that "The Ball is red" is more likely false than true is to hold that NOT ...[text shortened]... that either one makes this egregious error, and you cannot derive that claim from my analysis.

That is, given that you justifiably believe propositions A, B, and C, you are not entitled to claim that your belief of the proposition (A and B and C) is justified.

I don't agree. That belief is perfectly justified even in the light of the other justified beliefs. There is no inconsistency. Note that I am not saying that this belief is justified:

Mary believes that the ball is not red, nor green, nor blue, but that the ball is one of red, green, or blue.

This would be the belief that the conjunction of the propositions is justified if I understand correctly. No one is claiming this.

Are you saying that one cannot consistently believe the ball is not red, believe the ball is not blue, believe the ball is not green, and believe the ball is one of red, green or blue? All four beliefs simultaneously? Are you saying this is equivalent to the one belief in the conjunction of the four propositions? I think you agree that the two positions are not the same, yet you for some reason claim the weak atheist is inconsistent due to the inconsistency of the second position, which the weak atheist does not hold.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
[b]That is, given that you justifiably believe propositions A, B, and C, you are not entitled to claim that your belief of the proposition (A and B and C) is justified.

I don't agree. That belief is perfectly justified even in the light of the other justified beliefs. [/b]

No, it's not.

Define these propositions:
Proposition A: The ball is not red.
Proposition B: The ball is not blue.
Proposition C: The ball is not green.
Proposition D: The ball is one of red, blue, or green.
Proposition E: A and B and C and D

Do you agree that E is a logical contradiction? I hope you do. It is a contradiction because its truth table would have a value of false in all cases; no case could ever make E true.

Do you agree that belief in E cannot be justified? I hope you do. Since it is a contradiction, it cannot by definition be more likely true than false, and thus its belief cannot be justified.

Now, I'll assume you agree to those two points.

Suppose somebody's beliefs in the disjoint propositions A, B, C, and D are each justified. This person is justified in believing them severally but not jointly; severally by the supposition, but not jointly as proven above, since E is an unjustifiable belief.

Do you follow? If you do, then you should understand the flaw that I have been trying to point out. It is this: given any set of propositions in which you hold justified beliefs under your justification criterion (e.g. the set {A, B, C, D}), you cannot be sure that the conjunction of their underlying propositions (e.g. E) is not a contradiction. But this means that if you do in fact simultaneously believe everything that you believe, then you may be believing in a contradiction, as just illustrated -- and this belief is itself not justified under your criterion, the very criterion that yields the contradiction.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
No, it's not.

Define these propositions:
Proposition A: The ball is not red.
Proposition B: The ball is not blue.
Proposition C: The ball is not green.
Proposition D: The ball is one of red, blue, or green.
Proposition E: A and B and C and D

Do you agree that E is a logical contradiction? I hope you do. It is a contradiction becaus ...[text shortened]... s itself not justified under your criterion, the very criterion that yields the contradiction.

Yes, E is a logical contradiction. Belief in E cannot be justified.

Suppose somebody's beliefs in the disjoint propositions A, B, C, and D are each justified. This person is justified in believing them severally but not jointly; severally by the supposition, but not jointly as proven above, since E is an unjustifiable belief.

I don't know what you mean by "jointly".

Please explicitly answer this question:

Do you claim that to simultaneously believe A, B, C and D is equivalent to believing E? I claim that is not the case.

I would like to present a separate rebuttal of your justification criterion.

Suppose that there is a fourth black ball in the bag.

Define these Propositions:
A': The ball is not red.
B': The ball is not green.
C': The ball is not blue.
D': The ball is red, green or blue.
E': The ball is red, green, blue, or black.
F': A and B and C and D

As above, you should agree that F' is a contradiction.
By definition, belief in F' cannot be justified, since F' is a contradiction which can never be true.

Now comes the problem. You will agree that P(x and y) = P(x)*P(y) for independent propositions x and y. The question is, are A', B', C', and D' independent? If so then it follows from the rule of joint probability that F' is actually more likely true than false(*). But F' is a contradiction, so we know that A', B', C' and D' do not form an independent set - the likelihood of one's truth depends on the truth of the others.

Given that conclusion however, you are no longer free to hold justified beliefs in individual propositions that together form a non-independent set. That is, you cannot believe A', B', C', and D' severally, since you cannot both evaluate their probabilities independently and assert that each of those probabilities is accurate. That is, by believing A', you are making an estimation of A's likelihood and thus when evaluating B', you are required to make use of that likelihood. It follows that, given that you first believe D', you can never believe all of A', B', and C', because by the time you evaluate the third, you must hold that it is more likely false than true, since you have estimated that the others are more likely true than false. If you reject this, then you are claiming that A', B', and C' are independent, and must accept the conclusion that some contradictions, like F', are more likely to be true than false.

Dr. S

* Upon review, this is a mathematical error on my part. I'll need to refine the example to fit the argument.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung

Please explicitly answer this question:

Do you claim that to simultaneously believe A, B, C and D is equivalent to believing E? I claim that is not the case.

No, I do not. My assessment is that a justification criterion that finds justified belief in A, B, C and D but not (A and B and C and D) for any propositions A, B, C, and D is flawed.