Can your god lie?

Originally posted by Agerg

If not then he is not omnipotent.

If so is there proof?

[b]FAIL!

You are under the false assumption that lying is superior to truth and therefore more potent than the truth. The truth is always superior to falshood and thusly God being the Spirit of Truth in no way inhibits his perfection or power.
You misunderstand. Wolfgang is aski ...[text shortened]... means it cannot do EVERYTHING (that is logically permissible).

Thus it is not omnipotent.[/b]

Another interpretation is that if X is, and God says X is not, "X is" becomes false. X stops is-ing. This implies that God can change history. If at a previous time T1, X was, but at a later time T2, God says "at time T1, X was not," then history changes accordingly. This works if space-time is viewed as a canvas God is painting; he can go to any instant in space-time and change it, by utterance alone.

Yet another alternative is that God's uttering "X was not," when in the universe we are conscious of, X was, the universe we are conscious of instantly becomes the one where X was not. The multiverse comes to the rescue!

This of course means that God cannot NOT lie.

I wonder if God can irreversibly reduce or eliminate one of his abilities. If God sings the Oscar Meyer wiener song, what happens? Maybe that's a song God can't sing.🙂

Originally posted by JS357
Another interpretation is that if X is, and God says X is not, "X is" becomes false. X stops is-ing. This implies that God can change history. If at a previous time T1, X was, but at a later time T2, God says "at time T1, X was not," then history changes accordingly. This works if space-time is viewed as a canvas God is painting; he can go to any instant in sp sings the Oscar Meyer wiener song, what happens? Maybe that's a song God can't sing.🙂

I think in both interpretations it's important to specify which reference point we are interested in when we ask "can god lie?" I say that given a lie is the act of asserting information about X believed false (for some statement X) then we should be concerned about god's reference point.
In this case, whatever is the nature of it's own temporality,Reveal Hidden Contentif it delivers information it believes to be false about X without instantaneously making it true from it's own temporal perspective then regardless of how it repaints our own timeline then surely it has still lied!
It's a bit like someone asking me if I'm holding a tennis ball - if I'm holding one but believe I dropped it at precisely the instant I started to say "not" in "I am not" then you could argue I didn't lie. If I believe I haven't dropped it yet at that point then I did lie.

As for the last question, I don't see why this couldn't be the case (so long as we aren't suggesting it may be able to make itself not exist then will itself back into existence or something crazy like that!)

As for the "oscar mayer wiener song" if I've just listened to the right version of that song on youtube then if god ever decided to sing it, then we'd have to assume it's tanked up on God-beer and would always lie about this when sober 🙂

Originally posted by Agerg
I think in both interpretations it's important to specify which reference point we are interested in when we ask "can god lie?" I say that given a lie is the act of asserting information about X believed false (for some statement X) then we should be concerned about god's reference point.
In this case, whatever is the nature of it's own temporality,[hidden](s ...[text shortened]... it's tanked up on God-beer and would always lie about this when sober 🙂

You are right; if we God's lying is to say something God believes to be untrue before he speaks, -- but can make true in either of the ways I suggested, that is not lying as we understand it, and so God could not lie as we understand it. He'd try, and say drat, as soon as I told that so-called lie, it became the truth. That would be a result of God's power to utter things into truth.

Originally posted by JS357
You are right; if we God's lying is to say something God believes to be untrue before he speaks, -- but can make true in either of the ways I suggested, that is not lying as we understand it, and so God could not lie as we understand it. He'd try, and say drat, as soon as I told that so-called lie, it became the truth. That would be a result of God's power to utter things into truth.

I think if saying "drat" was an action that didn't occur simultaneously with conveying false information then we can validly claim it lied (at the very least from it's own perspective).
Also I think another question that remains in this scenario is whether this god is forced to alter timelines to prevent lies from occuring!? I see no reason why it should be!

Originally posted by Agerg
I think if saying "drat" was an action that didn't occur simultaneously with conveying false information then we can validly claim it lied (at the very least from it's own perspective).
Also I think another question that remains in this scenario is whether this god is forced to alter timelines to prevent lies from occuring!? I see no reason why it should be!

Right. This is beginning to sound like something that we'd see on Monty Python.

Originally posted by JS357
Right. This is beginning to sound like something that we'd see on Monty Python.

I think disregarding all the tiptoeing about hypothetical gods dwelling in multidimensional timespaces repainting human timelines to instantaneously usher in truth from our own perspectives where there would otherwise have been a conveyance of falsity and such (for now at least!), the essential part of this question is whether something can really stand as an immovable obstacle to some omnipotent god lying.

I see no way to logically deduce there is, and I simply haven't seen enough reason to assume it.

Originally posted by Agerg
My problem is the object you propose the theist should reference in "God can lie" is not the God they believe exists. Much theist illogic is built upon equivocating terms and conflating ideas. You are promoting this way of debating here.

My entry into this thread was an objection to your incomplete analogy seeking to legitimise the melding of two different m sorry but the theist doesn't get a free pass from me when it comes to blatant dishonesty.

My problem is the object you propose the theist should reference in "God can lie" is not the God they believe exists. Much theist illogic is built upon equivocating terms and conflating ideas. You are promoting this way of debating here.

You are deeply confused. I did not suggest anything of the sort. I explained this all in my last post.

My entry into this thread was an objection to your incomplete analogy seeking to legitimise the melding of two different and contrasting notions of God as and when the theist sees fit.

No, it wasn't. You came in challenging my explanation of the word 'can', requiring it to mean 'it is possible that', that there has to be, in your own words, 'a subset of a universal set' where God lies in order for us to claim that God can lie. I rejected that outright but explained, even if we took that line of interpretation, there is a possible solution -- that God in that set of worlds where he lies must be a different God. As I had said, this solution is problematic.

So, basically, I am really confused why you are now getting hung-up on an argument which I raised only later in the thread and which I acknowledged did not provide an ideal solution.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]My problem is the object you propose the theist should reference in "God can lie" is not the God they believe exists. Much theist illogic is built upon equivocating terms and conflating ideas. You are promoting this way of debating here.

You are deeply confused. I did not suggest anything of the sort. I explained this all in my last post.
ed only later in the thread and which I acknowledged did not provide an ideal solution.[/b]

Actually I came in challenging the structural parity between analogy and subject. I don't agree you've interpreted what I said correctly.

In response to (primarily the bolded part of):

I think there is an ambiguity in the word 'can': One is the dynamic sense ('it is within X's power to do Y); the other is the potential sense ('it is possible that X will do Y'😉. These however do not necessarily overlap. I can plough a field in the dynamic sense (I have the physical strength, the technical know-how and no disability which would prevent me from ploughing). However, I am not anywhere near arable land, have no access to the necessary equipment or, for that matter, have any reason to plough. In the potential sense of the word, I cannot at this moment plough.

I think this is the theist's solution to your argument here. The theist can reply that only the dynamic sense of the word is relevant to his theological vocabulary. By omnipotence, he only means that God has the requisite power and ability, just not the volition since God has an honest character. In one sense of the word, God can lie; in another sense of the word, he cannot. As creator and ultimate power over the universe, God could destroy earth; because, however, he is love and has promised salvation to mankind, it would be impossible for him to do so. Impossibility however does not necessarily challenge his omnipotence unless it entails that the action is outside his power.

I said:

One feature that is not conserved with your ploughing a field analogy when considering the question "Can your god lie" is it's universality. By that I mean that presently you lack access to facilities to perform such ploughing, but next year may be different. As such you've only identified a small subset of all the possible situations you will be in whilst you exist here on earth for which you lack the resources to plough fields...

By this, following the usage of "can" you decided upon, I meant for the arguably infinite set of situations you could find yourself in whilst you exist on earth; it isn't necessarily impossible for it to have a proper subset which itself contains all situations where you lack access to the resources to plough (in a dynamic sense).
For god on the other hand, for the infinite set of situations it could find itself in where it makes sense to ask "can god lie here in a dynamic sense?" the only subset of this set which contains all situations where it cannot is the entire set itself; i.e. there is no conceivable or potential situation this God (not a different form of this God) can lie in a dynamic sense. Structurally the analogies are different.

I'm not saying how one should define "can", I'm merely pointing out how your usage of it in your analogy does not match the original system.

A clarification post on both our parts later, you ignored my original contention and then took it upon yourself to recast the argument in terms of how "can" has different meanings, chide me on how I don't get to call the shots (because the theist has ultimate control (why!? because they have the right to determine how another person's question should be answered???)), and prior to suggesting I didn't acknowledge the numerous meanings of "can" myself, you set up a situation (which you deny in the post I'm responding to here) where "the entity the theist should reference in "God can lie" is not the God they believe exists." when you said:
the traditional answer is just to say that God can lie, just for that world in which God does lie, He just does not have a honest nature. The theist can frame it like this 'God can lie, provided that such a lying God would be of different nature'. I addressed this in a post above. - a different God!

and yes before you say it, I'm going over things you have acknowledged because you're now attacking my comprehension of what I and you have said - presently we are both not debating or adding anything interesting to this discussion.

Originally posted by Agerg
Actually I came in challenging the structural parity between analogy and subject. I don't agree you've interpreted what I said correctly.

In response to (primarily the bolded part of):
[quote]I think there is an ambiguity in the word 'can': One is the dynamic sense ('it is within X's power to do Y); the other is the potential sense ('it is possible that X ebating or adding anything interesting to this discussion.

I really have no idea what any of this means. However, you did say this in another post,

In this case there would be a real and unbreachable impediment to your ploughing such that for all intents and purposes you cannot plough. Or if you can plough, then you can plough just as much as my dog can speak german (if it had the correct anatomy and a desire to learn the language), i.e. cheapening what it means to say "one can"

This is the point I wanted to discuss. Basically you are saying that to say 'I can plough' requires some world, some conceivable arrangement of circumstances, where I do in fact plough, even if in reality those circumstances cannot present themselves. This is only the point I wanted to address.

I have no idea why you are suggesting that I think the theist has to invent some other God. My comment about this was quite tangential and as I said, I had no interest in discussing it further. What I am concerned with is whether a dynamic interpretation of 'can' entails a potential interpretation i.e. 'it is possible'. I don't believe it does.

Ok, I think I get your point about structural disparity between anaology and subject. While there can be some conceivable circumstances in which I might plough, there is no conceivable circumstances in which God can lie (granted, at least, that we do not admit the possibility that there are in fact conceivable circumstances i.e. when God has a different nature). But, there is always a difference between analogy and subject. For an analogy to be false, you have to show that the differences are quite significant. I don't believe here that they are. Under the dynamic definition of 'can', it is not because there is some set of worlds in which I plough that makes me able to claim that I can plough -- it is the fact that I at least have the ability, whether or not it is actually possible for me to plough (all arable land could be destroyed, for example). That's the point of analogy. The subject and analogy are not identical but the disparity is not enough to vitiate the worth of the analogy.

Originally posted by JS357
Another interpretation is that if X is, and God says X is not, "X is" becomes false. X stops is-ing. This implies that God can change history. If at a previous time T1, X was, but at a later time T2, God says "at time T1, X was not," then history changes accordingly. This works if space-time is viewed as a canvas God is painting; he can go to any instant in sp ...[text shortened]... sings the Oscar Meyer wiener song, what happens? Maybe that's a song God can't sing.🙂

Merely changing history so that, say, event E does not happen at time T, does not change the fact that E had occurred in a "previous" timeline. It would be tantamount to destroying an idea, which is impossible. I don't think God could destroy the integer 1 either, for example.

Perhaps a silly observation, but there it is...

Originally posted by Agerg

If not then he is not omnipotent.

If so is there proof?

[b]FAIL!

You are under the false assumption that lying is superior to truth and therefore more potent than the truth. The truth is always superior to falshood and thusly God being the Spirit of Truth in no way inhibits his perfection or power.
You misunderstand. wolfgang59 is as ...[text shortened]... means it cannot do EVERYTHING (that is logically permissible).

Thus it is not omnipotent.[/b]

I didn't misunderstand his point. My point is that his understanding of omnipotent is flawed. An all powerful being, an all knowing being and a being of perfection would not lie, as it is an inferior state. So then the question is: Can God exist in an inferior state? Or perhaps can God be less than perfection? No. That does not make God less than omnipotent.

Originally posted by Conrau K
I really have no idea what any of this means. However, you did say this in another post,

[quote]In this case there would be a real and unbreachable impediment to your ploughing such that for all intents and purposes you cannot plough. Or if you can plough, then you can plough just as much as my dog can speak german (if it had the correct anatomy and a d can' entails a potential interpretation i.e. 'it is possible'. I don't believe it does.

With the exception of a comment on your other post, I'm going to draw a line under the discussion that has taken place previously and concentrate on:

[quote]In this case there would be a real and unbreachable impediment to your ploughing such that for all intents and purposes you cannot plough. Or if you can plough, then you can plough just as much as my dog can speak german (if it had the correct anatomy and a desire to learn the language), i.e. cheapening what it means to say "one can"

This is the point I wanted to discuss. Basically you are saying that to say 'I can plough' requires some world, some conceivable arrangement of circumstances, where I do in fact plough, even if in reality those circumstances cannot present themselves. This is only the point I wanted to address. [/quote]
I don't think I'm saying that; I certainly divorce myself of "even if in reality those circumstances cannot present themselves".
I'm saying that to bear out the statement "Alice can do X" in a potential sense, there must be some sort of realisable situation Alice could find herself in with respect to her intelligence, physical build... (lets just say Alice's construct) such that she could bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense. If a permanent impediment exists, then she cannot do X.

God as many Christians view it cannot lie in a potential sense here because there is no situation in which it could lie in a dynamic sense. Sure, if it had a different nature it could, but then this sort of God wouldn't be the God Christians tend to believe in. Similarly my dog could speak german if it had a brain and voice box suited to this task - it would be a different "dog" though.

Originally posted by Conrau K
Ok, I think I get your point about structural disparity between anaology and subject. While there can be some conceivable circumstances in which I might plough, there is no conceivable circumstances in which God can lie (granted, at least, that we do not admit the possibility that there are in fact conceivable circumstances i.e. when God has a different nat alogy are not identical but the disparity is not enough to vitiate the worth of the analogy.

I argue the disparity is more significant than you give credit for. Firstly I'm not highlighting trivial aesthetic differences such as lying is not ploughing etc.. nor am I mentioning the lack of irrelevant structural elements such as god's power to do anything logically possible (omnipotence) vs the vastly smaller set of things you are capable of doing.
I'm highlighting the fact that your analogy featuring a person A who can potentially do X in a dynamic sense is used to support the assertion an entity B can do Y given it can never potentially do Y in a dynamic sense (unless we change its nature). The essential structural elements are not conserved (it is the lack of irrelevant structure that should give rise to disparity between analogy and subject).

Originally posted by Agerg
With the exception of a comment on your other post, I'm going to draw a line under the discussion that has taken place previously and concentrate on:

[quote]
[quote]In this case there would be a real and unbreachable impediment to your ploughing such that for all intents and purposes you cannot plough. Or if you can plough, then you can plough just as much brain and voice box suited to this task - it would be a different "dog" though.

I'm saying that to bear out the statement "Alice can do X" in a potential sense, there must be some sort of realisable situation Alice could find herself in with respect to her intelligence, physical build... (lets just say Alice's construct) such that she could bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense. If a permanent impediment exists, then she cannot do X.

I don't know what it means 'to bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense'. I think there is a confusion of terminology. We do not bring out things in a dynamic sense. 'Dynamic' just means 'relating to power or ability' (coming from the Greek, dynamis, 'power' or 'ability'.) Now this is a meaning quite different from potentiality.

Imagine this scene with a farmer with an assistant scrutinising a bunch of young men wanting to plough. He points to the first and asks 'Can he plough?' to which the assistant replies, 'No. He can't. He's not old enough to be allowed to plough' (this is is the permissive or deontic use of 'can'😉; he points to another and asks, 'Can he plough?' to which the assistant replies 'No. He has a football match today and can't but he will tomorrow' (potential); finally, the assistant comes to a scrawny young man and asks 'Can he plough?' to which the assistant replies 'No. He can't even lift the ploughshed' (dynamic).

Now in this example we see three quite standard but different meanings of 'can'. Obviously there is some overlap. If a person can plough in the potential sense, that obviously means they can plough in the dynamic sense. But it does not mean that if he can plough in the potential sense, he can plough in the permissive sense (perhaps he is underage) and I don't see why the dynamic sense should entail the potential. When the farmer asks the third man if he can plough, he is not asking 'is it possible that he will plough today?' He is surprised at the man's scrawniness and is simply enquiring about the man's physical strength. He would probably say 'Can he even plough?'

God as many Christians view it cannot lie in a potential sense here because there is no situation in which it could lie in a dynamic sense. Sure, if it had a different nature it could, but then this sort of God wouldn't be the God Christians tend to believe in. Similarly my dog could speak german if it had a brain and voice box suited to this task - it would be a different "dog" though.

Right. I don't disagree here. God cannot lie in the potential sense. It is impossible for him to lie given his immutably honest character. But I don't see why this should affect his omnipotence. The theist can just say 'Yes, but it is still in his power, which is what I see as the key requirement of omnipotence'. Perhaps this is more a problem for free will than it is for omnipotence.