Can your god lie?

Originally posted by Conrau K
I'm saying that to bear out the statement "Alice can do X" in a potential sense, there must be some sort of realisable situation Alice could find herself in with respect to her intelligence, physical build... (lets just say Alice's construct) such that she could bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense. If a permanent impediment exists, then she can oblem for free will than it is for omnipotence.

Yes, I'll put that down to bad phraseology on my part - in trying to emphasise which notion of can I refer to I paid insufficient attention to how the sentence reads. In "to bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense" I could have dropped "in a dynamic sense" and we would have still agreed we were discussing alice's power to do X.

As for lacking omnipotence, that was never my reason for joining this discussion but I think this may fall down to how one defines "omnipotent". I define it to be the power to do all things logically possible; and so as for whether a god defined to be honest should be excused from having to do something which logically contradicts it's character there may be some mileage. More importantly as for whether one is correct in defining a god in this fashion in the first place given there is no way for humans to validly deduce it must have this property (I have no problem imagining a lying god that says it is honest) is another matter. (One can use "God" cannot lie as a basis to deduce other things in the Bible should be true (in the belief this God exists), but they can't use it to deduce it can't lie)

I don't see why the dynamic sense should entail the potential. When the farmer asks the third man if he can plough, he is not asking 'is it possible that he will plough today?' He is surprised at the man's scrawniness and is simply enquiring about the man's physical strength. He would probably say 'Can he even plough?'
I keep editing and re-editing on this one, I'll get back to you on this later.

Originally posted by Agerg
Yes, I'll put that down to bad phraseology on my part - in trying to emphasise which notion of can I refer to I paid insufficient attention to how the sentence reads. In "to bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense" I could have dropped "in a dynamic sense" and we would have still agreed we were discussing alice's power to do X.

As for lacking omnipote ...[text shortened]... eep editing and re-editing on this one, I'll get back to you on this later.

Yes, I'll put that down to bad phraseology on my part - in trying to emphasise which notion of can I refer to I paid insufficient attention to how the sentence reads. In "to bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense" I could have dropped "in a dynamic sense" and we would have still agreed we were discussing alice's power to do X.

Fair enough. Debates like this are always complicated by difficult turns of phrase. Just holding you accountable for your words, as you should do for me.

I define it to be the power to do all things logically possible; and so as for whether a god defined to be honest should be excused from having to do something which logically contradicts it's character there may be some mileage.

Well, it's a definition I agree with. But again I disagree with your interpretation of the terms involved. To say 'God has the power to' does not seem to me to entail that 'God has the will or character to'. So there is no contradiction as I see it to say that God has the power to lie and also that God has an honest character. It would obviously be contradictory to say God has the will and character to lie yet has an honest nature. I guess it's the same problem as before, whether 'has the power to' entails 'it is possible that'. Obviously if that were the case, then we would confront a contradiction -- to say God has the power to lie would then entail that it is possible for God to lie, ultimately belying his honest character.

Originally posted by Conrau K
[b]Yes, I'll put that down to bad phraseology on my part - in trying to emphasise which notion of can I refer to I paid insufficient attention to how the sentence reads. In "to bring about the doing of X in a dynamic sense" I could have dropped "in a dynamic sense" and we would have still agreed we were discussing alice's power to do X.

Fair enough. ...[text shortened]... il that it is possible for God to lie, ultimately belying his honest character.[/b]

You're touching on a distinction between two kinds of possibility -- logical and nomological or a variant on the latter. Nomological possibility is "possibility under the actual laws of nature" (Wikipedia, also the Oxford Companion to Philosophy). Applying that to God, due to the actual "nature" of God as traditionally depicted, it is not nomologically possible that God would lie. But it is (arguably?) logically possible for God to have a different nature that allows for lies (it doesn't entail logical contradiction) so it is logically possible for God to lie.

Originally posted by JS357
You're touching on a distinction between two kinds of possibility -- logical and nomological or a variant on the latter. Nomological possibility is "possibility under the actual laws of nature" (Wikipedia, also the Oxford Companion to Philosophy). Applying that to God, due to the actual "nature" of God as traditionally depicted, it is not nomologically possibl ...[text shortened]... lies (it doesn't entail logical contradiction) so it is logically possible for God to lie.

No. I don't believe that is quite the distinction. I think the terms are quite appropriate as they are. God can do everything in the dynamic sense of the word 'can'; there are certain things God cannot do, in the potential sense of the word 'can'. Now whether those things are nomologically or logically impossible is a different matter.

Originally posted by Conrau K
No. I don't believe that is quite the distinction. I think the terms are quite appropriate as they are. God can do everything in the dynamic sense of the word 'can'; there are certain things God cannot do, in the potential sense of the word 'can'. Now whether those things are nomologically or logically impossible is a different matter.

I haven't found references in philosophy to dynamic possibility contrasted with potential possibility, but there are always opportunities to learn.

Originally posted by wolfgang59
If not then he is not omnipotent.

If so is there proof?

God told Adam and Eve they would die and they did after some 900 years, at least Adam lived that long. So i don't think God can lie. And if he did, in his point of view i would say he would call it not lying?

Originally posted by JS357
I haven't found references in philosophy to dynamic possibility contrasted with potential possibility, but there are always opportunities to learn.

No. This is semantics. These are semantic categories for modal verbs.

This isn't properly the domain of the philosopher. Philosophers are concerned with meaning but they do not generally describe the meanings of particular words in particular languages. That kind of data can be interesting and useful to the philosopher but it is unlikely to appear in a philosophy handbook.

Also, 'dynamic possibility' is not a term I used. I am in fact arguing that a dynamic interpretation of 'can' (i.e. 'has the power to'😉 does not entail possibility. 'Potential possibility' just sounds dangerously close to pleonasm. I have also discussed deontic 'can' and I think there may also be something called epistemic 'can' (which broadly covers both dynamic and potential.) You are free to add more because this is after all language and new meanings may arise for 'can'. There is no exhaustive list to be found in a philosophy textbook.