1. Standard memberAThousandYoung
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    09 Aug '07 00:35
    Originally posted by GregM
    Suppose Bob is created after the orange has been eaten, then.
    Then he didn't make the decision to eat the orange.
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    09 Aug '07 01:411 edit
    Originally posted by AThousandYoung
    Then he didn't make the decision to eat the orange.
    Didn't he? All his memories and feelings are consistent with having eaten the orange. There is an orange aftertaste in his mouth. There is an orange in his stomach. He clearly remembers putting the orange in his mouth, chewing it, and swallowing it. He clearly remembers choosing to eat the orange and why. If you say that Bob didn't choose to eat the orange, did Arthur really choose to do so? He's in exactly the same boat. Is Arthur the one who chose simply because his body and mind were the original and Bob's body and mind are copies. What if, at the instant we created Bob, we switched the location of Arthur and Bob? Then the result would be indistinguishable from if we had not switched them. So how can you say that Arthur is the "original" and Bob is the "copy" when the two are indistinguishable? I assert that they both chose, because saying that one did and the other did not doesn't make sense.
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    09 Aug '07 01:51
    Originally posted by darthmix
    Oh.

    Well, in order to say that, then we'd have to actually be saying that Bob is Arthur. If only one orange was eaten, and Arthur ate it, then whoever ate it must be Arthur also. There is no Bob; there is only Arthur, twice. Is that what you're saying?
    No, I'm saying Bob and Arthur are different people, and both of them freely chose to eat an orange, under exactly the same circumstances. They are two separate people who happen to have made the same choice, both of their own free will. In the future they are going to make different decisions (even if you are a determinist, because Bob starts out in a location several meters apart from Arthur) and thus clearly have separate minds. My contention is that it is possible to create a being that has free will and will freely choose to do exactly what you want it to do (or, in the case if Bob, has freely chosen that).

    Thus, if I am God, and I want to create a being that has free will but is also guaranteed to love me, I simply imagine a being with free will making the decision to love me and then, once the decision is made, I manifest the imagined being as a real one. This real being has free will, and, I assert, has freely chosen to love me.
  4. Standard memberAThousandYoung
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    09 Aug '07 03:09
    Originally posted by GregM
    Didn't he? All his memories and feelings are consistent with having eaten the orange. There is an orange aftertaste in his mouth. There is an orange in his stomach. He clearly remembers putting the orange in his mouth, chewing it, and swallowing it. He clearly remembers choosing to eat the orange and why. If you say that Bob didn't choose to eat the orange, di ...[text shortened]... they both chose, because saying that one did and the other did not doesn't make sense.
    He was created with those memories and sensations. He remembers events that did not occur.

    He also thinks his name is Arthur, not Bob.
  5. Standard memberAThousandYoung
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    09 Aug '07 03:09
    Originally posted by GregM
    No, I'm saying Bob and Arthur are different people, and both of them freely chose to eat an orange, under exactly the same circumstances. They are two separate people who happen to have made the same choice, both of their own free will. In the future they are going to make different decisions (even if you are a determinist, because Bob starts out in a l ...[text shortened]... eing as a real one. This real being has free will, and, I assert, has freely chosen to love me.
    But they aren't different, except for the name.
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    10 Aug '07 17:38
    Originally posted by GregM
    Suppose I have access to unimaginably powerful technologies and can perfectly replicate a human being, including its mind, so that that no difference can be seen between the original and the copy, not even in principle.

    Now suppose I am monitoring Arthur while he chooses whether to eat an apple or an orange. Once he makes the decision (orange), I copy him ...[text shortened]... is perfectly consistent with having chosen to eat an orange. So did he choose or didn't he?
    Could you clarify please? In this hypothetical are the original and the copy in fact identical, or are they just identical under observational scrutiny (perhaps ostensibly so)? Your post at points only seems to entail the latter, which is weaker and would, I think, lead to more complications.
  7. Standard memberknightmeister
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    10 Aug '07 17:51
    Originally posted by GregM
    No, I'm saying Bob and Arthur are different people, and both of them freely chose to eat an orange, under exactly the same circumstances. They are two separate people who happen to have made the same choice, both of their own free will. In the future they are going to make different decisions (even if you are a determinist, because Bob starts out in a l ...[text shortened]... eing as a real one. This real being has free will, and, I assert, has freely chosen to love me.
    My contention is that it is possible to create a being that has free will and will freely choose to do exactly what you want it to do (or, in the case if Bob, has freely chosen that).

    Thus, if I am God, and I want to create a being that has free will but is also guaranteed to love me, I simply imagine a being with free will making the decision to love me and then, once the decision is made, I manifest the imagined being as a real one. This real being has free will, and, I assert, has freely chosen to love me. GREG

    RESPONSE----

    But in the process of creating free will the guarantee goes out of the window. The whole point of free will is that it is possible for us to not love God. You might as well say that God just creates beings who blindly love him and add the token gesture of "free will". What kind of love would it be if we were robotically programmed to love? I contend it would not feel real at all but more like a sickly forced allegiance. The very spark of what makes us human would be taken away with such guarantees. It would be like the difference between watching WWF (which we know is staged) and a football match where there is no guarantees of victory. A choice to love has to be a real choice not a pseudo choice. Free will to really choose , nothing less nothing more --that's what gives real meaning to love because it's a real choice.

    One example of this is courage. Once one takes the fear out of a situation an act cannot be said to be courageous. There has to be an element of fear and the possibility that the courageous act did not have to be done for it to be truely courageous. Similarly faith is meaningless without it's sister doubt lurking in the shadows. Choosing God without the possibility of rejecting him is not choosing at all , it's just meat computers following a program.
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