21 May '08 04:06>1 edit
Originally posted by twhiteheadI know I am not explaining it in the way I see it in my mind.
My argument is new for me ans so probably has lots of holes in. But let me try it again.
First some comments:
1. If we observe a new phenomena in the universe, as scientists we do not immediately suggest the supernatural but instead assume it is a natural phenomena.
2. It is popular to suggest the supernatural when one believes that he knows the laws o broken by a supernatural even then it wasn't a law. So supernatural events cannot take place.
Man, I know the feeling! Let me just throw out some thoughts willy-nilly, and maybe they’ll stimulate your own thinking—
Your argument seems to be:
(1) A supernatural event is one that violates some natural law. [definition]
(2) A natural law cannot be violated. [by definition]
(3) Any actual violation of a perceived natural law means that it was not in fact a natural law. [by (2)]
—In which case, our understanding of that natural “law” must be reconsidered.
(4) Therefore, there is no such thing as a supernatural event.
This seems to me to reduce to:
(1) A supernatural event is one that violates what cannot be violated. [from (1) and (2) above]
(2) Therefore, there is no such thing as a supernatural event.
But, if that is the case, it is simply because you have defined “supernatural” in such a way that it entails a logical contradiction. That seems to be a bit of question-begging. Of course, it works—if the supernaturalist accepts your definition.
A supernaturalist, I suspect, would argue that, since nature is subject to supernature, natural “laws” can only be said to hold in the natural realm so long as the natural realm is not acted upon by the supernatural.
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And some random thoughts based on my prior post—
My focus was on the question of the supernatural communicating to the natural domain via events that, although they may appear to violate natural laws, are at least sufficiently “naturalized” that we can observe and analyze them. We are in agreement that such “weird” events are no reason to leap to a supernatural category.
Any purely supernatural event would not be observable at all by our natural faculties. Is this in line with your argument? I base it on the notion that a truly supernatural category would be “wholly other” to the natural order in which our perceptual apparati function. If such a supernatural category is not “wholly other”, then why call it supernatural at all, rather than simply an extension of the natural?
I have the sense that this is correct, but...
Therefore, for any observable event—no matter whether it seems to violate the natural order as we understand it thus far—there is already prima facie evidence that it is a natural event: which evidence is simply that it is observable to us.
This means that no purely supernatural event can ever be identified as such?
I think the key here may be the distinction between a supernatural domain (category) and the possibility of a purely supernatural event in the natural world. That is why—on my less strict definition of the supernatural (category)—I raise the communicability issue. To be clear, a Christian supernaturalist-theist, for example, is likely to admit (I think most do) that the “supernaturally revealed” scriptural texts are nevertheless “naturalized” in terms of language and accessible meaning. (Otherwise, we end up with SwissGambit’s bizarro language.)