14 Jun 07
Originally posted by dottewell...and so once again you prove that in a deterministic universe, things are determined. And what's more, this is incompatible with libertarian free will. DOTTY
...and so once again you prove that in a deterministic universe, things are determined. And what's more, this is incompatible with libertarian free will.
NO ONE IS DISPUTING THIS.
It's like watching the first five minutes of a lecture called "introduction to free will" over and over and over and over and over and over again.
...you do realise I don't believe the door 17 or 18 model myself don't you? I think the worm is in the door 18 model and we are not. THAT'S what makes us different , THAT'S what makes us morally responsible , THAT'S why we find door 18 models of human behaviour strange and uncomfortable , because somewhere deep inside we know it's bunk. And we can't live by it either.
14 Jun 07
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Originally posted by knightmeisterI'll pose as deterministic-universe guy, if you like.
All this I could live with if only one compatabilist would just accept and admit for one millisecond that in respect of being programmed to make certain choices we are no different from worms.
So I'll admit this: in an absolute/physical sense, we could not have made different (free) choices to the (free) choices we actually made.
Now you answer this: If choices I make, in a deterministic universe, are made accoding to good reasons and beliefs, with no external hindrance, why can they not truly be described as FREE choices? Even if, in some abstract physical sense, they could not have been otherwise?
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by twhiteheadi could have told you the two are not compatible, i dont think that takes any form of intelligence to work that out... i think knightmeister is saying a lot more than just that. maybe it is you who's missing it
The brain is programmed and you do have free will. knightmeister is claiming that the two are not compatible but is not getting very far with proving it.
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by eatmybishopWow! You understand what I am saying? Eatmybish have I found an oasis of clear thinking in this desert of a forum! You are spot on! Too b****y right I am saying a lot more than whitey realises , but then if he realised what I was saying he wouldn't be debating with me would he? Is it as clear to you as it is to me?
i could have told you the two are not compatible, i dont think that takes any form of intelligence to work that out... i think knightmeister is saying a lot more than just that. maybe it is you who's missing it
14 Jun 07
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Originally posted by knightmeisterA model is not an argument, and as Dottwell has pointed out, the presuppositions implicit in the model are question-begging. So, I'm giving you an opportunity to actually construct an argument that doesn't begin with the assumption that free will has to be libertarian or that it is a necessary condition for a choice to be actual that one could have chosen otherwise given identical conditions as the time of apparent choice. As has been pointed out many times before, these are assumptions compatibilists reject.
This argument is question-begging, since it presumes that free choices must be those where one could have done otherwise. Since compatibilists reject that claim, your argument is irrelevant to their position. Did I not specify that I was looking for a non-question-begging argument against compatibilism? Here, let's try this again:
Premise 1........ . You obviously have a problem with it but you are not going to say what it is are you?
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by dottewellQUOTE---
I'll pose as deterministic-universe guy, if you like.
So I'll admit this: in an absolute/physical sense, we could not have made different (free) choices to the (free) choices we actually made.
Now you answer this: If choices I make, in a deterministic universe, are made accoding to good reasons and beliefs, with no external hindrance, why can they no ...[text shortened]... as FREE choices? Even if, in some abstract physical sense, they could not have been otherwise?
Now you answer this: If choices I make, in a deterministic universe, are made accoding to good reasons and beliefs, with no external hindrance, why can they not truly be described as FREE choices? Even if, in some abstract physical sense, they could not have been otherwise?
RESPONSE--
Since you have chosen not to mock but debate instead I will respond in good faith. You have also had the guts to address the question , so fair play to you.
The choices you talk about cannot be fully free because they are determined. This so called "abstract physical sense" you talk about is not abstract at all in the slightest. If determinism is actually true (which I presume you think it might be) then in the real and tangible physical world the door 18 model must apply logically . Door 18 is the scientific reality and the subjective sense of being 'free' must logically be the abstract illusion. Notice that you labelled the PHYSICAL as abstract. What is abstract about an objective , scientific model of human choices based on everything we know about the deterministic universe?
If you describe determined choices as free choices then what language do you have left for my view of free choices? Super free choices? You have nicked the word 'free' . If I offer you a choice between A and A then what kind of choice is that ? It doesn't sound like you are free to choose anything other than A. You have to admit that there are levels of freedom , yes?
This freedom from external hinderance idea is no better at giving us truely free choices because we are under the dictates of our nervous systems . I see no reason to logically think that we are any more free than a worm . We make better choices , more informed choices and highly complex choices but free choices? Yes we will make choices that create more freedom and make us happier , but we are no more able to choose A over B than a worm is , we just subjectively 'feel' we are. We spend longer in the door 18 model than the worm but we are still in the same trap.
The fact that we are being driven by the internal structure of our brains rather than some external hinderance makes no difference . External forces or internal forces will insure that determinism has its way , so why does it matter ? If a man is prevented from a choice because he has brain cancer is that any less of a hinderance than a man with a gun? Both are results of the physical world. If you say to your computer "look I'm not going to threaten you or coerce you I want you to make a free choice here between these two subroutines" do you think it is more free than it was before ?
Now dotty , do you think there is only one possible and real life that you can ever lead in your future? Do you think your future is inevitable?
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by bbarrA model is an argument . It is a position expressed in a creative format that is often clearer and easier to argue around than all the philosobabble I hear around here. In any case I backed it up with some premises. What I really want to know is is this model a fair representation of what compatabilism is. You want me to play on your terms with all that philosophy speak so you can lose yourself (and
A model is not an argument, and as Dottwell has pointed out, the presuppositions implicit in the model are question-begging. So, I'm giving you an opportunity to actually construct an argument that doesn't begin with the assumption that free will has to be libertarian or that it is a necessary condition for a choice to be actual that one could have chosen oth ...[text shortened]... oice. As has been pointed out many times before, these are assumptions compatibilists reject.
me) in a tangle of words and rationalisations. If Brian Greene can express his theories with the model of a string then door 18 is good enough for me.
I accept your defintion of free will I just think that compatabilists have stolen the phrase from libertarians. You have stolen our totem pole from the village and left us nowhere to go . Or maybe I could call my version of free will 'super' free will? Yes , I will let you have the other phrase. Keep it. Super free will is even more free than free will because with super free will you ge to make responsible moral choices that are even more moral and responsible and choiceful because there really are two staircases. Not only that its much more consistent with our person experience of choice in that we are not a fatalistic animal by nature.
Maybe you will accept that super free will and determinism are NOT comnpatible , or would you like to steal it? The door 18 model is determinism but door 18 can never be super free will.
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by knightmeisterAn argument is a set of premises that, when taken together, support some proposition that is the argument's conclusion. Since models do not have premises or conclusions, they are not arguments. As has been pointed out, the premises you provided earlier were question-begging, since they presumed the very thing a compatibilist denies, that a necessary condition for a choice being free is that one could have chosen otherwise given identical conditions.
A model is an argument . It is a position expressed in a creative format that is often clearer and easier to argue around than all the philosobabble I hear around here. In any case I backed it up with some premises. What I really want to know is is this model a fair representation of what compatabilism is. You want me to play on your terms with all tha ...[text shortened]... u like to steal it? The door 18 model is determinism but door 18 can never be super free will.
14 Jun 07
Originally posted by bbarrSince models do not have premises or conclusions,
An argument is a set of premises that, when taken together, support some proposition that is the argument's conclusion. Since models do not have premises or conclusions, they are not arguments. As has been pointed out, the premises you provided earlier were question-begging, since they presumed the very thing a compatibilist denies, that a necessary condition for a choice being free is that one could have chosen otherwise given identical conditions.
...rubbish ! Any model has to be based on some argument or way of looking at the world. The model itself is a conclusion as well. The big bang model is a scientific statement and a conclusion of a series of premises. Even if I accept that a model is not an argument it's still well within your grasp to say how accurate /inaccurate you think my model is. I know you can do this . It's not rocket science.
15 Jun 07
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If door 17 was the only one that had a stairway, so what. The guy in the room still had the choice to do whatever he wanted to. He could have opened the door just to let the breeze in. He could have opened all of the doors, ripped them of their hinges, run up the stairs and smashed the glass ceiling. He could have squashed the worm. He could have slowly over a period of time picked at the mortar in the brick wall with one of the screws he found in the door hinges.
15 Jun 07
Originally posted by knightmeisterI'll just post this again, since I guess you didn't read it:
Since models do not have premises or conclusions,
...rubbish ! Any model has to be based on some argument or way of looking at the world. The model itself is a conclusion as well. The big bang model is a scientific statement and a conclusion of a series of premises. Even if I accept that a model is not an argument it's still well within your grasp t ...[text shortened]... accurate /inaccurate you think my model is. I know you can do this . It's not rocket science.
As has been pointed out, the premises you provided earlier were question-begging, since they presumed the very thing a compatibilist denies, that a necessary condition for a choice being free is that one could have chosen otherwise given identical conditions.
This applies to the model as well.
15 Jun 07
Originally posted by knightmeisterGod, what a load of goo. You're tiresome.
Premise 1 - The door 17 model is a correct representation of human and animal behaviour under determinism.
Premise 2- In the door 17 model a worm may make different choices than a human but looked at from outside has no less freedom of will than a human. The human makes different selections and spends more time in the room but essentially only has ...[text shortened]... ing? How can one then criticise a theist for being committed to an "illusion" that God exists?
Worms aren't capable of making choices. They are not capable of acting from reason, and their movements and behaviors are not indicative of evaluative commitments.
Interestingly, this side show about worms is more relevant to your conception of freedom, genius. According to your conception, when one chooses freely, it thereby must not be the case that he/she acted from sufficient reason. And under your view, it is very hard to say that the content of the willing is indicative of...well, really anything at all, given that your view entails that "free" willings are metaphysically random and arbitrary. In short, your crap about worms bears no relevance to a compatibilist account such as mine; but it does bear some altogether sad similarities to your view.
-----------
By the way, you're just begging the question with, e.g., Premises 2 and 3.
15 Jun 07
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Originally posted by knightmeisterSince you have chosen not to mock but debate instead I will respond in good faith. You have also had the guts to address the question , so fair play to you.
blah
People have been trying to make this point all along.
The choices you talk about cannot be fully free because they are determined.
STOP. Once again, you are assuming something that needs to be shown. I say the type of freedom you are talking about here doesn't and cannot exist. However I say that doesn't matter, because when we talk of actions being "free" we just mean they are in accordance with my reasons and beliefs, etc, will no external hindrance. You have to show WHY this conception of freedom is inadequate. You can't just babble on about "full freedom" - you have to show it exists.
not abstract at all in the slightest
It is abstract as far as I am concerned, since I say an act is free if it is unhindered by outside circumstance (gun to the head or whatever) and not free if it is not. To me, the fact the world (including me) ultimately operates according to deterministic laws is an abstract point. The question of "free will" is to do with the circumstances in which I make a choice.
If you describe determined choices as free choices then what language do you have left for my view of free choices?
Well, I'd call your view "libertarian free will". I can describe it, but since it doesn't exist, it doesn't really concern me.
If I offer you a choice between A and A then what kind of choice is that? It doesn't sound like you are free to choose anything other than A.
No - I am free to choose, since "free" choosing is simply going through a reasoning process, unhindered, and coming to a conclusion. That's ALL it is.
You have to admit that there are levels of freedom , yes?
No, there is the freedom we actually have and the freedom you want us to have, but which sadly doesn't exist. They are not "levels" of freedom. They are quite different concepts of freedom.
I see no reason to logically think that we are any more free than a worm . We make better choices , more informed choices and highly complex choices but free choices?
The conception of free will I've put forward for a human simply cannot be applied to a worm - it lacks the capacity for reason and belief. (Just as an aside, even a worm's "choices" can be more or less "free", I guess; you could set up a worm-farm that forced the worm to tunnel in a particular direction.)
no more able to choose A over B than a worm is
Yes we are - at least according to my view of what a choice is. On your view of what a choice is, we are not. So this is yet another of you simply STATING your view, as ASSUMING it is correct. It is not ARGUING FOR you view.
If a man is prevented from a choice because he has brain cancer is that any less of a hinderance than a man with a gun? Both are results of the physical world.
Yes, and both could prevent a choice being meaningfully "free". So what?
If you say to your computer "look I'm not going to threaten you or coerce you I want you to make a free choice here between these two subroutines" do you think it is more free than it was before ?
Your computer is not a human being. It may say that in the manual.
Now dotty , do you think there is only one possible and real life that you can ever lead in your future? Do you think your future is inevitable?
Yes, in some sense. But it will be the future that I choose.
15 Jun 07
Originally posted by knightmeisterI not only admit it for one millisecond but have maintained it throughout all the threads you have started on the subject. So can you live with it?
All this I could live with if only one compatabilist would just accept and admit for one millisecond that in respect of being programmed to make certain choices we are no different from worms.
My understanding of the position of most of your opponents is this:
A free choice is one in which the choice is not completely determined by an influence external to the entity making the choice. ie a different entity (with a different program) but in the same situation (identical inputs) could make a different choice. I believe this can be applied to any program even a one line computer program.(eg if x>y goto 20)
I think that the main reason why everyone is saying that a worm (or a typical simple program) does not have free will is not because of the 'free' but because of the 'will'. Your will is the sum of your desires. You only have a will if when presented with a choice you can deliberate and take your desires into account before making a choice. bbar takes it further and insists that the entity in question must have consciousness and be aware that other entities are conscious.
So:
1. a conscious entity A is presented with a choice and it deliberates and an
answer results. Lets say door 17.
2. another conscious entity B with different programming is presented with the same situation and makes a choice.
3. if conscious entity B could never make any choice other than door 17 then it does not have free will. ie it is constrained by its environment (all other doors are bricked up).
4. if conscious entity B is able to choose door 8 then both entities made a free choice.
Was it an example of free will? I think so, but I am not certain if bbar would say so as he may require that a free will choice is a choice that takes either desires or morals into account whereas your 20 door example might have just been a random choice with no real 'will' involved.
3. If
15 Jun 07
Originally posted by dottewellIt is abstract as far as I am concerned, since I say an act is free if it is unhindered by outside circumstance (gun to the head or whatever) and not free if it is not. To me, the fact the world (including me) ultimately operates according to deterministic laws is an abstract point. The question of "free will" is to do with the circumstances in which I make a choice. DOTTY
[b]Since you have chosen not to mock but debate instead I will respond in good faith. You have also had the guts to address the question , so fair play to you.
People have been trying to make this point all along.
The choices you talk about cannot be fully free because they are determined.
STOP. Once again, you are assuming something th ...[text shortened]...
Yes, in some sense. But it will be the future that I choose.[/b]
But surely the whole free will debate is far deeper than that . Do you think the whole world of philosophy has been debating about whether guns are being held to peoples heads or not. ?