Dread of death

Originally posted by dottewell
My argument requires only that my death is, in fact, an event. I'd be sceptical of any philosophy that suggests (as you seem to be doing here) that if I do not experience my death from all sides, as it were(i.e. before, during, after) then it doesn't count as an event.

It may be a relative comfort to learn that your unwanted lobotomy will be pain ...[text shortened]... less fearful. (Let's say the lobotomy in question removes your self-consciousness entirely).

I'd settle for an experience of any side of death. I'm just not sure what you consider to be the event taking place, can you detail it?

For a moment lets consider that I do fear death, what might it be about death that I fear and why?

Originally posted by dottewell
My argument requires only that my death is, in fact, an event. I'd be sceptical of any philosophy that suggests (as you seem to be doing here) that if I do not experience my death from all sides, as it were(i.e. before, during, after) then it doesn't count as an event.

It may be a relative comfort to learn that your unwanted lobotomy will be pain ...[text shortened]... less fearful. (Let's say the lobotomy in question removes your self-consciousness entirely).

Are you saying that you fear the event itself not just the loss of life and all it entails?

Suppose you were given a chance to dies and then be brought back to life in say three days. Would you still be afraid? I don't think I would -one of the reasons I find it hard to understand some of the claims about Jesus' death. If he knew he would rise again, then he shouldn't have been that worried.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Are you saying that you fear the event itself not just the loss of life and all it entails?

Suppose you were given a chance to dies and then be brought back to life in say three days. Would you still be afraid? I don't think I would -one of the reasons I find it hard to understand some of the claims about Jesus' death. If he knew he would rise again, then he shouldn't have been that worried.

No, I'm certainly not saying that. I'm saying death is an event which entails a great loss.

Originally posted by Starrman
I'd settle for an experience of any side of death. I'm just not sure what you consider to be the event taking place, can you detail it?

For a moment lets consider that I do fear death, what might it be about death that I fear and why?

Death is a physical event, but one which entails a great loss. One does not need to experience this loss for it to be real, or - given that one knows it will happen - to fear it. I have something now; I know now that I will not have it at some point in the future. It is a justified expectation of something negative happening; that leads to fear (or more exactly, dread).

(It is surely not, generally, a necessary condition of my losing something that I experience that loss).

Again, it is not a fear of the event itself, of the moment of death, since this moment is generally unknown, and the event itself fleeting; it is a general dread caused by the inescapable knowledge that at some point we will lose something precious.

Originally posted by dottewell
Again, it is not a fear of the event itself, of the moment of death, since this moment is generally unknown, and the event itself fleeting; it is a general dread caused by the inescapable knowledge that at some point we will lose something precious.

Two thought experiments:
Suppose that you are told that at some indeterminate point in the future you will be whisked away from where you are and live out the rest of your life on another continent with no opportunity to ever communicate with anyone you currently know. Would you fear that loss too? As much?

Suppose that you are told that death includes some part of you, not including your consciousness or memory going to some other plane of existence (heaven). Would you be consoled in any way?

Originally posted by twhitehead
Two thought experiments:
Suppose that you are told that at some indeterminate point in the future you will be whisked away from where you are and live out the rest of your life on another continent with no opportunity to ever communicate with anyone you currently know. Would you fear that loss too? As much?

Suppose that you are told that death include ...[text shortened]... ess or memory going to some other plane of existence (heaven). Would you be consoled in any way?

a) Yes, but not as much
b) I don't know; I suppose, but can make little sense of the proposition

Originally posted by dottewell
a) Yes, but not as much
b) I don't know; I suppose, but can make little sense of the proposition

So even if you became a theist, you would still fear death because:
1. Some theists believe that going to heaven is almost equivalent to moving to another country except possibly the guarantee of 40 virgins for your personal pleasure etc at your destination.
2. Other theists - the ones willing to discuss the soul concept with me so far - believe in some incomprehensible proposition and thus you would basically have to fear the unknown.

Originally posted by dottewell
Well, this is one reason I didn't use the word "fear", but "dread". What is upsetting is not so much the thought of one's death, but the knowledge (now) that this death is inevitable, and of what will be lost. It can seem like _everything_ will be lost; I think personally the temptation is to fall into a "first-person" way of looking at things (i.e. from m ...[text shortened]... o look at things from a "third-person" point of view (I am but one of billions, etc.).

Responding to a number of posts—

Thinking of dying as event makes a lot more sense (to me) than thinking of it (”death&rdquo😉 as some kind of state, even a state of “nothingness”, whatever that is.

If, after the event of dying, there is no I to experience anything, it seems to me that Starrman’s argument is correct. However, even though I do not fear dying per se, the conditions of dying, I may well fear.

I don’t know exactly what you mean by “dread.” If I can relate that to a feeling of, say, the inescapable tragic, I might agree with you.

Originally posted by vistesd
Responding to a number of posts—

Thinking of dying as event makes a lot more sense (to me) than thinking of it (”death&rdquo😉 as some kind of state, even a state of “nothingness”, whatever that is.

If, after the event of dying, there is no I to experience anything, it seems to me that Starrman’s argument is correct. [b]However, e ...[text shortened]... ad.” If I can relate that to a feeling of, say, the inescapable tragic, I might agree with you.[/b]

But the issue here is actually if you can fear the possibility of losing something, in this case life. If you fear losing your life, then necessarily you fear death.

To argue for not fearing death one must be indifferent between the state of living and non-living (or preferring the latter).

Originally posted by josephw
[b]"The fact that I am going to die leads me to try to live as richly and well as I can now, in what I call the simple bliss of being."

I question the premise of the idea that death should be a motive for trying to live as richly a life as one can while one is alive. I would rather think that living and life would be a better motive. While death is bo ...[text shortened]... that death brings the end of life, then the way one lives now is brought into question.[/b]

I question the premise of the idea that death should be a motive for trying to live as richly a life as one can while one is alive. I would rather think that living and life would be a better motive.

The point is well-taken. However, realization of the fact that the symphony will end leads me to focus on the symphony while it is being played, rather than allowing my mind wander to other things, since I cannot listen to it after it ends (this particular performance, anyway).

[Note: I fully understand people for whom the symphony may be so painful, that they wish it to end. Been real close to that, but decided not.]

"Faith is the substance of things hoped for, and the EVIDENCE of things not seen."

First, you and I have disagreed before about whether or not faith remains faith in the face of certainty. Faith is generally defined in terms of trust or confidence (and that is the meaning of the Biblical Greek word as well). Are you defining “faith” as epistemic certainty across the board, such that if one is not certain—of whatever—then one does not have faith?

Second, the word “evidence” also does not entail certainty.

Third, “hope” implies something less than certainty—why would I need to hope for something that I know to be certain?

Fourth, I have absolutely no idea what it means to call faith either “substance” or “evidence”—in any context, not just a biblical, or even spiritual, one. I don’t think St. Paul did either; I think he was going for the poetry of paradox, not a sensible proposition.

Fifth, I never saw Santa Claus. Yet, as a child, I believed that there was a Santa Claus; I placed trust in my parents’ claims that there was a Santa Claus (and in the childish evidence they placed for me: half-eaten cookies, presents, etc.). Under your claim, my belief/faith itself constituted evidence—even certain evidence—that Santa Claus exists.

Can you—or anyone else—give me a non-theological, non-biblical example of faith being either “substance” of something, or “evidence” of something, or faith giving certainty of something?

Originally posted by Palynka
But the issue here is actually if you can fear the possibility of losing something, in this case life. If you fear losing your life, then necessarily you fear death.

To argue for not fearing death one must be indifferent between the state of living and non-living (or preferring the latter).

To argue for not fearing death one must be indifferent between the state of living and non-living (or preferring the latter).

That is simply not the case. Fear is not the single differentiating emotion or attitude. Suppose I am simply sad at the prospect of dying? Simply the fact that I enjoy living (and, if you will, enjoy my enjoyment) is enough to establish the preference.

I am not disputing that some people may either be indifferent or prefer dying—or that under certain conditions, I might as well. For someone in great suffering, continuing to live may represent actual disutility according to their subjective utility function (with no implication of cardinal utility there). [I can imagine Gary Becker doing an analysis of making a “marginal” decision to commit suicide. 😉 But now I reaching back to stuff I haven’t dealt with in 25 years.]

A preference function is simply a preference function. In this case, the goods in question are mutually exclusive: one cannot have any combination of both guns and butter.

______________________________________

Caveat: It is possible, perhaps even likely, that, confronted with imminent death, one’s survival instinct will naturally kick in. But what we think of as the emotional content of that could be “anger” (rage: the fight response) as well as “fright” (the flight response). But one does not need to be “taken over” by that (although one may well be).

First off, Id like to say "3 cheers for Vistest". Your posts are so measured, thoughtful and intelligent, I always learn from them.

I wonder whether anyone believes they looked forward to their birth? Maybe Hindus and Buddhists but I don't think many people think of experience before they came to be. I think the same is true after death. There is no loss to me since the will be no me to experience any loss. People who love me will experience loss and I feel sadness for them but I do not think I feel any fear of death itself for me.

What I do fear is infirmity in old age. Alzheimers, dementia, a body and mind slowely packing up is what I fear, not the final stage. If I end up going down that route, I fully expect to welcome and even long for death.

--- Penguin.

On a lighter note, I have a nice glass of wine in front of me which I intend to enjoy to the fullest.

Originally posted by vistesd
Responding to a number of posts—

Thinking of dying as event makes a lot more sense (to me) than thinking of it (”death&rdquo😉 as some kind of state, even a state of “nothingness”, whatever that is.

If, after the event of dying, there is no I to experience anything, it seems to me that Starrman’s argument is correct. [b]However, e ...[text shortened]... ad.” If I can relate that to a feeling of, say, the inescapable tragic, I might agree with you.[/b]

Dread, roughly, is the inescapable knowledge that I exist now, but one day will not; it is not the fear of the specific event of death, but the knowledge now that I will one day die, and that this death could come at any time, and the knowledge that, as a result, something I value, i.e. the "experience" of being me, will be lost. It does not typically manifest itself as fear (sweat, dry mouth, whatever), but more as a quesiness, sickness, dizziness etc.

I guess one might say it is more diffuse than fear; for some existentialists it is the very context for living/morality/etc.

Originally posted by dottewell
Dread, roughly, is the inescapable knowledge that I exist now, but one day will not; it is not the fear of the specific event of death, but the knowledge now that I will one day die, and that this death could come at any time, and the knowledge that, as a result, something I value, i.e. the "experience" of being me, will be lost. It does not typical ...[text shortened]... re diffuse than fear; for some existentialists it is the very context for living/morality/etc.

Yes, but I’m an existentialist (or at least a quasi-existentialist, a bit closer to Camus) without the (in)famous angst. 😉

One of my favorite images of dying is that of Ragnar (played by Ernest Borgnine) in the movie The Vikings: confronted with inevitable death (no question of suicide), he takes his sword and leaps laughing into the wolf-pit. The other is of Zorba the Greek hanging on to the window-frame, gazing into the sun for as long as he physically can before falling and dying. (I once saw a nature film of a mortally wounded coyote doing the same thing, struggling to stay up as long as possible, watching the setting sun; I do not assign any anthropomorphic emotions, however.)

Even in the case of Ragnar, there may well have been a moment (I don’t recall if one was shown) of “dread” at inescapable and impending doom.

If (a) I am aware when I am dying, and (b) my mind is sufficiently strong, then I have some choice about my emotional content.

An example: once I was in an airplane that I was absolutely convinced was going to crash (and I used to fly a lot, so I didn’t reach that conclusion with every rough ride; these circumstances were pretty extreme). There was a moment of what I think you mean by “dread.” Then I decided that if I was going to die now, I wanted my last consciousness to be of something beautiful. And so I formed a mental image of my wife’s face and held it. My feelings changed to the simple joy of contemplating that. This was all in a matter of seconds, less time than it has taken me to type this.

That kind of thing has happened a couple of times. I don’t think that had anything at all to do with courage, just choice. But I suspect there are people on here who have faced more dreadful experiences than that.

This is a very interesting discussion. First, I agree with dottewell's general thesis: that death is an event, and it is an event about which we can come to hold "well-grounded" fear (or apprehension, or dread -- I'm not really sure which term is best).

However, sometimes I think this sort of discussion can quickly turn nonsensical. Consider for example:

dottewell: I have something now; I know now that I will not have it at some point in the future.

To me, this makes no sense when applied to one's life (here, a special case). Upon death (and thus the end of my life), those psychological features that collectively comprise the person I am will cease to exist; therefore, I will simply cease to exist. So I fail to see how it is true that there will ever be some point at which "I will not have" my life. I get concerned when the discussion represents death as one's losing his own life because, although dotte is right to say that it is not a necessary condition of one's losing something that one experience the loss, nevertheless if we want to talk sensibly about subject S losing X, it does seem to be a necessary condition that we can form coherent notions of both S's existing with X and S's existing without X. And I fail to see how it is coherent to think about my existing without my own life (when in this context the end of my life simply is also the end of my existence). Speaking for myself, I would want to clarify the discussion to avoid representing death as "one's losing his life" or anything similar that seems to invoke the notion of one's existing without his life (which in this context is like saying one's existing without his existing).

Other than that, I fully agree with dottewell that one can come to hold well-grounded "fear" of death both because of its inevitability and because of what it entails. The considerations that could inform such "well-groundedness" could be things like: perhaps one has reasons to think his life is simply intrinsically valuable; or (recalling what vistesd already said) simply the enjoyment (bliss) of life coupled with the knowledge that "I am alive, but I know now that such will not always be the case" (this is how I would prefer to put it, rather than saying that someday I will lose my life); or reasons to think that one's family and friends would have to endure much pain and suffering upon his death; relatedly, that his death will extinguish many meaningful and valuable projects; etc.

So I do agree that "fear" of death, depending on what sorts of considerations inform it, can be "well-grounded". However, I generally would not agree that fear of death, well-grounded or not, should be inherent to the human condition (although I do think it's very likely that we are evolutionarily disposed toward some manner of aversion to death). For instance, I think with Dharma practice can come the disintegration of the ego; and with disintegration of the ego comes disintegration of whatever causes us to cling needily to our lives; and with this also disintegration of fear of death. Further, I see no reason why a fear of death must be crippling toward our own interests. In some sense, it should heighten our awareness: given that death is inevitable and my life finite, that gives me motivation to be vigilant and discerning about how I live. Even so, out of simply compassion for others or passion for life, it would be difficult not to feel some urgency and mistrust of death -- something we know to disrupt and frustrate so many things we prize.