There is no faith without doubt, just like there is no courage without fear. Faith is simply a manifestation of the fact that doubt has not crippled us to act, much like courage is the manifestation of fear not crippling our actions as well.
Originally posted by whodey There is no faith without doubt, just like there is no courage without fear. Faith is simply a manifestation of the fact that doubt has not crippled us to act, much like courage is the manifestation of fear not crippling our actions as well.
One very important thing about faith is it cannot be taken for granted, because lack of faith is ‘the sin that so easily entangles one.’ To maintain a firm faith requires putting up a hard fight for it, resisting men who could plunge one into immorality, combating the works of the flesh, avoiding the snare of materialism, shunning faith-destroying philosophies and traditions of men, and, above all, looking “intently at the Chief Agent and Perfecter of our faith, Jesus.”—Heb 12:1, 2; Jude 3, 4; Ga 5:19-21; 1Ti 6:9, 10; Col 2:8.
Originally posted by galveston75 One very important thing about faith is it cannot be taken for granted, because lack of faith is ‘the sin that so easily entangles one.’ To maintain a firm faith requires putting up a hard fight for it, resisting men who could plunge one into immorality, combating the works of the flesh, avoiding the snare of materialism, shunning faith-destroying philos ...[text shortened]... nt and Perfecter of our faith, Jesus.”—Heb 12:1, 2; Jude 3, 4; Ga 5:19-21; 1Ti 6:9, 10; Col 2:8.
The main point here is that faith is not the destruction of doubt, rather, it is merely overcoming ones doubt so as to be motivated to action.
Originally posted by whodey The main point here is that faith is not the destruction of doubt, rather, it is merely overcoming ones doubt so as to be motivated to action.
Perhaps with faith one shouldn't assume that doubts need to be overcome. The doubts may well point to the truth, while faith might be conjuring "truth" up. Also, with doubt, I cannot see why one should assume that it precludes action or motivation.
Originally posted by FMF Perhaps with faith one shouldn't assume that doubts need to be overcome. The doubts may well point to the truth, while faith might be conjuring "truth" up. Also, with doubt, I cannot see why one should assume that it precludes action or motivation.
I think we should all go with our gut in terms of the Golden Rule. It is the universal morality. Although I agree that we must be careful as to what or who we place our faith in, I contend that the one pointing to the Golden Rule as the one based on truth.
Originally posted by whodey I think we should all go with our gut in terms of the Golden Rule. It is the universal morality. Although I agree that we must be careful as to what or who we place our faith in, I contend that the one pointing to the Golden Rule as the one based on truth.
I have no idea what you think you are saying. Was this a response to what I said?
Originally posted by whodey The main point here is that faith is not the destruction of doubt, rather, it is merely overcoming ones doubt so as to be motivated to action.
I will try once more.
Why do you assume that doubts need to be overcome?
Is it not the case that in many instances it may well the doubts that in fact point to the truth?
Isn't it possible that faith might be conjuring "truth" up and that doubts are the alarm bell?
Why do you assume that doubt precludes action or motivation?
Originally posted by whodey I think we should all go with our gut in terms of the Golden Rule. It is the universal morality. Although I agree that we must be careful as to what or who we place our faith in, I contend that the one pointing to the Golden Rule as the one based on truth.
Not only do I dispute the claim that the Golden Rule is the universal morality, but it is foolish to assume that someone who claims one truth is therefore correct in all he says.
You for example 'point to the Golden Rule' yet quite happily lie about other things - yet you think you are 'the one based on truth'?
Originally posted by whodey There is no faith without doubt, just like there is no courage without fear. Faith is simply a manifestation of the fact that doubt has not crippled us to act, much like courage is the manifestation of fear not crippling our actions as well.
I have no idea what you are talking about.
Why should I think 'faith' has only to do with talk of action? I was under the impression that 'faith' could also extend to the purely theoretical. There is a distinction between practical reasoning (which concerns ferreting out courses of action) and theoretical reasoning (which concerns ferreting out what is the case). Why should I think 'faith' is related only to the former?
Maybe it would help everyone if you actually stated what you take 'faith' to consist of. I recall some time agao a very interesting discussion between epiphinehas and bbarr wherein bbarr offered up the following possible construals of 'faith'. Perhaps you could indicate if any of these are similar to what you have in mind.
Posted in a past thread by bbarr:
"1) S has faith that P.
This reads as though faith is a type of propositional attitude, similar in structure to belief, desire, fear, etc. in that faith is a stance one can take with respect to some proposition. I could believe that it will rain, desire or fear that it will rain, or have faith that it will rain. But the difficulty here is specifying the difference between faith and the other propositional attitudes. It seems clear, to me at least, that the claim 'S has faith that P' analytically entails the claim 'S believes that P'. It would certainly be strange for somebody to claim that he has faith it will rain while sincerely believing that it will not rain. Note that this is one reason it is so hard to understand just what Kierkegaard is getting at when he speaks of the psychology of the Knight of Faith. But it is also strange, though perhaps less so, to construe faith as wholly cognitive, unconnected to conative or affective states. Typically people do not claim to have faith that P when they simply do not care whether it is the case that P. Further, people typically claim to have faith that P only when that take some broadly pro-attitude towards P. It is natural to claim that one has faith that his friends will treat him well, but it sounds strange to claim that one has faith that his enemies will treat him viciously. But, if this is right, then faith is a mongrel state, much like optimism, possessing characteristics of both belief and desire. If faith is construed in this way, then there is no reason to think that faith, by its very nature, is epistemically irresponsible. Whether an instance of faith is epistemically responsible will depend on the evidence upon which it is partly based.
2) For S, P is an article of faith.
Unlike (1), this does not read as though faith is a propositional attitude, but like (1) it entails the claim 'S believes that P'. The term 'faith' here seems to demarcate a class of propositions constitutive of either an epistemic orientation or a normative worldview. If the former, these are the propositions that serve as epistemically basic and are taken to be non-inferentially justified (if one is a foundationalist of either the internalist or externalist variety), or those nearest the center of the web of belief and most insulated against revision urged by the tribunal of experience (if one is a holist or coherentist). If the later, these propositions are those that specify the deepest, most fundamental normative commitments one has; commitments that function as first principles, perhaps tacitly, in practical deliberation. Since, on this reading, 'faith' refers to classes of propositions specified by function within the cognitive and/or evaluative life of agents, rather than to propositions specified by either their content or evidential backing, it will be an open question whether any particular article of faith is epistemically irresponsibly held. Again, it will be the evidence that decides. Of course, settling disputes at this level will often be difficult, and the threat of begging the question in such disputes looms. In many cases the best we can do to settle disputes about the nature of epistemic justification or of the credentials of first-order moral judgments is to construct localized consistency arguments of the form "if you believe that, then you commit yourself to this implausible entailment", where we hope the implausibility of the entailment is evident to our interlocutor.
3) S takes P on faith.
Like (2), this usage of the term 'faith' is closely tied to issues of inference and deliberation, but unlike (2) this claim does not invariably entail the claim 'S believes that P'. I have heard this expression used to indicate that one has taken a proposition as a hypothetical posit; a provisional assumption for the purpose of guiding inquiry. Here, unlike the first two examples, the will is implicated in faith. Nothing in either (1) or (2) entails that S chooses to take any particular stance towards P. But here we have a use of 'faith' that seems to require choice. An agent must choose, perhaps in some limited manner, to deliberate and act as though P was the case. The term "leap of faith" is most clearly an example of this usage, but admonishments to have faith often take this sense as well, at least when they are not mere exhortations in the face of flagging confidence. Now, a case could be made that posits of this sort are epistemically irresponsible, since if one had sufficent evidence for P one would not need to posit P provisionally, and why treat the world as though P were true if there is insufficient evidence that P is true? But there is no guarantee that, for all P, the world is such that the truth or falsity of P is discoverable independently of treating the world as though P were true. Conditional proofs work this way in logic, after all. Further, since provisionally positing P does not commit one to the belief that P, it is always open to one who takes P on faith to cite pragmatic reasons for the positing.
4) S believes P based on faith.
Of course this entails that S believes P, and so it will be an open question whether this belief is epistemically justified. I hear this or similar claims quite often, and admit to being at a loss as to what exactly is meant. Often the claim is simply pejorative; elliptical for "S has no evidence for his belief that P'. If this is how 'faith' is to be construed, then of course it will follow that faith is epistemically irresponsible, since it leads to unjustified believing. But this is not the only way we can construe (4). 'Faith' here could refer to either some other propositional attitude, as in (1) above, from the propositional contents of which the belief that P is inferred, or to some actual proposition taken to be foundational or nomratively central, as in (2) above, from which P is inferred, or it could refer to some psychological capacity or state or trait that functions as a mechanism of belief formation. Although the epistemological details here matter, the upshot of this non-pejorative reading of 'faith', and the basing relation in particular, is that justified faith can itself justify belief (or, if faith is a belief forming psychological mechanism, that it may yield justified beliefs if it reliably produces true ones)."
Originally posted by whodey There is no faith without doubt, just like there is no courage without fear. Faith is simply a manifestation of the fact that doubt has not crippled us to act, much like courage is the manifestation of fear not crippling our actions as well.
"And Jesus said unto them, Because of your unbelief: for verily I say unto you, If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed, ye shall say unto this mountain, Remove hence to yonder place; and it shall remove; and nothing shall be impossible unto you." -- Matthew 17:20, KJV
We are encouraged to have faith "as a grain of mustard seed". Either you believe, or you do not. As Yoda said, "There is no try."
Doubt is weakness. As is fear. Eschew these things.
Why do you assume that doubts need to be overcome?
Is it not the case that in many instances it may well the doubts that in fact point to the truth?
Isn't it possible that faith might be conjuring "truth" up and that doubts are the alarm bell?
Why do you assume that doubt precludes action or motivation?
You are correct in that doubt can lead us to the truth. All I'm saying is that if you are wrong, it can keep you from the truth as well.
As far as doubt precluding one to act, do you often act on things you have no faith in? It would seem to me that not believing in something and then pursuing it would be a total waste of time.
Originally posted by LemonJello I have no idea what you are talking about.
Why should I think 'faith' has only to do with talk of action? I was under the impression that 'faith' could also extend to the purely theoretical. There is a distinction between practical reasoning (which concerns ferreting out courses of action) and theoretical reasoning (which concerns ferreting out wha stified beliefs if it reliably produces true ones)."[/i]
I knew it. You are determined to give me a headache by dragging out one of bbarr's logic rants. I don't have time now but at some point I will try to address this question........later.......maybe. 😛
Originally posted by whodey As far as doubt precluding one to act, do you often act on things you have no faith in? It would seem to me that not believing in something and then pursuing it would be a total waste of time.
Who said anything about acting upon things "you have no faith in"? You're not making any sense at all.
Originally posted by whodey My point is that you would not act on things you have no faith in. Therefore, you doubt cripples your ability to act on that specific area.
Well if "doubt" leads to not doing something because you realise it's not the right thing to do or because you realise you have no faith in it, then that's good isn't it? You can do something else, something you do have faith in.
13 May '12 21:181 edit
Faith and doubt
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