Faith and reason are intrinsically non-violent ...

Originally posted by bjohnson407
You make two points worth commenting on

The first is based on a misunderstanding, so I will clarify: I am [b]not just talking about practical reason. Perhaps the pope was, in which case I'm sure he has some account of why the violence done in the name of a misguided practical reason (say Eichmann's Kantianism) is not intrinsic to the practical rea ...[text shortened]... trinsic to reason or if it is extrinsic and imposed by the reasoning agent[/i].[/b]

Yes, both Kant and Hume presented arguments. So what? Both theoretical and practical reason have the same basic structure regardless of who employs it, but different people can employ it better or worse. I took the question that initiated this debate to be whether reasoning well about what to do leads one away from violent action. In which case it is the norms of practical reason that are at issue. If you want to try and figure out whether reason qua conceptual and inferential capacities is itself violent, go right ahead. But I'll tell you in advance how where that inquiry will end: You will only be able to maintain the thesis if you mangle the concept of 'violence' beyond recognition.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
Kant's ethics was not concerned with "constutive norms," but rather obedience to the moral law. Hume is a trickier case. At any rate, as I explained above, the debate concerning constutive norms is unrelated to my claim that "reason is intrinsically violent." It is, however, and interesting one. So if you have anything of substance to contribute to it, why not get the ball rolling and throw out a preliminary hypothesis that we can engage with?

Nonsense. The whole point of the Formula of Universal Law is to show that some maxims are such that they cannot be consistently willed, and hence must be based on proposed considerations for action that are not universalizable. Considerations for action that are not universalizable cannot be reasons, as far as Kant is concerned, since it is a law of the will that if one is to act at all one must act for reasons that have the form of a law. In other words, it is a constitutive norm of practical rationality for Kant that we only act for reasons that everyone could endorse. When we fail to do so we are manifesting a heteronomous rather than an autonomous will, and this is at root a failure of agency.

Further, Kant was not interested in mere obedience to the moral law, since one can obey the moral law for the wrong reasons. This is the point of the shopkeeper example in the Groundwork. Kant is interested in the nature of the good will, characterized as a will that acts out of respect or reverence for the moral law (i.e., a will that recognizes and is motivated by the fact that some proposed maxim is such that it could not be universally endorsed, or, relatedly, that some proposed maxim is an instance of a failure to respect the rational autonomy of another).

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Big, you're committing an elementary fallacy in your analysis.

Do you think this is a valid argument:

My pet is a dog.
Hence, all pets are dogs.

I hope you don't, but you are making a formally equivalent argument here, namely,
[quote]
This doctor commits violence as a result of his reasoning.
Hence, reasoning about an object d ...[text shortened]... ort, you're trying to figure out what the pope meant when he didn't mean anything at all.

I agree with your last point completely.

As for your main critique of my argument, you make an important point. And please don't think I don't see its importance. I do. But I am working with a very wide understanding of what violence is. Perhaps too wide, but I think the point is important none the less. The violence doesn't just arise in the doctors act, it is preceded and guided by the violence that reason does by distorting reality -- I know this is a far-out-there point, but I think it's a very interesting one. Reasoning subjects reality to formal structures, categories and rules.

I will do the best I can with your question mark example.... Your sentence is the expression of an "idea." In order to communicate it, you must put it in to words that can be understood. That is, you must, subject it to the laws of language and reason. The "idea" must be transformed into something else -- a sentence. I think this is a kind of "violence." It's necessary for communication, and it's largely a good thing. But it's violence insofar as it violates or betrays the "idea." So to answer your question, the idea expressed is done a sort of violence when it is forced to end with a question mark. The idea was as much a rhetorical statement as it was a question, but langauge and reason won't allow it to be both things at once.



It is at this most mundane level where my claim seems absurd, and I grant that it sounds silly. But I think that the claim I am defending is interesting and valueable.

Originally posted by bbarr
Yes, both Kant and Hume presented arguments. So what? Both theoretical and practical reason have the same basic structure regardless of who employs it, but different people can employ it better or worse. I took the question that initiated this debate to be whether reasoning well about what to do leads one away from violent action. In which case it is the n ...[text shortened]... ly be able to maintain the thesis if you mangle the concept of 'violence' beyond recognition.

Now that is a useful criticism. Mangled beyond recognition, perhaps, but I am dealing with the proposition that the Pope gave us. He didn't say "practical reason" is inherently non-violent. He said reason. So why not make this an occasion to discuss the violence or nonviolence inherent in reason.

I argued that reason distorts reality and thereby violates, or does violence to, it. I think that this understanding of violence is still easily recognized as violence. It's just violence on such a tiny scale that we never take the time to call it such.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
Now [b]that is a useful criticism. Mangled beyond recognition, perhaps, but I am dealing with the proposition that the Pope gave us. He didn't say "practical reason" is inherently non-violent. He said reason. So why not make this an occasion to discuss the violence or nonviolence inherent in reason.

I argued that reason distorts reality and there ...[text shortened]... olence. It's just violence on such a tiny scale that we never take the time to call it such.[/b]

Your definition of violence is different from the Pope's, who's clearly talking about physical violence. If you are dealing with the proposition the Pope gave you, then you should also stick to what he meant by "violence", not just what he meant by "reason".

Originally posted by bbarr
Nonsense. The whole point of the Formula of Universal Law is to show that some maxims are such that they cannot be consistently willed, and hence must be based on proposed considerations for action that are not universalizable. Considerations for action that are not universalizable cannot be reasons, as far as Kant is concerned, since it is a law of the will ...[text shortened]... at some proposed maxim is an instance of a failure to respect the rational autonomy of another).

Where does Kant use the expression "constitutive norm"? 😉


Respect for the moral law is not a matter of normalizing behavior. It's a matter of constant obedience to (obedience implies consciously submitting to, not just being in line with) the law. This word norm suggests the forming of moral attitudes habits which is better associeted with Aristotle than Kant. Kant mentions in the Groundwork that we must "cultivate" our faculties, and he returns to this idea of cultivation in the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Teleological Judgement, but he never makes his morality about norms.

When you say "norms" do you just mean "rules?" Because the word "norm" has a connotation similar to that if the word "custom" which I would definitely resist when describing Kants morals. It might be better for Kant's teleology (it certainly seems appropriate for Hegel). Kant talks about "cultivation" in the Metaphysics of Morals and the 3rd Critique, and there it has a significance. But I'd avoid it when giving a cursory overview of the Groundwork. Wouldn't want to do violence to the text. 😉

Originally posted by Palynka
Your definition of violence is different from the Pope's, who's clearly talking about physical violence. If you are dealing with the proposition the Pope gave you, then you should also stick to what he meant by "violence", not just what he meant by "reason".

This is a good point. There is a sense in which your definitely right. Logic doesn't ever club you over the head, at least not literally. Here's an attempt at a response...

He says that non-violence is intrinsic to reason. Certainly violence or nonviolence that is intrinsic to something is going to look different from the nonviolence or violence that follows from it when it is realized. Logic doesn't ever shake your hand either, at least not literally.

But I would say that physcal violence certainly can fall out of this more basic violence, and it frequently does. Usually, it gets blamed on something else -- like the violent agent who "abuses" reason. I'm saying that the subsequent physical violence is an outgrowth of the basic violence that's intrinsic to reason itself.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
the violence that reason does by distorting reality ... Reasoning subjects reality to formal structures, categories and rules.

So it sounds like you think there is some intrinsic "violence" in reason that consists of subjecting articles of objective reality to phenomenal experience and interpretation. To me it seems like you are making a noumenal/phenomenal distinction and claiming that our phenomenological framework invariably does "violence" to noumenon when we form concepts and related inferences. Even if it is true that our interpretations of the world are always somehow "distorted" relative to thing-in-itself, I have no idea why you think we should apply the term 'violence' here (like bbarr, I think you are mangling the concept). First, although it is true that 'violence' can be taken to mean distortion/alteration, it is also true that it typically evokes a sense of unwarranted and deliberate action. If it is the case that my reasoning is intrinsically distortive in some way, it is certainly not because of any willful intention on my part. Plus, our interpretations of the world do not come at the deliverance of wholly active processes. Second, it is not clear at all to me that we should think there is some non-ersatz distortion that is intrinsic to reasoning. When we reliably form beliefs that have correspondence to facts or when we are responsive to good reasons in our dealings with others (as theoretical and practical examples), then I am having trouble understanding what should be viewed as the distortive aspect of such reasoning. Third, you claim to be faithfully inquiring on the Pope's assertion; but as Palynka already pointed out, a lot of this has next to nothing to do with the intended content of the Pope's claim. I think he is trying to claim something along the lines that when people are acting reasonably and relating well, the deliverances of practical reason are always non-violent. To say that this is all just faithful investigation of the Pope's claim seems misleading and equivocal.

Basically, I vote we don't employ the term 'violence' in the way you suggest.

Originally posted by LemonJello
So it sounds like you think there is some intrinsic "violence" in reason that consists of subjecting articles of objective reality to phenomenal experience and interpretation. To me it seems like you are making a noumenal/phenomenal distinction and claiming that our phenomenological framework invariably does "violence" to noumenon when we form concepts a

Basically, I vote we don't employ the term 'violence' in the way you suggest.

Your characterization of my view is basically correct, but I would avoid the language of phenomenal/neumenal, because Kant and I have very different ideas about the character and availability of "things in themselves." I am more concerned with the way things are made intelligible (and these are often sensible things in the phenomenal world). Also I wouldn't say that reason "invariably" does violence. I said early on that I don't think the violence of reason isn't all pervasive, but it is intrinsic to the structure of reason itself. Hopefully my responses to your three points will help clarify.

Why use the term "violence?"

I admitted that this was the right question to be asking, and I tried to explain myself above by pointing out that violence on the level of "intrinsic to reason" looks different from violence in practice, but your objection seems to be that "violence" implies intention ("unwarranted and deliberate action" ). And therfore the fact that I don't intend to do harm with my reasoning means thatI don't do violence. I disagree with your point, because 1) I think violence is often "warranted." There have been good wars, but I don't think they were any less violent. And 2) I don't see any inconsistency in unintentional violence. If a gun goes off in my hand and kills the person next to me, that person dies a violent death whether I meant to kill them or not.

Is there an intrinsic distortion in reason?

Let me first tell what I'm not saying... I'm not saying that we can't do a very good job lining up our thoughts with reality. And I'm not saying that to reason is a bad thing. I'm saying that, like any tool, reason must form and shape its object, like the way reading glasses refract light. This is a kind of force, and "distorts" the object. In fact I think "does violence to the object" would be better than "distorts" because we can get a very accurate picture of reality by manipulating it with the tool of reason. And sometimes the "distortion" is so miniscule that it doesn't seem worthy of the word. And very often the "distortion" is well worth it. Keep in mind that you have to disrupt the soil by tilling it before you can get anything to grow.

Have I been faithful to the Pope?

I admit that the discussion seems to have turned away from what the Pope may have meant, but to be fair, How would you go about proving that reason is intrinsically nonviolent? Reason has been used to justify the most horrible of acts and at the same time to forbid them. So talk of reason being intrinsically anything is likely to send us in some rather bizarre directions. If the Pope was saying that reason, properly understood, will always lead to nonviolent conclusions, then I have the right ask what it is in reason that causes it to give birth to nonviolence. Usually reason is thought to sit on the fact side of the fact/value distinction, and "practical reason" has to incorporate values which are extrinsic reason.

So my question to the Pope: where are the values intrinsic to reason that make it nonviolent? My answer early on was that if reason values anything, it values knowing, and any good Nietchean will know that a geneology of the will to truth will find a long history of violence in the name of learning -- interrogative torture, animal testing, the locking up and studying of the insane etc. I have been trying to show how that violence, therefore, might grow out of a violence intrinsic to reason. I am not fully confident that I am right, but I think it's a very interesting and philosophically worthwhile task.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
Now [b]that is a useful criticism. Mangled beyond recognition, perhaps, but I am dealing with the proposition that the Pope gave us. He didn't say "practical reason" is inherently non-violent. He said reason. So why not make this an occasion to discuss the violence or nonviolence inherent in reason.

I argued that reason distorts reality and there ...[text shortened]... olence. It's just violence on such a tiny scale that we never take the time to call it such.[/b]

O.K., let's talk about your thesis that violence is inherent to reason. I am confused about both your use of term 'inherent' and your use of the term 'reason'. Presumably, if violence is indeed inherent to reason, then it must be the case that violence necessarily attends every instantiation of reason. It can't simply be the case, if violence is inherent to reason, that violence merely often attends reason. Further, if it is reason itself that you are talking about, then it follows that even the best reasoning will be violent. After all, you are not making the claim that violence is inherent merely to sloppy reasoning.

Now, this claim is clearly false when the term 'reason' refers to abstract deductive reasoning. I can engage in modus ponens, after all, without falling victim to distortion. When I infer from [P & (P -> Q)] that Q, I take no stand on the nature of the referents of P and Q. These propositional placeholders are simply variables, and the truth of the conclusion is guaranteed by the truth-conditions of conjunctions and conditionals. So, if no violence attends this inference, then your claim is false.

But perhaps you mean by 'reason' something else; something like 'conceptualization'. On this view the violence inherent to reason does not attend actual patterns of inference, but rather the attribution of various properties to elements of our ontology. On this view, whenever I judge that X is an F, where 'X' refers to some element of our ontology and 'F' refers to some property, I thereby abstract away from the actual nature of X in a manner that constitutes doing violence to X. There are, presumably, two ways this conceptualization could count as violent. It could be that the very act of conceptualizing an element of our ontology is violent, even if that resultant judgment that X is an F is true. Alternatively, it could be that the judgments of the form X is an F are all false. Now, I don't think you can hold the second view, since it leads to a contradiction. You are, after all, making judgments of that very form when you claim that instances of reason have the property of being violent. So, if your view is coherent, then you must be claiming that conceptualization itself is violent. But there are at least three problems with such a view: First, attributing relational properties to elements of our ontology seems to do no violence to them. For instance, when I say of X that it has to property of being to the left of me, this seems to do no violence to X. Second, attributing trivial modal properties to elements of our ontology seems to do no violence to them. For instance, when I say of X that X has the property of having those properties, whatever they are, that suffice to make X whatever it is, I am making a metaphysical claim about X that is both necessarily true and completely uninformative. Here, again, it seems no violence is done. Third, to the extent that the violence of reason derives from conceptualization, assessment of such violence will require something like a comparison between the an sich or unconceptualized nature of things and the content of the concepts applied to them. In other words, in order to determine whether all conceptualizations are violent, you need to determine what the unconceptualized natures of respective elements of our ontology are like. But, since thinking is conceptually mediated, any such comparison will require minimally the attribution of demonstrative concepts to the 'chunk of nature' you are holding up for comparison. So, your whole claim presupposes a sort of unmediated epistemic contact with the world that you do not, in fact, possess.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
Where does Kant use the expression "constitutive norm"? 😉


Respect for the moral law is not a matter of normalizing behavior. It's a matter of constant obedience to (obedience implies consciously submitting to, not just being in line with) the law. This word norm suggests the forming of moral attitudes habits which is better associeted with Aristot sory overview of the Groundwork. Wouldn't want to do violence to the text. 😉

He doesn't use that expression. So what? A constitutive norm of practical reason is just a constraint one must abide by in order to engage in good practical reason. For Kant, one must not act for considerations that cannot be universalized. For Kant, considerations that cannot be universalized do not even count as normative reasons; they cannot serve to justify an act. So, for Kant, it is a constitutive norm of practical reason that one only act for considerations that can be universalized. This is the law of will, as expressed in his first formulation of the Categorical Imperative.

'Norm' in philosophy, just means 'normative constraint or requirement'. It does not connote custom or social convention.

Originally posted by bbarr
He doesn't use that expression. So what? [b]A constitutive norm of practical reason is just a constraint one must abide by in order to engage in good practical reason. For Kant, one must not act for considerations that cannot be universalized. For Kant, considerations that cannot be universalized do not even count as normative reasons; they cannot serv ...[text shortened]... ns 'normative constraint or requirement'. It does not connote custom or social convention.[/b]

It's a twentieth century word used in debates in 20th century ethics and social/political philosophy that Kant was not aware of.

I respect your usage of the term upon clarification, but don't think that you have the patent on the philosophical usage of the term "norm." Christine Korsgaard's uses the word in her book on Kant's ethics Sources of Normativity. For her, it has a slightly different meaning from what you describe.

In any case, I admire your enthusiasm, but I wish you wouldn't be so pedantic. Such an approach leads us into this pointless nitpicking that detracts from the subject at hand. For that I apologize, but I am sincere in my interest in taking up Kant more civilly in another thread. I'm taking a close look at your longer post, and I will try to post a response this afternoon.

Originally posted by bjohnson407
It's a twentieth century word used in debates in 20th century ethics and social/political philosophy that Kant was not aware of.

I respect your usage of the term upon clarification, but don't think that you have the patent on the philosophical usage of the term "norm." Christine Korsgaard's uses the word in her book on Kant's ethics Sources of Norm king a close look at your longer post, and I will try to post a response this afternoon.

Korsgaard came out to give a talk at my department a few weeks back, and we spoke at dinner about our respective conceptions of practical reason. I detected no disagreement about the use of this expression in our conversation, though we differ about what we take the norms of practical reason to be. I have Sources of Normativity right here in front of me, and I'm interested in knowing just how we disagree on the use of this term. If you could point me to the page, I'd appreciate it.

Originally posted by bbarr
Korsgaard came out to give a talk at my department a few weeks back, and we spoke at dinner about our respective conceptions of practical reason. I detected no disagreement about the use of this expression in our conversation, though we differ about what we take the norms of practical reason to be.

Did you browbeat him? That might explain his concession to your use of the term.

Originally posted by DoctorScribbles
Did you browbeat him? That might explain his concession to your use of term.

Inherently, apparently.