Originally posted by CalJust
Hi, LJ, welcome back. I was wondering what had happened to you. You sort of kicked off this thread and then disappeared!
I must ask you to explain a bit more what you mean by value in the practices of justification. In my book justification is very much like rationalisation, i.e. pretending, and arguing, that something is right, when ...[text shortened]... t that I should not have done so.
What am I missing here? You must be meaning something else.
Hi CalJust, thanks. I was taking some time off for vacation.
When I talk about 'justification', I typically mean it in an epistemic sense. In rough terms, justification is that which is added to true belief in order to arrive at knowledge. In other words, justification is a necessary component in the analysis of knowledge: in order for S to know that P and not just merely believe that P, it is necessary that S's belief that P is justified. In other terms, though, we could think of justification as that which undergirds the warrant one has in claiming or believing that P, if the claim or belief happens to be warranted. It is one thing for S to make the claim that P or for S to believe that P is the case; it is another thing for those attitudes to be warranted or justified. This is a thoroughly normative notion: it is concerned with how one ought to form and maintain propositional attitudes like beliefs. To first order, we could say that a belief is justified if it is an appropriate attitude for one's cognitive and epistemic environment. But that begs the question of what it means to be appropriate in this sense. There are many different theories on this. Some will claim that the belief, to be justified, needs to be properly apportioned to the evidence one has; others will claim that the belief needs to fit in coherently with one's belief structure; others will claim that it has to do with the processes or methods under with the belief forms; others will claim that it has to do with pragmatic considerations; etc. Whatever account one thinks is correct in this regards, there will be explanative reasons in virtue of which a belief is justified, if it happens to be justified on that account. So, by the "practices of justification" I am talking about the give and take of these sorts of reasons in debate. Typically, in these sorts of debates, one tries to argue for his or her view on the grounds that the view is factually correct; and so the natural reasons to offer are evidential ones, since those are the ones that should have direct bearing on the question of whether or not P is true. However, I am not excluding other sorts of justification, although I think other sorts tend to be ineffective in debates.
As I mentioned, I think there are many reasons why the practices of justification is valuable, regardless of whether or not there is expectation that the primary parties will be particularly receptive to countervailing ideas. These practices inherently promote confluence of ideas, which is something that lends itself to healthy perspective and mutual understanding, and these discussions are often public and documented and thus are often far-reaching beyond the primary parties involved. If I recall correctly, you have stated before that instead of engaging in such discussion, it is often better to have a program of tolerance and understanding instead. However, what I think needs to be emphasized here is that a program of tolerance and healthy understanding often goes hand-in-hand with the practices of justification, in a synergistic relationship. After all, I can have a much healthier appreciation and understanding for another's view, even if it differs radically from my own, if I have some knowledge of the reasons with which they moor that view. Of course, there is never any guarantee that the discussion will go well, and the value may not manifest. And, of course, there is always the potential that in trying to tease out whatever justification one has for a view, you find their attempts at justification so poor that you lose whatever respect you had for that view. Sometimes, them's the breaks, but there is value in that too. However, when the discussion goes well, you gain newfound respect for that person's view, even if you still disagree. When it goes really well for you, you capsize someone else's beliefs. When it goes extremely well for you, your own beliefs get capsized.
I would treat the question of God's existence (for some particular conception of 'God', case by case) as a theoretical question, not distinct in this sense from any other theoretical question. The value added by the practices of justification will apply, just like any other area of inquiry or discourse. If you are trying to give this particular area of discourse a special exemption for some reason, I do not understand what would merit that special treatment.