I, vistesd, am not true. I am not false.
I take my existence as a fact. I take the following statement as true: “It is the case that vistesd exists.”
—I will continue to be insistent over the distinction between (a) fact, as that which is the case; and (b) truth, as a statement that accurately represents that which is the case; though I think I understood what sonship was after. To say that “I am not true” is not true—or false—if we are taking about existence: it is meaningless. There may be some other language game (contextual discourse) whose context could render such a statement about my “trueness” (or not) meaningful for those engaged in that language game.
Further, I take my own existence as a “brute fact” , in this sense— Since my senses and my consciousness are part and parcel of what I take it to mean for me to exist—to what else could I appeal for confirmation? What evidence could there possibly be for my existence that is not filtered through my senses and consciousness—i.e., my existence? I do not even rely on “my” senses and consciousness to “tell me” that “I” exist. That would be a confusion. They are what “I” am.
—“One of the most misleading representational techniques in our language is the use of the word 'I.'” (Wittgenstein) This is the kind of case where it seems quite easy to become “bewitched by our own language” (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 109).
Wittgenstein made this point in On Certainty. Some kinds of doubt undermine themselves—for example, any doubt that I exist, such that there could be any sense in seeking confirmation from some exogenous source. (If I were to seriously question whether or not I exist at all, it is my brain chemistry that ought to be examined, not logic or some external evidence.* ) Such doubts undermine the very notion of evidentiary justification. As Wittgenstein said (using a different example): "I would not know what such a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not.” (OC, 231; my emphasis) In the example at hand, I do not know what could be counted as evidence and what not.
Further: “To be sure there is justification; but justification comes to an end.” (OC, 192) And: “The reasonable man does not have certain doubts.” (OC, 220; italics in original)
Note that none of this has to do with taking anything on faith. It just has to do with what I cannot sensibly doubt, such that there could be any evidence that could sensibly count toward resolving that doubt; to attempt to do so would just accentuate the absurdity.
*As I recall, Descartes did not question his existence per se, in his skeptical thought experiment, but the form of that existence. In any event, I am not a Cartesian skeptic. I mention “brain chemistry”, not to be flippant, but just to allow for some psychiatric condition that could result in such an absurdity.