Judgement day? When a god knows all?

Originally posted by DeepThought
...and they are overwhelmingly likely to choose either 37 or 73, so his choice of example was entirely predictable.

You mean it can be narrowed down to most likely one of two options. Not quite 'entirely predictable'.
But the real question here, is if you had a computer that was programmed to always produce the number 37, is it entirely predictable, ie is there no possibility that it will either pick another number or fail to pick anything?
My own opinion is that the future is predictable only to a certain degree, and that the past is also only predictable to a certain degree. But predictions in the past tend to converge, whereas predictions in the future tend to diverge, resulting in past predictions being much more reliable. This is all related to entropy.

My general opinion on the threads topic is that most people haven't really thought through what 'free will' is or what they want it to be. Most people hold a somewhat incoherent view of free will.

Originally posted by DeepThought
The problem with your list is that you haven't distinguished between God's knowledge of different possible worlds. G knows P in the actual world, but that doesn't entail that P is true in all possible worlds since G can also know ¬P in some other possible world.

1) Necessarily G knows P is true in world 1.
2) G in world 2 knows P is true in world 1.
3) so (1) does not entail that P is true in world 2.

I don't think there is any problem with my list. I never said or in any way implied that G's knowing P in the actual world would entail that P is true in all possible worlds. After all, P could just be contingently true. Rather, what my list shows is that "Necessarily P" does follow from "Necessarily G knows P". You can also see this clearly from the following argument:

(a) Necessarily, G knows P. (Taken on supposition.)

(b) Necessarily, if G knows P then P. (Just expresses that the consequent follows with necessity from the antecedent, from the analysis of knowledge.)

(c) If necessarily A; and if necessarily (A -> B); then necessarily B. (A transfer of necessity principle.)

(d) Therefore, necessarily P.

My point is, I think bbarr misspoke before. The discussion we had in those threads did not show that the libertarian theist's position can be safe because "necessarily P" does not follow from "necessarily G knows P". Rather, I think it showed that a libertarian theist's position can be safe because they are not actually committed to "necessarily G knows P". They can get everything they want from "Necessarily, if P then G knows P". This condition secures what they want, but is immune from fatalism, as far as I can tell.

Originally posted by twhitehead
My general opinion on the threads topic is that most people haven't really thought through what 'free will' is or what they want it to be. Most people hold a somewhat incoherent view of free will.

Free will is not a coherent concept as it is normally envisioned, as was demonstrated to me in a previous thread. We have something beyond freedom to act, but quite what it is is one of those "make your career in philosophy" things.

Originally posted by LemonJello

The crux of the matter was that even if, necessarily, God knows P, it doesn't follow that P is itself necessary.

(1) Necessarily G knows P.
(2) So, G knows P in every possible world.
(3) So, P is true in every possible world.
(4) Therefore: necessarily P.

No?

If the libertarian theist sticks to an infallibility condition like "N ...[text shortened]... s seems to ensure perfect foreknowledge for G and yet it is compatible with libertarian freedom.

Sorry, I was assuming the conditional (that P is true of some agent's action) but didn't make it explicit. From 'Necessarily, God knows P' it follows that there are no contingent truths. That's crazy. The point of the previous discussion was that from 'Necessarily, if P, then God knows P', it doesn't follow that 'Necessarily, P'. This allows God to know contingent truths about agents' actions, which in turns allows the libertarian to say that it's possible that agents could have done otherwise even though God knows, and always has known, what they would do.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think there is any problem with my list. I never said or in any way implied that G's knowing P in the actual world would entail that P is true in all possible worlds. After all, P could just be contingently true. Rather, what my list shows is that "Necessarily P" does follow from "Necessarily G knows P". You can also see this clearly from the ...[text shortened]... s P". This condition secures what they want, but is immune from fatalism, as far as I can tell.

Yep, this is correct.

Originally posted by LemonJello
I don't think there is any problem with my list. I never said or in any way implied that G's knowing P in the actual world would entail that P is true in all possible worlds. After all, P could just be contingently true. Rather, what my list shows is that "Necessarily P" does follow from "Necessarily G knows P". You can also see this clearly from the ...[text shortened]... s P". This condition secures what they want, but is immune from fatalism, as far as I can tell.

I assume that your definition of knowledge is something along the lines of justified belief which is true (at least to some precision). If something is true in all possible worlds then we don't have free will about it whether God exists or not. Since the scope of our discussion is things we have free will about they must be contingently true, there has to be a possible world with ¬P otherwise it is outside the scope of our discussion. Your statement in this post reads differently to the one in the previous post. You seem to be saying in the one I'm replying to now that if P is true in the actual world then G knows P out of necessity. But that is different to the statement necessarily G knows P therefore necessarily P.

I've got to admit that modal logic isn't exactly a strong point. The book I read got as far as first order logic, it didn't include predicates with predicates or ideas like necessity. Give me a chance to read the threads and I'll tell you what I think about your statement.

Edit: I wrote this post while bbarr was posting so I see that we aren't actually disagreeing.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Hi Kelly, the argument is that omniscience is incompatible with the notion of free will. God can predict all possible worlds given the initial conditions, what is more God knows what the actual world among all possible worlds will be at any time. If God was able to predict what I'd write in this post with 100% accuracy and precision I don't really have ...[text shortened]... ill. After all omnipotence must include the power and self-control not to exercise omnipotence.

The argument really is we cannot do it, nor can we see even see how it
could be done. That does not mean that God cannot do it with His ability
to see all variables at once from the smallest and fastest to the largest
and slowest and all points in between so He can work it all out at once.

Free will simply is us making a choice nothing more, not us making a
choice under threat, or us being programmed to make a choice.

For God it isn't a matter of prediction, He gives us something we cannot
create the ability to do as we will. The issue we have with that is that we
are without doubt doing as we will. We see people seeing evil in others
no matter what they do and say just because they want to see it, it may
be there and it may not, but they will find it. We see others that excuse
all manner of evil in others and will make excuses in what they see just
so they can excuse it. Rare is the person that looks at things honestly and
sees things as they really are.

I think God is the only one who can give freewill, and I'll tell you this in my
opinion Adam and Eve were the only two that really had it. After that we
all have been tainted with a sin nature that actually pulls us into focusing
on ourselves above others, we will dislike that which we don't agree with
instead of looking for truth we will look for reasons to dismiss, going back
to my earlier point. He can give us freewill and allow us to act it out while
trying to direct us into a better way, but we choose. Which means we will
be held accountable for our choices.

If we are unable to exercise self-control than we would be lost, He has
made away for us in His Son to set us free from our nature which binds us
to a sinful way of life.

Originally posted by bbarr
Back in 2010, we really hashed out this question in a couple threads:

Thread 130680
Thread 133337

After much modal logic, the conclusion was that perfect foreknowledge is actually compatible with the libertarian notion of free will. The crux of the matter was that even if, necessarily, God knows P, it doesn't follow that P is ...[text shortened]... he best threads I've come across in over 12 years on RHP. They're well worth reading carefully.

I have not read them yet, but I'm about to.
I'd submit to you that it doesn't matter if God knows the choices, it only
matters if we were free to do as we will, those are two different things!

Knowing an event will occur does not mean you direct it to, it only means
you know it will occur. This isn't like a pool game where the shooter can
tell where all the balls will bounce once s/he shoots, it is are you free to
choose? With choice we see people under threat caving in and those who
remain faithful to what they think is true, all the pressure was the same
and still some choose this over that. With advertising some buy the
product some do not, they choose.

Our problems are that without God we are stuck in a place where we are
bound by the nature we were given at birth. To be freed of that we need
something more than what we are.

Creation is more than a computer program with a countless number of
'ifs', 'then', and 'else' statements for humans to be programmed with.

Originally posted by KellyJay
I have not read them yet, but I'm about to.
I'd submit to you that it doesn't matter if God knows the choices, it only
matters if we were free to do as we will, those are two different things!

We came to the same conclusion.

Originally posted by KellyJay
The argument really is we cannot do it, nor can we see even see how it
could be done. That does not mean that God cannot do it with His ability
to see all variables at once from the smallest and fastest to the largest
and slowest and all points in between so He can work it all out at once.

Free will simply is us making a choice nothing more, not us ma ...[text shortened]... e away for us in His Son to set us free from our nature which binds us
to a sinful way of life.

Possibly the best we can hope for is to look at things honestly and realise that we won't see things as they really are every time. I think that your argument boils down to something along the lines of "God is not subject to (human) logic"?

In your reply to bbarr you said:

Creation is more than a computer program with a countless number of 'ifs', 'then', and 'else' statements for humans to be programmed with.

This is a huge metaphysical claim. Want to expand on it?

Originally posted by DeepThought
Hi thanks for the links, I'm about half way through the first of them. I couldn't help chuckling about this post from Agerg:[quote]For all intents and purposes, to say your god knows infallibly the future is tantamount to the assertion the future is fixed. There can no variability. Saying it knows all future is no more informative than me knowing all po ...[text shortened]... rwhelmingly likely to choose either 37 or 73, so his choice of example was entirely predictable.

I don't actually see what there is to chuckle about really (assuming the face palm sort of chuckle that is) - perhaps 4 years ago when I made that post I was well aware of the fact that 37 was a likely random choice in {1, ..., 100} and chose that number specifically to make the point that highly likely is NOT equivalent to certain.

Or perhaps otherwise that consideration wasn't on my mind and I did indeed make a pseudo-random choice. But then that being the case, I still didn't, obviously at least, defeat my own argument with what you think is a blunder simply because either:

a) Certain psychological characteristics about the problem of choosing a random number in {1, ..., 100} preclude a large subset of that set (and so I didn't really have free-will to choose those any more than I have free-will to think my name is Albert), and from the set which remained, if other situational variables compelled me to choose 37. then it is difficult to argue I had any free will (consistent with my argument). Or otherwise

b) It could not be guaranteed that had I made that post a moment later, my thought processes would not have compelled a different choice - in which case my choosing 37 was NOT entirely predictable (again consistent with my argument).


It remains for me to revisit and reflect upon the argument made by bbarr later in the thread. I still hold, at the moment, that it is impossible to infallibly know P at time t of timeline T in world w of universe U and for then ¬P to happen at time t of timeline T in world w of universe U - but perhaps there is something I am missing.



Edit, on revisiting that argument and the follow up posts by LJ and Bbarr here I am seeing the argument is that of
a) P implies God infallibly knows P
b) God infallibly knows P does not imply ¬P is not possible

(a) is comfortable with free will whilst (b) isn't (since it reduces to God infallibly knows P does not imply P - a contradiction), and where in the past I would have been scratching my head with (a) it kind of makes sense to me now.

Originally posted by sonhouse
Why would there be a judgement day when a god would have known when the universe and Earth was created, who would be naughty and who would be nice, this deity would have known that from day 1.

So why would there be a NEED for a judgement day? Or ANY of the tests put up in the bible. Like poor old Abe asked to off his own son Isaac.

A god would have k ...[text shortened]... at old Abe would have gone through with it. So why the test when it knew beforehand the outcome.

See if this helps:

"The Bible leaves us in no doubt as to God’s having foreknowledge. He knows “from the beginning the finale,” says Isaiah 46:10. He even used human secretaries to record many prophecies. (2 Peter 1:21) What is more, those prophecies always come true because God has both the wisdom and the power to fulfill them in every detail. Hence, God can not only foreknow but also foreordain events whenever he chooses to do so. However, does God foreordain the destiny of every human or even the total number who will gain salvation? Not according to the Bible.

The Bible teaches that God is selective when it comes to foreordaining the future. For example, God foretold that “a great crowd” of righteous humans would survive the destruction of the wicked at the end of the present system of things. (Revelation 7:9, 14) Note, though, that God did not give a specific number for that great crowd. The reason? He does not predestinate individuals. God is like the loving father of a large family. He knows that at least some of His children will reciprocate His love, but He does not predetermine the number.

Compare God’s use of foreordination with the way he uses his power. As the Almighty, God has absolute power. (Psalm 91:1; Isaiah 40:26, 28) But does he use his power in an uncontrolled manner? No. For instance, he held back from acting against Babylon, an enemy of ancient Israel, until the time was right. “I kept exercising self-control,” God said. (Isaiah 42:14) The same principle applies to his use of foreknowledge and foreordination. Jehovah exercises self-control in order to respect the free will that he gave us.

God’s control of his powers does not limit him or render him imperfect. In fact, it magnifies his greatness, and it endears him to us, for it shows that his sovereignty truly is exercised not only with omniscience and power but also with love and respect for the free will of his intelligent creation.
On the other hand, if God predetermines everything, including every nasty accident and vile deed that has ever happened, could we not rightly blame him for all the misery and suffering in the world? Thus, upon closer inspection, the teaching of predestination does not honor God, but casts a pall over him. It paints him as cruel, unjust, and unloving—the very opposite of what the Bible says about him.—Deuteronomy 32:4." Awake 2009

Originally posted by Agerg
I don't actually see what there is to chuckle about really (assuming the face palm sort of chuckle that is) - perhaps 4 years ago when I made that post I was well aware of the fact that 37 was a likely random choice in {1, ..., 100} and chose that number specifically to make the point that highly likely is NOT equivalent to certain.

Or perhaps otherwise tha ...[text shortened]... here in the past I would have been scratching my head with (a) it kind of makes sense to me now.

Sorry, I should have made clear that I thought your post was perfectly reasonable. It was just slightly ironic that the number you chose was predictable.

Edit:

I still hold, at the moment, that it is impossible to infallibly know P at time t of timeline T in world w of universe U and for then ¬P to happen at time t of timeline T in world w of universe U - but perhaps there is something I am missing.

I think that that sentence is correct. But it's a little eyewatering, what I think you intend by timeline is a specific possible world. In philosophy (I think) the universe is the universe of discourse (what the conversation is about) and world means the entire universe - so another possible world means a copy of this universe, but where something is different - such as one where I didn't make this edit. But yes infallibly knowing P will be true in a given possible world means that when it is time t in that world ¬P cannot be true.

Originally posted by DeepThought
Sorry, I should have made clear that I thought your post was perfectly reasonable. It was just slightly ironic that the number you chose was predictable.

Edit:
[quote]I still hold, at the moment, that it is impossible to infallibly know P at time t of timeline T in world w of universe U and for then ¬P to happen at time t of timeline T in world w of ...[text shortened]... be true in a given possible world means that when it is time t in that world ¬P cannot be true.

That still doesn't answer the question as to why a deity would put out those tests when it knows full well the outcome. Therefore the test was not needed and all that shows is more the idea that said deity is man made.