Life after Death

Originally posted by bbarr
Are you sure you're not talking about (6)? (5) doesn't seem to have anything to do with multiple or parallel universes, but rather with a universe progressing as though its present state resulted from any number of possible pasts. There are interpretations of quantum mechanics, in particular interpretations of the metaphysics of the collapse of superposition ...[text shortened]... niverses. The Many-Worlds hypothesis and the Many-Minds hypothesis both have this entailment.

Cosmos and Time for the Tibetan Buddhism is unique and One, and includes infinite universes, each one of them totally unique but stiil in response with any other; one could say that this idea resembles too much with the very essence of the existence of a human being. It is uncertain if cosmos began as a universe progressing as though its present state resulted from any number of possible pasts. The quality of Time (kalpa) for Tibetan Buddhism is extremely eccentric;

Originally posted by bbarr
Wait, isn't (1) above just a denial of one entailment of H's uncertainty principle? Since position and momentum are complementary properties for particles like electrons, if we decide to measure the momentum of these particles we are thereby precluded from determining their position.

The uncertainty principle arises from the fact that any given measurement can result from more than one possible past.

What does (2) have to do with quantum mechanics at all? Even classical systems are such that, possibly, a complete specification of their states at a particular time does not entail respectively unique past states. Further, this does not entail that we cannot know which past states gave rise to the current states.
Doesn't it? How so? How would you tell the difference?
Or am I misunderstanding you?

What does (4) have to do with two-slit experiments? These experiments purport to show that our choice of experimental methodology determines whether light behaves as we would expect either a particle or a wave to behave (e.g., we observe diffraction in some experimental setups, but not others).
The two slit experiment is at the heart of what I am talking about. Forget about waves, as they are a mathematical model that just happens to match closely the result of what I am talking about.
The two slit experiment:
a. Take a light source emitting 1 photon per second in the general direction of a screen.
b. Place in front of light source an obstruction with two slits.
c. Place a detector behind obstruction.
d. The photons will be detected, but we cannot know which slit they passed through.
e. Oddly enough we will observe that over time, a pattern is formed showing us that they more often arrive at certain bands in the same direction as the slits (the pattern is reminiscent of the pattern formed when waves pass through two slits).
f. If we block one slit, only half the number of photons will arrive at the detector, we will know which slit they passed through and they will produce a uniform pattern at the detector (not a banded pattern).
g. We block the other slit and observe the same.
h. So the banding pattern only arises when we do not (cannot) know what the recent past of the photon is.

How is (5) not trivial? If the total state of the universe at a particular time is consistent with any number of possible pasts, then of course the universe will behave as though any of those pasts actually took place.
It is not as trivial as it seems. The banding pattern in the two slit experiment it decidedly odd.

I don't understand (6). In particular, I don't understand what it means for possible futures to diverge very fast. Could you explain?
When an atom absorbs a photon, we can often know with certainty which direction it came from, ie we can predict the past. However, when it emits a photon, we often cannot predict which direction it is going. Its hard to explain, but it is a phenomena that arises directly from the increase in entropy over time. The only reason why we can predict past events is because we know for certain that the past had a lower entropy than the present.
Its complicated and I am afraid I dont have any good examples to explain it with.

Originally posted by twhitehead
The uncertainty principle arises from the fact that any given measurement can result from more than one possible past.

What does (2) have to do with quantum mechanics at all? Even classical systems are such that, possibly, a complete specification of their states at a particular time does not entail respectively unique past states. Further, t ...[text shortened]... s e present.
Its complicated and I am afraid I dont have any good examples to explain it with.

No, the uncertainty principle results from the fact that the act of measuring a particle messes with the particle because we have to reflect something off of it to get a measurement. In fact, in his Chicago Lectures, Heisenberg claimed that uncertainty relations do not hold for the past (e.g., if we know precisely the momentum of a particle prior to measuring its position, we can calculate backwards its trajectory).

If some possible pasts are extremely unlikely, then that could constitute sufficient evidence to deny that they are live options for explanation. That we cannot be certain about this is immaterial, since knowledge does not require certainty.

Yes, I'm familiar with the two-slit experiment. But nothing above clears up my confusion about the relationship between the results of this experiment and your notion of possible pasts. If anything, these experiments show that our choice of experimental methodology influences the way in which quantum systems behave.

Yes, I understand that it is difficult to predict the evolution of physical systems. But I was asking about the divergence of possible futures. What does this mean? Does it mean simply that there are a rapidly increasing number of possible outcomes of measurement of dynamic systems? If so, then this holds for complex classical systems as well (e.g., the weather, or wave patterns on the surface of a body of water).

Originally posted by Badwater
I don't know how I got here, I just showed up one day. I don't know if my consciousness of myself makes me other than my biological self. I have no idea what happens when I die.

I'm willing to attribute the "I don't know" of my pre-existence and post-existence to some sort of creator force; label it theism if you like. I'm also willing to entertain the p ...[text shortened]... ddress that question is central to whatever meaning we care to invest into our existence.

Does it matter? How any of us address that question is central to whatever meaning we care to invest into our existence.

You lost me here. Does what matter; what question are you claiming is so central to our imbuing our lives with meaning?

Originally posted by stoker
to the original question, its not a matter when you die, you will die at some point the hour of it is in question, and the same rule applies. im on the side of life after death, and the sins in this life revealed. whos life is found in the balance which side you are put is up to you. ie if you die at birth you are not in sin, if you die latter in life then the scales start to tip

im on the side of life after death, and the sins in this life revealed.

Alright, but why should I take your side seriously?

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]Does it matter? How any of us address that question is central to whatever meaning we care to invest into our existence.

You lost me here. Does what matter; what question are you claiming is so central to our imbuing our lives with meaning?[/b]

Life after death. I would suggest that if you post a topic that your mind and comments not wander, unless you're just stirring debate without the slightest modicum of reason or basis of thought. If that is the case then you've already answered the question and rendered it moot.

Originally posted by epiphinehas
[b] Is this enough to give adequate accounts of things like consciousness and agency?

It would be enough for a strict materialist, yes, but it seems that the discovery of an enfolded order, beyond the limits of the physical (i.e. Planck's length), have changed all that. Far from being infinite, we've discovered that our physical world has a limit ,' is death, but to fill your mind with the spirit is life and peace" (Rom. 8:6).[/b]

Thanks for your patience. I had to find some time where I could sit down and read through Stapp's work. I don't find the article you posted very convincing, either as a model concerning freedom of the agent or as an account that casts plausibility onto the existence of some non-physical soul.

First of all, their model really has nothing to do with genuine freedom. Their criterion for a "free" choice is that the choice is "not specified by the currently known laws of physics". I can see, assuming some libertarian construal, how this might align with what is taken as a necessary condition for freedom; but why anyone should think that this is sufficient for the choice's being "free" is beyond me. My exercising free will is supposed to be about my acting autonomously. That article has absoutely nothing meaningful to say about this subject.

In this work Stapp doesn't provide any plausible account for autonomous action; if anything at all, his theory merely pushes everything back one step. As far as I understand it, his account is along the following lines: his basic idea is that the brain superimposes between each unwilled (or, I guess what your article would call each "passive'😉 collapse, and this leads to unstable behavior which may be stabilized through the conscious intent (the willful effort) of increasing the rate of process 1 events. So, the quantum Zeno effect is how Stapp brings the will in and is critical to his theory. As I understand it, the Zeno effect basically says that, supposing we get a 'yes' measurement outcome at time t1, the likelihood that we obtain the same measurement outcome at later time t2 increases with increasing measurement frequency between t1 and t2. In other words, Stapp thinks that once a "desired" collapse occurs, willful effort can then, through the Zeno effect, "hold" this condition and thereby prevent the brain from superimposed wandering. And it also seems that Stapp's account limits the influence of the will to just this -- that of changing the rate of process 1, thereby altering dynamics through the Zeno effect. However, surely it will not be good enough (for freedom) if the will stabilizes (or is somehow forced to stabilize) just any old outcome; presumably it will be good enough only if it can wait for some "desired" outcome to stabilize. This requires some evaluative process that is really at the root of acting autonomously, and the article doesn't seem to even address it. So, I fail to see how Stapp actually addresses the root considerations of freedom in any meaningful way. If anything, he has only pushed it back, and now we are left wondering what governs, if anything, the underlying desirings and intents. Stapp fails to give much insight into just how this Zeno effect implementation would work, and, to me, it seems dangerously close to just positing some mysterious "little man" or "homunculus" in the brain that just somehow acts autonomously -- which does nothing but push the problem back one step. Very unconvincing and more or less totally irrelevant toward an account of freedom of the will I think.

In light of this, it is entirely plausible that there is life after death

Why do you say this? At first glance, I don't find Stapp's account very plausible because I just don't see how the temporal constraints are feasible (increasing the "rapidity" of process 1 through to completion of the act would require a sequence of rapid conscious events that I don't find feasible -- not to mention that the will has to first wait in order to get a desired collapse). As a result, I think if Stapp's account were true, we should expect to encounter everyday experiences of "weak will", which in fact do not occur. This was my first reaction when considering plausibility of the account. Subsequently I found the following article, which makes basically the same charge in more detail than I can give (see section VIII):

http://www.dbourget.com/papers/QLPM.pdf

For completeness, I found that Stapp also has a reply to this article:

http://sts.lbl.gov/~stapp/repB.pdf

Originally posted by Badwater
Life after death. I would suggest that if you post a topic that your mind and comments not wander, unless you're just stirring debate without the slightest modicum of reason or basis of thought. If that is the case then you've already answered the question and rendered it moot.

Oh, well excuuuuuuse me.

Now, can you explain why the question of life after death is so important to our imbuing our lives with meaning? I still don't get that part. For me, I treat the question more as an interesting descriptive inquiry into the world.

Originally posted by Penguin
No-one has mentioned buddhism.

Maybe my understanding of the philosophy/religion is wrong but I thought that Buddhists do not believe in any supernatural 'God' (hense non-theistic) but that they do believe in a non-material soul/spirit and life after death in some sort of limbo followed by re-incarnation.

Does this count as non-theistic belief in life after death?

--- Penguin

Does this count as non-theistic belief in life after death?

Yes. I was also thinking Buddhism as an example, and I think there clearly are Buddhists who fit the description. However, in no way do I think the typical Buddhist is committed to some positive belief about life after death. As I understand the initial core notions as referenced to the Buddha, they are about (dharma) practice and are decidedly agnostic concerning questions like life after death. I like Stephen Batchelor's Buddhism Without Beliefs where he laments that much of modern "Buddhism" has not remained faithful to what he takes as the "deep agnosticism" of core teachings.

Originally posted by twhitehead
Well obviously you must first define or understand what you mean by "I".
To help illustrate the problem, if you experienced brain death but your body was kept alive on a machine, would you still exist?
Exactly what percentage of brain cells must die?
If your brain was divided into two, and both halved gained conciousness, then what?
When you are aslee ...[text shortened]... more or less unconscious, do you still exist?
Does the person you were yesterday still exist?

Well obviously you must first define or understand what you mean by "I".

By the self I mean to refer to my psychology and conscious sphere, including my character (consortium of deliberation- and action-guiding dispositions that are evaluative, motivational, etc), my beliefs, my memories, etc. Further, my idea of identity (for instance, what makes me the same person I was three years ago) would be along the lines of overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness.

if you experienced brain death but your body was kept alive on a machine, would you still exist?

It would depend on the particulars and what is meant by "brain death". If you mean total brain death and, for instance, there is no longer the capacity for consciousness, then no -- the person I was no longer exists.

When you are asleep or otherwise more or less unconscious, do you still exist?

I think so. All of the capacities for the psychology I mentioned above are present when I am sleeping, even if they are not being exercised and conscious states are not occurrent. As far as I am concerned, all of the psychology is still there for the self and chains of strong connectedness.

Does the person you were yesterday still exist?

Yes, and that has to do with identity (see above).

Originally posted by bbarr
No, the uncertainty principle results from the fact that the act of measuring a particle messes with the particle because we have to reflect something off of it to get a measurement.

And we detect the reflected particle, and make an estimate of its trajectory etc. The uncertainty principle arises because the mathematics surrounding the trajectory path calculation means we cannot work out exactly the interaction of it and the particle we wish to measure. ie it has more than one possible past.

You keep trying to separate 'classical' physics, yet what I am saying is that physics is classical (ie forget about waves) and that it is the impossibility of knowing certain information at small scales that gives rise to quantum effects - though the probability effects might conceivably be considered non-classical.

Originally posted by LemonJello
By the self I mean to refer to my psychology and conscious sphere, including my character (consortium of deliberation- and action-guiding dispositions that are evaluative, motivational, etc), my beliefs, my memories, etc. Further, my idea of identity (for instance, what makes me the same person I was three years ago) would be along the lines of overlapping chains of strong psychological connectedness.

It is important to note that your concept of identity is 'gray edged' ie we can subtract bits of it in a continuous manner such that you will not be able to accurately identify when your identity is finally lost.
When you die, you will disappear bit by bit. When you were 'created' you appeared bit by bit. Your identity concept means that the embryo that lead to your body, was not infact you, and you were formed gradually as your brain developed, and you have been changing ever since.

Originally posted by twhitehead
It is important to note that your concept of identity is 'gray edged' ie we can subtract bits of it in a continuous manner such that you will not be able to accurately identify when your identity is finally lost.
When you die, you will disappear bit by bit. When you were 'created' you appeared bit by bit. Your identity concept means that the embryo that ...[text shortened]... nd you were formed gradually as your brain developed, and you have been changing ever since.

It is important to note that your concept of identity is 'gray edged' ie we can subtract bits of it in a continuous manner such that you will not be able to accurately identify when your identity is finally lost.

This strikes me as similar to the sorites paradox charge. I'm not sure why I should feel affected by it. Suppose I asked you to describe for me something -- say a gold coin. There would be some identity to this hypothetical coin: for instance, the coin could undergo changes like becoming scratched or worn or tarnished or subsequently cleaned up or what-have-you; and yet it would still be the "same coin" over the course of these times. Now, we could hypothetically remove just a single atom from your coin and surely it would still be the same coin. However, if we repeat similar small eliminations over and over and over again, eventually we would be left with small little globs of gold that could hardly be said to be your original coin -- in the extreme, we would remove all the original atoms leaving nothing. So, if you cannot "accurately identify" when precisely during the course of these eliminations your original gold coin no longer exists, then clearly there's something defective and "gray edged" about your concept of a gold coin (or the identity thereof). Does this strike you as a compelling argument? Does it make you feel the need to run after a new understanding of what a gold coin is or how a gold coin can remain the same gold coin over time? I doubt it.

Your identity concept means that the embryo that lead to your body, was not infact you

That's right, and I would consider that a sanity check for my view. I think the idea that *I* was once an embryo is absurd, considering that the embryo has no mentality to speak of and, for example, lacks the capacity for consciousness.

Your identity concept means that ... you were formed gradually as your brain developed

My view means that I came into existence sometime after the mind came into existence, which in turn came into existence sometime after the body. Many of the biological processes and developments involved could be said to be gradual, yes.

and you have been changing ever since.

Yes, of course. We are temporal beings and agents, so I would certainly hope that my view admits that I change over time and acquire different properties. Even so, there will be persistent psychological features that go into the "chains" (of the "overlapping chains" for identity), and there may be some abiding features that will simply always enter into who I am.

Originally posted by LemonJello
Does it make you feel the need to run after a new understanding of what a gold coin is or how a gold coin can remain the same gold coin over time? I doubt it.

There is no need for a new 'gold coin' concept. However, as long as the concept is gray edged, it can be difficult to answer questions relating to continued existence when a significant proportion of the properties commonly used to describe the coin are changed. For example, if I use a press to change the pictures on the coin, is it still the same gold coin? It is still a coin, it is still the same gold atoms, but to what extent is its pattern on its face a part of its continued identity?

Now back to the concept of personal identity. If we destroyed your body then reconstituted it 10 years later, would it still be you? What if we reconstituted it 10 years earlier? What if we made two or more copies?

If you suffered from a disease which caused you to loose most of your memories or a significant personality change, would you still be you? If not, then it in my mind causes major problems for any possible concept of life after death. The question would be, which personality would continue after death, the original one, or the modified one? Or both?

Originally posted by twhitehead
The question would be, which personality would continue after death, the original one, or the modified one? Or both?

I would say that none would be the coherent answer.

The theist that believes in the concept of the soul can simply say that during his life time his personalities were conditioned by the combination of both body and soul, with the body being the constraint. For example, not many theists would believe that a lobotomy wouldn't affect his earthly personality.

In that sense, none of his earthly personalities were unconstrained, but his afterlife's personality would be.