Moral Relativity

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
However do people attain this objectivity without reference to some authorised code?

(Ha ha).

People don't "attain this objectivity". Moral facts are just objective in themselves. That doesn't mean that people ever come to know these facts. People do and don't to different degress, and no one can ever know for sure how much they do and don't, though there are some cases where I think we can be fairly sure, but any moral assertion is always defeasble. So, there is plenty of "room" for modesty, difference, and debate once moral objectivity is tempered with epistemological uncertainty.

And a code would only help to the extent that it mapped on to the objective moral order faithfully. And if it did, it would then be a very complex code, admitting all sort of labyrintine qualifications. Such a code is only ever going to be approximated.

Also, kind of like John Searle in his Chinese Room doesn't understand Chinese just by blindly manipulating symbols, so you don't understand morality just by blindly following a preexisting code, even if perfectly correct. Moral syntax is not sufficient for moral semantics.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
And [b]that is the million-dollar question.[/b]

I question your mercenary motives 🙂

Originally posted by Pawnokeyhole
People don't "attain this objectivity". Moral facts are just objective in themselves. That doesn't mean that people ever come to know these facts. People do and don't to different degress, and no one can ever know for sure how much they do and don't, though there are some cases where I think we can be fairly sure, but any moral assertion is always ...[text shortened]... preexisting code, even if perfectly correct. Moral syntax is not sufficient for moral semantics.

In this context, I wonder if the distinction between epistemic relativism and ontological relativism isn't a bit trivial. I mean, if you cannot be certain that a particular action or code is/isn't moral then what difference does it make whether it is absolutely moral or not?

Originally posted by lucifershammer
In this context, I wonder if the distinction between epistemic relativism and ontological relativism isn't a bit trivial. I mean, if you cannot be certain that a particular action or code is/isn't moral then what difference does it make whether it is absolutely moral or not?

Surely it matters whether someone does something objectively right or wrong quite apart from whether they know it is objectively right or wrong. I am not saying the latter doesn't matter; but surely the former does not matter only because of the latter.

Originally posted by Pawnokeyhole
Surely it matters whether someone does something objectively right or wrong quite apart from whether they know it is objectively right or wrong. I am not saying the latter doesn't matter; but surely the former does not matter only because of the latter.

From a practical perspective, it does not aid moral action if we cannot be certain what at least some of the tenets of the objective moral code are.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
From a practical perspective, it does not aid moral action if we cannot be certain what at least some of the tenets of the objective moral code are.

True, but that does not negate my previous assertion.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Might objective morality not be unnecessary if every moral choice is contingent upon one particular instance, thus not repeatable?

Today, I think that objective morality is an illusion. What counts is right action. (Insert Taoist or other paradox here). Speculation before or after the event is vain.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Today, I think that objective morality is an illusion. What counts is right action. (Insert Taoist or other paradox here). Speculation before or after the event is vain.

"Objective morality" / "right action" - what's the difference? If an action is right it is objectively moral and vice-versa.

Looks like you object more to the term "objective morality" (perhaps it comes too close to established religion) than the concept itself.

Originally posted by lucifershammer
"Objective morality" / "right action" - what's the difference?

The difference as I see it is that objective morality would enable me to judge all actions before, after or during the event. Right action in the sense I'm using it (the Taoist sense) is simply doing what makes sense without necessarily even thinking about it. Every action is unique; objectivity does not exist.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Today, I think that objective morality is an illusion. What counts is right action. (Insert Taoist or other paradox here). Speculation before or after the event is vain.

And objective morality wasn't an illusion yesterday?

How did that change occur? If morality really is objective, then it doesn't matter what the contingent cultural or historical consensus is. That is what objective *means*. Morality was never objective or it always has, and always will be, objective.

Why is speculation prior to action vain? Aren't some ethical matters tricky to decide and deserving of prolonged, careful consideration?

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
The difference as I see it is that objective morality would enable me to judge all actions before, after or during the event. Right action in the sense I'm using it (the Taoist sense) is simply doing what makes sense without necessarily even thinking about it. Every action is unique; objectivity does not exist.

As I have pointed out, objective morality does not automatically enable anyone to answer a moral question. It only means that there always is an answer in principle, not that anyone will be able to find that answer in practice.

Doing what makes sense? But people differ on what makes sense. Does it make sense to behead gays or social integrate them?

I agree that, sometimes, too much moral thought can be antithetical to moral action.

Your last line is a clear non-sequitar. Compare: every act of scientific investigation is unique; objectivity does not exist.