Moral responsibiliy
02 Apr '06 09:19Moral responsibility.
At lemonJellow's suggestion I think it would be good to discuss moral responsibility given free will is perhaps (how shall I put this) taken for granted.
First thing that should be cleared up is the definition of free will. Most people use a definition of free will called libertarian which entails that at time T, I could have chosen to do A or B. There are a few objections to this, 1) it is a presupposition of science that my ensuing action would be determined and hence you could only act one way (i.e. A and not B), and 2) Any event that is indeterminate is random. So a libertarian idea of free will is absurd because we must then accept that our actions are random.
The other definition is called compatibilist. It argues that I determine my actions so that at time T, I could not do A, because I wanted or willed to do B- and I have free will if I am free to do it (this strangely resembles a definition of just plain freedom). This also seems to be a kind of semantic escapism since all it has done is re-define our libertarian free will in order to make it true. It does not seem to logically follow that moral responsibility is conferred to this free willing agent described by the compatibilist since even before I was born my actions were determined (so how are the antecedent events that dictated my actions my fault?). If my actions are determined by my will, then to be morally responsible I must be accountable for my will, but am I? How do I choose my will? My will [to me] is part of my being and I am not accountable for my being and hence my will. Or am I?
To me moral responsibility and accountability entail that I could have acted otherwise. So if I do evil, I am morally accountable for this evil if I could have acted otherwise. This immediately relies on a libertarian free will which has already been discredited.
If I should have done otherwise but could not have done otherwise, how am I morally responsible? It seems to be an unfair demand on a person.
This is probably a frenetic presentation of ideas and I am eager to be quickly corrected in some areas I might have lapsed on. I should also have added in some detail that moral responsibility, although perhaps logically untenable was selected through evolutionary processes... but maybe more adept evolution proponents might explain this.
In short I guess, is free will a necessary condition for moral responsibility?
At lemonJellow's suggestion I think it would be good to discuss moral responsibility given free will is perhaps (how shall I put this) taken for granted.
First thing that should be cleared up is the definition of free will. Most people use a definition of free will called libertarian which entails that at time T, I could have chosen to do A or B. There are a few objections to this, 1) it is a presupposition of science that my ensuing action would be determined and hence you could only act one way (i.e. A and not B), and 2) Any event that is indeterminate is random. So a libertarian idea of free will is absurd because we must then accept that our actions are random.
The other definition is called compatibilist. It argues that I determine my actions so that at time T, I could not do A, because I wanted or willed to do B- and I have free will if I am free to do it (this strangely resembles a definition of just plain freedom). This also seems to be a kind of semantic escapism since all it has done is re-define our libertarian free will in order to make it true. It does not seem to logically follow that moral responsibility is conferred to this free willing agent described by the compatibilist since even before I was born my actions were determined (so how are the antecedent events that dictated my actions my fault?). If my actions are determined by my will, then to be morally responsible I must be accountable for my will, but am I? How do I choose my will? My will [to me] is part of my being and I am not accountable for my being and hence my will. Or am I?
To me moral responsibility and accountability entail that I could have acted otherwise. So if I do evil, I am morally accountable for this evil if I could have acted otherwise. This immediately relies on a libertarian free will which has already been discredited.
If I should have done otherwise but could not have done otherwise, how am I morally responsible? It seems to be an unfair demand on a person.
This is probably a frenetic presentation of ideas and I am eager to be quickly corrected in some areas I might have lapsed on. I should also have added in some detail that moral responsibility, although perhaps logically untenable was selected through evolutionary processes... but maybe more adept evolution proponents might explain this.
In short I guess, is free will a necessary condition for moral responsibility?
Back to Top