06 Jun '05 21:21>
As I understand it (from various threads in this forum), a person S is said to know proposition P if and only if:
A1. P is true.
A2. S believes P.
A3. S is justified in his/her belief of P.
There is a fourth condition - Gettier's condition (http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html) that might not be relevant to this discussion (hopefully!)
Suppose P1 is "S thinks". Then clearly S knows P1. Not only that, but S knows that he knows P:
B1. It is true that S knows P1.
B2. S believes that he knows P1.
B3. S is justified in believing that he knows P1.
Now, suppose P2 is "There is a cherry tree outside S's house". If:
C1. P2 is true.
C2. S believes P2.
C3. S is justified in believing P2 (he can see, smell and feel the tree)
then S knows P2. But does S know that he knows P2 (let's call this P3)? For him to be justified in believing P3, he must be able to confirm the truth of C1 above. However, his only means of confirming C1 are to use his senses and memory - and both may be compromised (people hallucinate, sometimes remember things wrong).
It seems to me, then, that although S may know a proposition, he cannot always know that he knows; he will have to act as though he does; i.e. he will have to take it on faith. And though this does not affect JTB "theory" itself (because it is a theory of knowledge, not truth), it certainly seems to put limits on its usability.
A1. P is true.
A2. S believes P.
A3. S is justified in his/her belief of P.
There is a fourth condition - Gettier's condition (http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html) that might not be relevant to this discussion (hopefully!)
Suppose P1 is "S thinks". Then clearly S knows P1. Not only that, but S knows that he knows P:
B1. It is true that S knows P1.
B2. S believes that he knows P1.
B3. S is justified in believing that he knows P1.
Now, suppose P2 is "There is a cherry tree outside S's house". If:
C1. P2 is true.
C2. S believes P2.
C3. S is justified in believing P2 (he can see, smell and feel the tree)
then S knows P2. But does S know that he knows P2 (let's call this P3)? For him to be justified in believing P3, he must be able to confirm the truth of C1 above. However, his only means of confirming C1 are to use his senses and memory - and both may be compromised (people hallucinate, sometimes remember things wrong).
It seems to me, then, that although S may know a proposition, he cannot always know that he knows; he will have to act as though he does; i.e. he will have to take it on faith. And though this does not affect JTB "theory" itself (because it is a theory of knowledge, not truth), it certainly seems to put limits on its usability.