As I understand it (from various threads in this forum), a person S is said to know proposition P if and only if:
A1. P is true.
A2. S believes P.
A3. S is justified in his/her belief of P.
There is a fourth condition - Gettier's condition (http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html) that might not be relevant to this discussion (hopefully!)
Suppose P1 is "S thinks". Then clearly S knows P1. Not only that, but S knows that he knows P:
B1. It is true that S knows P1.
B2. S believes that he knows P1.
B3. S is justified in believing that he knows P1.
Now, suppose P2 is "There is a cherry tree outside S's house". If:
C1. P2 is true.
C2. S believes P2.
C3. S is justified in believing P2 (he can see, smell and feel the tree)
then S knows P2. But does S know that he knows P2 (let's call this P3)? For him to be justified in believing P3, he must be able to confirm the truth of C1 above. However, his only means of confirming C1 are to use his senses and memory - and both may be compromised (people hallucinate, sometimes remember things wrong).
It seems to me, then, that although S may know a proposition, he cannot always know that he knows; he will have to act as though he does; i.e. he will have to take it on faith. And though this does not affect JTB "theory" itself (because it is a theory of knowledge, not truth), it certainly seems to put limits on its usability.
Originally posted by lucifershammerI wish I said that!
As I understand it (from various threads in this forum), a person S is said to know proposition P if and only if:
A1. P is true.
A2. S believes P.
A3. S is justified in his/her belief of P.
There is a fourth condition - Gettier's condition (http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html) that might not be relevant to this discussion (hopefully!) ...[text shortened]... ause it is a theory of knowledge, not truth), it certainly seems to put limits on its usability.
Not being so well versed in formal logic I would have said all that like this:
'I know it in my knower'! That is way too crude for these parts, I know (no pun intended), but I've wanted to point out for a while now that everyone believes things that can't be proven, once the daunting aura of philosophy introduced.
But like the two year old's continual asking 'Why Daddy?' can reach beyond the reasonable query, so the philosopher's ardent 'Can you prove that?' becomes only a sad cop-out.
Originally posted by lucifershammerS will know that he knows P3 if the following conditions obtain:
As I understand it (from various threads in this forum), a person S is said to know proposition P if and only if:
A1. P is true.
A2. S believes P.
A3. S is justified in his/her belief of P.
There is a fourth condition - Gettier's condition (http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html) that might not be relevant to this discussion (hopefully!) ...[text shortened]... ause it is a theory of knowledge, not truth), it certainly seems to put limits on its usability.
M1: S believes that he knows P3
M2: S indeed knows P3
M3: S is justified in believing that he knows P3
To take your cherry tree example, S may know that there is a cherry tree outside. S's knowledge will be contingent upon S's have good reasons for believing that there is a cherry tree outside. So, of course S will act as though there is a cherry tree outside. Now, whether S knows that he knows that there is a cherry tree outside has nothing to do with the cherry tree itself. The proposition at issue here is the proposition "S knows that there is a cherry tree outside". This proposition concerns whether conditions obtain sufficient for S to know something. He may have good reasons to believe that he knows that he knows there is a cherry tree outside, or he may not, depending on the situation at hand. None of this will change the fact that he has good reasons for believing that there is a cherry tree outside, and will act accordingly. Of course, if S not only knows that there is a cherry tree outside, but also knows that he knows there is a cherry tree outside, then presumably he will not only will S have access to the reasons in virtue of which it is justified for him to believe that there is a cherry tree outside, but also reasons in virtue of which it is justified to believe that those prior reasons are sufficient for knowing that there is a cherry tree outside. Faith doesn't enter into this at all, unless S believes, without good reason, that he knows that he knows that there is a cherry tree outside. I fail to see why this makes the JTB theory in any way impractical.
Originally posted by chinking58It is not the philsophers here who are asking for proof. We are asking for reasons. Philosophers aren't interested in establishing things with absolute certainty, because we recognize now that that is pipe-dream. What we want are good reasons for beliefs, and asking for these reasons is not the same as asking for proof.
I wish I said that!
Not being so well versed in formal logic I would have said all that like this:
'I know it in my knower'! That is way too crude for these parts, I know (no pun intended), but I've wanted to point out for a while now that everyone believes things that can't be proven, once the daunting aura of philosophy introduced.
But like ...[text shortened]... asonable query, so the philosopher's ardent 'Can you prove that?' becomes only a sad cop-out.
Originally posted by bbarrtwo weeks ago they took down a Pine tree out behind my house. had I woke up an hour later , I would have been wrong in my believe that there was a pine tree in my backyard. but still justified in the belief.
S will know that he knows P3 if the following conditions obtain:
M1: S believes that he knows P3
M2: S indeed knows P3
M3: S is justified in believing that he knows P3
To take your cherry tree example, S may know that there is a cherry tree outside. S's knowledge will be contingent upon S's have good reasons for believing that there is a cherry t ...[text shortened]... is a cherry tree outside. I fail to see why this makes the JTB theory in any way impractical.
Originally posted by frogstompIf you have a picture of that pine tree, and you show it to someone, and they look where it used to be but see no signs(stump, pine needle, hole in the ground) should they believe you? Prhaps it was another pine tree from a different place, and you're just mistaken.
two weeks ago they took down a Pine tree out behind my house. had I woke up an hour later , I would have been wrong in my believe that there was a pine tree in my backyard. but still justified in the belief.
Originally posted by Nyxiesend no1 over to investigate my claim.
If you have a picture of that pine tree, and you show it to someone, and they look where it used to be but see no signs(stump, pine needle, hole in the ground) should they believe you? Prhaps it was another pine tree from a different place, and you're just mistaken.