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Originally posted by bbarrNo, we're not. We are on the same boat where we need to make certain assumptions to make sense of the universe, the self and what our cognition itself entails. There, I agree it's inescapable. Some assumptions are necessary. The universe exists, I exist and other similar assumptions that without them communication itself would be meaningless.
And since you can't get to a description of the world without engaging in epistemology; an irreducibly normative enterprise, we're all in the same boat.
But we're not on the same boat when we start adding additional things on top of it. Additional premises that are not at all required, such as the normative premises you just mentioned. I don't find them justified at all and the excuse that "we all need to assume something" is wholly insufficient in something that is not a necessary condition for communication or understanding our own cognition.
Originally posted by PalynkaI am not talking about the assumptions needed to make sense of the universe. I'm talking about the normative assumptions needed for an account of the conditions under which we are justified in believing P, or believe P reasonably, or should believe P. Epistemology and ethics are symmetrical in this regard. Try to give an account of the conditions under which we know some proposition without taking a free normative premise.
No, we're not. We are on the same boat where we need to make certain assumptions to make sense of the universe, the self and what our cognition itself entails. There, I agree it's inescapable. Some assumptions are necessary. The universe exists, I exist and other similar assumptions that without them communication itself would be meaningless.
But we're no ...[text shortened]... ng that is not a necessary condition for communication or understanding our own cognition.
Originally posted by PalynkaIf you think your preference for P gives you a reason to pursue P, then you are committed to a normative claim about the reason-giving force of P-preferences. If you think that your preference for P gives no reason to pursue P, then if you do pursue P it will seem to you as though you're not acting at all, but merely moving about; riding shotgun in your own head. Action is something agents do, behavior is an intentional affair, and this is normative all the way down; it is governed by reasons. So, no, your example doesn't do the trick.
I also don't see why rejecting the normative requires paralysis. At all. Again, my preferences can be pretty absolute. I prefer to live, if people disagree, I don't feel bound to impartiality at all. The example is extreme but is enough.
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Originally posted by bbarrAgain, we're talking about normative premises on which we can ground moral objectiveness. Not normative premises required for any epistemological claims. You say they are similar, but they are not. Objective ethics require the same assumptions that are required for other beliefs and more. The more is what I find untenable.
I am not talking about the assumptions needed to make sense of the universe. I'm talking about the normative assumptions needed for an account of the conditions under which we are justified in believing P, or believe P reasonably, or should believe P. Epistemology and ethics are symmetrical in this regard. Try to give an account of the conditions under which we know some proposition without taking a free normative premise.
Originally posted by bbarrIt's not objective morality. How many times do I need to clarify?
If you think your preference for P gives you a reason to pursue P, then you are committed to a normative claim about the reason-giving force of P-preferences. If you think that your preference for P gives no reason to pursue P, then if you do pursue P it will seem to you as though you're not acting at all, but merely moving about; riding shotgun in your own h ...[text shortened]... ative all the way down; it is governed by reasons. So, no, your example doesn't do the trick.
Originally posted by PalynkaTry to give an account of the conditions under which we know something without employing a fundamental normative premise. You won't be able to. But that means that your account of the purely descriptive is based on a free normative premise. And that means that you can't very well allege that this is a problem in ethics, simply because ethicists take a free normative premise. But I love it that you think that one free normative premise is O.K., but two is simply untenable! Why not just say that neither is O.K., and be a skeptic? Well, because you find those parts of the world that are descriptively specifiable understandable, but don't feel the same way about the parts of the world that are only normatively specifiable. You start with what you think makes sense (for whatever reason), and then read off your normative commitments from your intuitions. But until you can give me a reason for thinking that your favorite epistemology is correct, I have no reason for taking seriously your claims about ethics.
Again, we're talking about normative premises on which we can ground moral objectiveness. Not normative premises required epistemological claims. You say they are similar, but they are not. Objective ethics require the same assumptions that are required for other beliefs and more. The more is what I find untenable.
Originally posted by bbarrMore deflection and repetion. Yawn. I already explained that only those that are necessary to make sense of our own cognition are acceptable. Feel free to address that.
Try to give an account of the conditions under which we know something without employing a fundamental normative premise. You won't be able to. But that means that your account of the purely descriptive is based on a free normative premise. And that means that you can't very well allege that this is a problem in ethics, simply because ethicists take a free ...[text shortened]... rite epistemology is correct, I have no reason for taking seriously your claims about ethics.
But until you can give me a reason for thinking that your favorite epistemology is correct, I have no reason for taking seriously your claims about ethics.
And why shouldn't I take the same position? Right, because I'm not being a pompous idiot.
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Originally posted by bbarrI'm using it in the sense of moral realism. But please tell me the dozen different philosophical uses for moral objectivism. Enlighten the plebs, if you will. Like.
I guess you need to clarify until you are clear. I have no idea how you're using the term 'objective'. There are, like, a dozen different philosophical uses of that term.
Originally posted by PalynkaO.K.: Much of our cognition deals with what we should do, not just what we should believe. So, I guess we'll need practical reasons as well as theoretical reasons. So, if an account of each type of reason requires a normative premise, I guess we'll be stuck with at least two.
More deflection and repetion. Yawn. I already explained that only those that are necessary to make sense of our own cognition are acceptable. Feel free to address that.
[b] But until you can give me a reason for thinking that your favorite epistemology is correct, I have no reason for taking seriously your claims about ethics.
And why shouldn't I take the same position? Right, because I'm not being a pompous idiot.[/b]
And, yes, you are being a pompous idiot. You're not giving an argument, but merely stamping your foot about objective morality or whatever. If you have a problem with normative premises, then articulate your problem. Then apply it to your favored epistemology. Then explain why you're not being a hypocrite.
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Originally posted by PalynkaOr, alternatively, you could just write clearly. But that's apparently too much to ask. Why don't you just stick with your current stance, you know, the hard-nosed realist who can't be bothered to give reasons.
I'm using it in the sense of moral realism. But please tell me the dozen different philosophical uses for moral objectivism. Enlighten the plebs, if you will. Like.
Edit: And moral realism is just the claim that some moral claims are true. Moral realism entails nothing about the facts that serve as truth-makers for those moral claims. Could be descriptive, could be normative. Could be objective, could be subjective (in whatever sense you're employing those terms). So, you probably don't actually mean what you just wrote.
Originally posted by bbarrI'm not stamping my foot, I'm waiting for you to address the points I'm saying.
O.K.: Much of our cognition deals with what we should do, not just what we should believe. So, I guess we'll need practical reasons as well as theoretical reasons. So, if an account of each type of reason requires a normative premise, I guess we'll be stuck with at least two.
And, yes, you are being a pompous idiot. You're not giving an argument, but mer ...[text shortened]... Then apply it to your favored epistemology. Then explain why you're not being a hypocrite.
Much of our cognition deals with what we should do, not just what we should believe.
So? AGAIN, the assumptions required for making sense of our cognition are inescapable. I can't even write the sentence without circularity. One cannot break it without assuming things for it. These are necessary assumptions. We agree up to here, I imagine.
Taking those assumptions, our cognition then deals with what we should do and even what we should believe about other things. In this category, we have ethics. I'm saying that any assumptions we require at this point on are not a necessary condition in the same way the previous are. Disagree?
I articulated my problem several times. But, of course, the problem couldn't be in your ability to understand (or pay attention), could it?
Originally posted by bbarrI'm a hard nosed realist? Wow. Have you even been reading?
Or, alternatively, you could just write clearly. But that's apparently too much to ask. Why don't you just stick with your current stance, you know, the hard-nosed realist who can't be bothered to give reasons.
Edit: And moral realism is just the claim that some moral claims are true. Moral realism entails nothing about the facts that serve as truth-mak ...[text shortened]... e you're employing those terms). So, you probably don't actually mean what you just wrote.
Originally posted by PalynkaAt least some of the assumptions needed to "make sense" of any anything at all, including our cognition, are, at the end of the day, going to be normative. It's not like there are a set of assumptions we need to make sense of the descriptive, and a different set we need to make sense of what we should do or believe. And that's because any attempt to give an account of the former presumes the assumptions of the latter. We're the ones attempting to "make sense" of whatever, and we do that from within the context of what we take to be our mental representations of the empirical world. But if anything is going to be evidence for anything, whether it be that P should be believed or that P should be done, then some assumptions about reasons are required, and these are normative, and there are some dealing with reasons for belief and some dealing with reasons for action.
I'm not stamping my foot, I'm waiting for you to address the points I'm saying.
[b]Much of our cognition deals with what we should do, not just what we should believe.
So? AGAIN, the assumptions required for making sense of our cognition are inescapable. I can't even write the sentence without circularity. One cannot break it without assuming things ...[text shortened]... ourse, the problem couldn't be in your ability to understand (or pay attention), could it?[/b]