Originally posted by twhitehead
And why not? What I find fishy is the claim that emotions are unscientific and not subject to investigation.
[b]If someone says they love you, do you ask for proof?
If it is important to me to know whether they are telling the truth then maybe I would.
But everyone here is getting too hung up on proof. I have not asked for proof nor is it part of ...[text shortened]... why can they not be reproduced in a lab? What nonsense. Lab workers have emotions too you know.[/b]
I tend to agree with Bosse. I think your insistence on “scientific” knowledge is a bit narrow (depending on how you define that term).
I might say that propositional statements about God ought to be (potentially) subject to falsification or verification by reason
or empiricism. Any statement that is not so subject is a vacuous assertion. Analytic truths are true by definition of their terms; synthetic truths are true by empirical proof.
If P, then Q; P, therefore Q. That is not a statement that requires any empirical validation; it is valid for any P or Q. That is, it is simply illogical to say, for any P or Q,
If P, then Q; P, therefore not-Q.
Further, if Kant is right and there are
synthetic a priori truths, then they are not subject to scientific proof, since they are the very means of conducting scientific inquiry.
I say: “That painting is beautiful to me.” On what basis will you claim that that statement is not true? By what criteria will you claim that I am mistaken? (Two different questions. This of course is in the realm of aesthetics.)
I decide to write these very words here on the screen. How, by what means, did I make such a decision? Consciousness researchers may one day be able to say; presently they cannot. That “how” remains “hidden” even if what goes on in my brain as I decide can be mapped. Does that warrant any claim that I did not make a decision?
There may be multiple universes that have no connection or contact with one another, such that no information at all can be passed from one to the other. In such a case, science cannot say it is impossible; the hypothesis is simply not empirically testable.
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We can only know the universe by applying the grammar of our consciousness to the syntax of the universe as we are able to perceive it. I see no reason to suppose that we are the singular species for whom the grammar of our consciousness is exhaustive of the universal syntax. There may well be a domain of mystery—we may even intuit that there is—about which we can say nothing at all.
Such a hypothesis could only be empirically verified by knowing that we know all there is to know about the universe. Short of that, it is technically not falsifiable. That does not make it unreasonable.
That domain of mystery, plus aesthetics, is the whole basis of my own spirituality.
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There is room for philosophy as well as science; there may even be room for metaphysics (under some definitions, metaphysics may be a given). I do not reject the supernatural (by which I mean extra-natural) category because it lies outside the purview of science (although I think that by definition it does); I reject it because I think it creates more epistemic problems than it resolves. I have pondered, though not really explored, the possibility of a “naturalized theology.”
In sum, although you and I both have taken similar strong stances (“strong atheism” ) vis-à-vis certain God-concepts, I am unprepared to take such a strong stance against any and all God-concepts (e.g., some versions of process theology).