Theological Fatalism Revisited

Originally posted by knightmeister
So you agree that ultimate reality can never be "known" rationally like a solution can be known. Ultimately existence is a deep mystery , that will confound our attempts to explain it in the normal way, yes?

our problem is that we want to confine our concept of ultimate reality in logical terms, without empirical experience to prove either way. now, those who do possess such an experience will not be able to express themselves without a confining definition of that reality. ultimate reality is a personal and divine experience, perhaps inexplicable by logical means, or else we can just think about it and we're already there!

if ultimate reality exists, we can only conceive the idea of it, yet, if we difine this reality through the filters of rationalism, we will never fully appreciate this experience. if it is a reality, then must keep an open mind and throw away our preconceived notions so we can more fully appreciate this experience.

Originally posted by dragonstarr369
our problem is that we want to confine our concept of ultimate reality in logical terms, without empirical experience to prove either way. now, those who do possess such an experience will not be able to express themselves without a confining definition of that reality. ultimate reality is a personal and divine experience, perhaps inexplicable by logi ...[text shortened]... n mind and throw away our preconceived notions so we can more fully appreciate this experience.

I agree , I also think that it's rational to be a partial mystic because rationalism ultimately folds in on itself in the end. This is not to say we should be irrational , it just means we recognise its limits.

Originally posted by AThousandYoung
#1 - Time travel is impossible.
#2 - If it were possible, then by talking to Adolf you'd be changing history and would not know what Adolf was going to do because you've changed things.
#3 - The environment has an INCREDIBLE effect on our choices. God, by controlling so much of the environment, manipulates our choices indirectly if by no other wa ...[text shortened]... rs that affected every human's choices and he knew HOW those factors would alter decisions.

Make up your mind. Does God see things in temporal order or can he simply look at the whole timeline simultaneously like a single image or painting?

response----

It's the latter , I use the term "wait" advisedly. This is why. God knows what you will choose to do tomorrow , but the only reason he knows this is because you have chosen it . Your future exists , if you don't choose it , he won't know.

God knows what you will do in 2009 in theory. Let's say for example that you die tomorrow (sorry) , God will not be able to know anything about what you do in 2009 because thousandyoung in 2009 will not exist. God only knows about things that happen. His knowledge depends on you being there in 2009.

Originally posted by vistesd
[/i]Thanks, LJ! There’s a bit for me to digest here, which will take some time, but I think I see where you’re coming from—the problem is that, as a layperson, I lack some of the formal philosophical context and lingo, which you have provided here.

On Wittgensteinian grounds, there are propositions such that, although they are not logically infallib ...[text shortened]... eaker form of omniscience than one in which God knows that his knowledge is not fallible.[/b]

Thanks again for your comments. You are forcing me to clarify my thinking a bit.

On Wittgensteinian grounds, there are propositions such that, although they are not logically infallible, it would be epistemically destructive generally if I cannot say that I know them to be true. For example, “I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday.” If I have to add the phrase “I know”—as in “I know that I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday”—that redundancy would likely cause a listener to wonder why I felt the need to add it (could I be in any doubt?). What does it mean to say that I fallibly know that I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday?

I agree that it would be destructive. Infallibilist accounts of knowledge often lead to a vicious skepticism where we know virtually nothing. Considering your example, under many infallibilist accounts you cannot know that it is not the case that you had lunch in Peking yesterday because the basis you have for that belief is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of that proposition (I first presented an account of evidential infallibilism, but I think the account that most readily captures the infallibilist intuition is the second modal account I presented: roughly that S knows P on basis b only if it is not possible that S have b and P is false). Here your "basis" for belief could consist of memories, perceptions, related inferences, etc. Given your basis for belief, it is possible, broadly speaking, that your belief is false and it really is the case that you had lunch in Peking yesterday. For instance, all your memories of yesterday are broadly compatible with a scenario in which you in fact did have lunch in Peking yesterday but your neurology has been subsequently manipulated and outfitted with false memories concerning your happenings and whereabouts of yesterday. (Now one could object that whether or not such a scenario is "possible" depends on our construal of possibility, and that is true; but certainly under a construal of logical possibility for instance, such a scenario is surely possible, and its mere possibility would preclude your meeting the infallibility condition. I feel it is the infallibilist's responsibility to clarify exactly what is the modal construal.).

On the other hand, If we say that you fallibly know the proposition that means you know it according to a fallibilist account, under which knowing does not require meeting the infallibility condition. For instance, the mere possibility of otherwise ridiculous accounts like the neurological manipulation above does not preclude your knowing that you did not have lunch in Peking yesterday. The key difference in terms of the argument is that infallibilist knowledge entails that the infallibility condition has been met whereas fallibilist knowledge does not.

it seems to me that God would not be omniscient if God thought that his own knowledge might be fallible. I’m not sure how omniscience can be defined in terms that allow for fallibility.

I guess it would depend on what is meant by 'omniscience'. If by it one means complete propositional knowledge (knowledge of each and every true proposition, or knowledge of every proposition that can be known, or some such), then I don't see any reason why we should just automatically assume that this refers to knowledge according to some infallibilist account. And I also don't see why knowledge according to a fallibilist account cannot be invoked within such a definition. Just because it is broadly possible that one's beliefs are mistaken (and thus fallible) doesn't mean any of the beliefs are mistaken and wouldn't as far as I can tell preclude the capacity to know all true propositions.

On the other hand, I do think it would be reasonable to assume that when a theist asserts that God is omniscient, the theist probably has some infallibilist account in mind. That is, beyond just that God knows every true proposition, he would also intend to convey that God's cognitive faculties are somehow perfect such that He simply cannot hold a false belief or be mistaken. (The theist might additionally mean to convey other things as well, such as that God has perfect acquaintance with all things.)

So let's just assume that the fatalist argument supposes that God's knowledge is infallible. Further, unless someone objects, let's take infallibilism to be the thesis that S knows P on basis b only if it was not possible that S had b and P was false. In God's case, because He is a perfect knower – His faculties are putatively perfect – His basis is always such that it is not possible both that He believes P and P is false (which modal construal of possibility is the proper one here is really not clear to me, however).

So, I presume that the fatalist's line of attack here is the following.

1. G knows in advance that S will do A.
2. It is not possible both that G believes S will do A and that S refrain from doing A (infallibility).
3. G believes S will do A (entailed by 1). So from 1 and 2, it is not possible that S refrain from doing A.
4. If it is not possible that S refrain from doing A, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A.
5. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A, then S is not free with respect to A.
6. Hence, If God knows (infallibly) in advance that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to A.

Do you think this argument works?

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thanks again for your comments. You are forcing me to clarify my thinking a bit.

[b] On Wittgensteinian grounds, there are propositions such that, although they are not logically infallible, it would be epistemically destructive generally if I cannot say that I know them to be true. For example, “I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday.” If I have to A, then S is not free with respect to A.

Do you think this argument works?

[/b]First, yes I think that argument works.

Second, I think that you have outlined precisely what at least most theists who use the term mean by omniscience.

Third: your technical use of “infallibist” versus “fallibist”—and hence, of the relevant adjectival and adverbial forms—reminds me of Wittgenstein’s language games. In one language game, “infallible” might mean that one is simply, but mysteriously, incapable of error (or at least that such is a reasonable inductive inference). In another language game, “infallible” entails meeting some (specified) infallibility condition. In another language game, it might additionally entail (as I suggested vis-à-vis God) knowledge of the infallibility condition itself.

Caveat: Whether or not S is free with respect to A has nothing to do with S’s conscious mental state.

Caveat^2: The film Groundhog Day is an example of S’s freedom within the context of a Nietzschean “eternal recurrence.” However, it is not an example of libertarian free will, since S apparently gains new knowledge (a new perspective) which each cycle. Just a thought...

Originally posted by LemonJello
Thanks again for your comments. You are forcing me to clarify my thinking a bit.

[b] On Wittgensteinian grounds, there are propositions such that, although they are not logically infallible, it would be epistemically destructive generally if I cannot say that I know them to be true. For example, “I did not have lunch in Peking yesterday.” If I have to ...[text shortened]... A, then S is not free with respect to A.

Do you think this argument works?

1. G knows in advance that S will do A.
2. It is not possible both that G believes S will do A and that S refrain from doing A (infallibility).
3. G believes S will do A (entailed by 1). So from 1 and 2, it is not possible that S refrain from doing A.
4. If it is not possible that S refrain from doing A, then it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A.
5. If it is not within the power of S to refrain from doing A, then S is not free with respect to A.
6. Hence, If God knows (infallibly) in advance that S will do A, then S is not free with respect to A.

Do you think this argument works? ----LEMONJ------


-----------RESPONSE---------------


It works if one thinks of time only in a certain one dimensional way. Thinking about eternity needs a bit more imagination. For example , if you replace S with hitler (H) and A then becomes invading poland (P) then it is true that H will do P . But we only know that H will do P because H has done P already. We are looking at Hitler's timeline in a similar way that God looks at ours. We can see both the present moment that Hitler is in (say 1937) and his future moment 1939 . In this respect we can see BOTH what he will do and what he has done simultaneously whereas for Hitler in 1937 it is still what he "will do" or "might do".

The implications of this are that for us Hitler kinda has his future laid out in front of him , but does he? In one sense we know that he "will" do P , but in another sense we also know P as what he "has" done. It is not totally true to say that we know what he will do "in advance" because that subtley places us in 1937 alongside Hitler on his position on the time dimension. We actually know what Hitler has done POST the event and are totally reliant on what Hitler does in that precise moment for our information (free or otherwise). If we had a time machine and travelled to 1937 we would sort of know BOTH that H will do P but also that H has done P.

What I'm trying to say is that God does not know that S will do A "in advance" in quite the way that you think he does.

I think that the argument doesn't work because it does not look hard enough at what this phrase "in advance" might actually mean for God. We do not know Hitler will do P "in advance" in the strictest sense. Hitler cannot refrain from doing P because he has already done it in our eyes. The fact that we know P does not prove that F (invading France) was never posssible.F might have happened.

You need to back track and ask yourself if the phrase "in advance " has any meaning for God. Otherwise , all you are saying is based on a restricted notion of time as only existing "now" and that can only be experienced in a linear sequential way. This is our only experience of time , but how likely is it that God would experience our timelines in the same way?

Originally posted by vistesd
Thanks, man: how ya doin’?

As I recall, your argument is something like—

(1) An omniscient god would know what is the best of all possible worlds.

(2) An omnipotent God can create the best of all possible worlds.

(3) An omni-good God will create the best of all possible worlds.

(4) God is O-O-O.

(5) God is the creator of the world.
...[text shortened]... “omni-good”. If some theist wants to argue that God’s omni-goodness entails malevolence, fine.

I think you hit the nail on the head here.

One thing that I have always struggled with is Catholicism's teaching of God is all good and God is everywhere.

Well, if God is all good, and God is everywhere, that means that good is everywhere, so how can evil exist?

The only answer can be that good and evil are our own perceptions as to how things effect us, our values, morals, and our never-ending search for happiness. Something that is good to you may be bad for me and vice versa.

The "free will" comes in with us always choosing the "good for me" option. That option can be anything to anyone, but it will be the option that you see as best fit to yourself. Why would you ever do anything other? IF it's for the benefit of someone else, then that's still the "good for me" option because you will be getting some sort of satisfaction out of it and you have convinvced yourself (through no act of God) that it is the best option for you.

(I'm not a practicing Catholic anymore, and I have my own views on God, but for the sake of argument...) God knows what we will do, because it's always the "what's good for me" option. We have free will in that the "good for me" answer is different for everybody. Given the choice between A and B, one may choose A, the other will choose B. There is no absolute right or wrong.

So, doing A at time T is correct, but the other layer is that A is variable yet constant for everyone.

Originally posted by vistesd
First, yes I think that argument works.

Second, I think that you have outlined precisely what at least most theists who use the term mean by omniscience.

Third: your technical use of “infallibist” versus “fallibist”—and hence, of the relevant adjectival and adverbial forms—reminds me of Wittgenstein’s language games. In one language game, ...[text shortened]... since S apparently gains new knowledge (a new perspective) which each cycle. Just a thought...[/b]

I'm inclined to think the argument works too, although it leaves open the question of what exactly is the modal construal. In that respect the argument may have to be modified ad hoc to accomodate what the theist actually means when he holds God's doxastic states to be infallible. This ties in with what you mention about W's language games (and in some cases I do think the theist's claim has no more discernable content than that it is just somehow "mysteriously" impossible for God to be mistaken).

The film Groundhog Day is an example of S’s freedom within the context of a Nietzschean “eternal recurrence.” However, it is not an example of libertarian free will, since S apparently gains new knowledge (a new perspective) which each cycle. Just a thought...

You're exactly right. When Murray's character makes different choices from one Groundhog Day to the "next", it does not demonstrate the existence of libertarian free will because the world is not identically specified at those moments. For instance, as you point out, he has different knowledge and memories to inform his deliberations (even at more or less the very moment when he wakes up each "new day" where the rest of the world would be supposedly identically specified to the "previous day", it is still the case within the plot that his perspective and memories are different).

Originally posted by knightmeister
1. G knows in advance that S will do A.
2. It is not possible both that G believes S will do A and that S refrain from doing A (infallibility).
3. G believes S will do A (entailed by 1). So from 1 and 2, it is not possible that S refrain from doing A.
4. If it is not possible that S refrain from doing A, then it is not within the power of S to re ...[text shortened]... how likely is it that God would experience our timelines in the same way?

What I'm trying to say is that God does not know that S will do A "in advance" in quite the way that you think he does.

I know that's what you are trying to say. But, as I have been saying for a long time, your conception of an "eternal" God who also happens to be a causal agent is not something I find to be coherent. I think your conception is self-contradictory, and I consider it meaningless. I'm frankly surprised that you find the notion to be coherent given that we both seem to hold similar reductionist views of time.

Originally posted by LemonJello
[b]What I'm trying to say is that God does not know that S will do A "in advance" in quite the way that you think he does.

I know that's what you are trying to say. But, as I have been saying for a long time, your conception of an "eternal" God who also happens to be a causal agent is not something I find to be coherent. I think your conception i ...[text shortened]... notion to be coherent given that we both seem to hold similar reductionist views of time.[/b]

What does God being a causal agent or not have to do with the point I made? The point is that God does not know your future "in advance" of your future existing because to him it exists in just as real a way as this present moment in which you are reading this. To God lemon in 2009 exists right "now" (eternally now) , so he knows your future "now" NOT "in advance". You will choose A because you are choosing and have chosen A already.

God knows everything whether it, or not.😕

Originally posted by knightmeister
You will choose A because you are choosing and have chosen A already.

Sure sounds like an argument against free will to me.

Originally posted by Nemesio
Sure sounds like an argument against free will to me.

Only if looked at in a certain way. If the choice A being made is made in that present moment in which choice A exists then it can be a free choice in that very moment. We know that hitler will choose A and has chosen A and is choosing A in the present moment we call 1939 but none of that proves his choice wasn't free.

In short , there is nothing about knowing choice A that makes it inevitable in that very moment. It is only because choice A is made that it is known. The knowing does not dictate the choosing , it is the other way round. God can only know choice A after it is made but the "after" choice A is made exists in God's mind now even before you reach choice A.