Think

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
I'm glad it's all wrapped up for you, not a few respected philosophers, scientists and philosopher-scientists reckon consciousness remains a bit of a mystery. Your language evinces a mind made up, probably for reasons of emotional security.

How conciousness works is indeed 'a bit of a mystery' and I said so....
Which part of "I don't know" do you not understand?

However the fact that it is an emergent by-product of the physical functioning of our brains HAS been determined... By science.

I really don't care whether any particular philosophers are caught up on this.

My views on this subject are entirely shaped by the available evidence.
The available evidence currently indicates beyond a reasonable doubt that conciousness is a product of how our brains function.
So that is my view.
If the balance of evidence were to shift, then I would alter my view.

THAT is having an open mind. I will change my view IF presented evidence that justifies it.
It doesn't mean being uncertain about things proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Originally posted by googlefudge
How conciousness works is indeed 'a bit of a mystery' and I said so....
Which part of "I don't know" do you not understand?

However the fact that it is an emergent by-product of the physical functioning of our brains HAS been determined... By science.

I really don't care whether any particular philosophers are caught up on this.

My views on thi ...[text shortened]... stifies it.
It doesn't mean being uncertain about things proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Not really, it's a philosophical viewpoint held by some scientists, as well as you. I'm interested to know what the basis of your firmly held belief is, though. Any particular sources?

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Not really, it's a philosophical viewpoint held by some scientists, as well as you. I'm interested to know what the basis of your firmly held belief is, though. Any particular sources?

It's not a 'philosophical' viewpoint.
My 'philosophy', in as much as I have one, is that of rationalism and scientific skepticism.

Part of rationality is trying to have an accurate view of the world as is possible.
This is achieved via the use of scientific skepticism.

The evidence thus far amassed shows clearly that we are our brains.
The physical activity that goes on inside our heads is responsible for everything we feel
think and experience.

Conciousness... our experience of the world is a physical process.

However precisely how the brain generates conciousness is not yet fully understood, but you can
see when an event in the brain becomes a conscious thought on an FMRI scanner.

It is not a 'philosophical' viewpoint, but a consequence of the evidence.

As for my sources... They are not web based, but this IS the mainstream scientific viewpoint.

There are a lot of philosophers (regarded highly or otherwise) who know sweet FA about science, wouldn't
know rationality if it looked like Rachel Stevens and gave them a naked lap dance, and have a great tendency
to talk out of their posterior.

Alain DE Botton is one such (at least on the last two counts).

http://freethoughtblogs.com/pharyngula/2012/02/28/i-am-officially-disgusted-with-alain-de-botton/


There are many issues to which more philosophical reasoning would be beneficial.
But for determining the facts of reality, science is the only option.

Originally posted by googlefudge
It's not a 'philosophical' viewpoint.
My 'philosophy', in as much as I have one, is that of rationalism and scientific skepticism.

Part of rationality is trying to have an accurate view of the world as is possible.
This is achieved via the use of scientific skepticism.

The evidence thus far amassed shows clearly that we are our brains.
The phys ld be beneficial.
But for determining the facts of reality, science is the only option.

Do you think that no philosophical viewpoints undergird the scientific method? That would be a rather naïve view. For example, the philosophical critique of verificationism seems to be what resulted in the emphasis on falsificationism that is (properly) pre-eminent in science—and which has been evidenced by scientists on these boards. This all hails from Hume’s “problem of induction”. So, whether you realize it or not, there are strictly philosophical underpinnings to your own scientific venture. The fact that some philosophers have got it wrong (or over-reached), is no more or less relevant than the fact the some scientists have.

The very strength of the scientific method is, in part, that it does not rest on putative verification, but can be continually falsified by new evidence; and that comes from a profound philosophical base—and from philosophers of science. The very things that distinguish science from dogmatism (religious or otherwise) are principles articulated by philosophy--and applied to science.

BTW, you're very last sentence is philosophical to the core, whether you realize it or not...

EDIT: If my "BTW" assertion is factually incorrect, you will be able to demonstrate that fact strictly using "scientific" methods, without relying on such philosophical resorts as--say--the principles of logical analysis...

Originally posted by vistesd
Do you think that no philosophical viewpoints undergird the scientific method? That would be a rather naïve view. For example, the philosophical critique of verificationism seems to be what resulted in the emphasis on falsificationism that is (properly) pre-eminent in science—and which has been evidenced by scientists on these boards. This all hai ithout relying on such philosophical resorts as--say--the principles of logical analysis...

To GF: Do you think that no philosophical viewpoints undergird the scientific method?

You may be referring to a metaphysical commitment to naturalism. Science does not require that. It requires a methodological commitment to naturalism.

If undergird means Provide support or a firm basis for (Merriam-Webster - The Free Dictionary) then I think you are wrong in one sense -- science requires no such philosophical or metaphysical undergirding. But you may be right in another sense, in that individual people might have such a commitment.

Originally posted by JS357
To GF: Do you think that no philosophical viewpoints undergird the scientific method?

You may be referring to a metaphysical commitment to naturalism. Science does not require that. It requires a methodological commitment to naturalism.

If undergird means Provide support or a firm basis for (Merriam-Webster - The Free Dictionary) then I think you ...[text shortened]... But you may be right in another sense, in that individual people might have such a commitment.

To a certain extent, I suppose that depends on whether (and to what extent) individual physical scientists themselves are committed to an ontological (metaphysical), rather than a methodological naturalism. The principle of falsification that undergirds science ought to stand against any, otherwise, ontological commitment at all. That is an argument that supernaturalist theists sometimes seem to make on here (it is clear, isn’t it, that I am not one of them?).

However, an ontology that allows supernaturalism would undermine scientific empiricism, in my view: once non-natural “miracles” are admitted, what naturalism cannot be claimed false (e.g., age of the earth)—on that very basis? Would we not be left with a “science of the gaps”? Science can admit the unknown, even the unknowable—but not a supernaturalism that confounds scientific discovery. In addition, as twhitehead has argued well (better than I might be able to), any putatively supernatural event that we could observe would be, by definition, a natural—even if unexplainable—event. Unless one wants to widen the circle by claiming (an equally unfalsifiable, in principle) supernatural observation mechanism. Any appeal to supernaturalism seems to end up being viciously circular. EDIT: A supernaturalism that is parallel to, but does not manifest itself in, a natural universe can be no more than a speculation. Analog: multiple parallel universes, as opposed to manifold universes that in some (in principle observable) way interact.

In order for a methodologically naturalist scientist to allow for ontological supernaturalism, it seems to me, nevertheless requires that scientist to remove all supernaturalism from that part of the ontological realm (being, reality)that the scientist investigates as a scientist. And what is the basis for that decision, if not simply pragmatic? (Wittgenstein, I think, had an answer for that, but it had to do with the ineffable (what he called the mystical), and not any kind of effable supernaturalism—or even what could, perhaps be claimed to be supernatural at all, depending on whether Wittgenstein’s “mystical” was necessarily supernatural.)

And, my point to GF: how are those questions to be answered without any philosophical reference? After all, even deductive logic is a philosophical regime. Nevertheless, I think it is very difficult for a scientist committed to physical empiricism and logic to accept anything more than a narrowly delimited ontological supernaturalism--which I am inclined to at least critique.

I have thought that out as I wrote, so…

EDIT: A thought re your comment on a commitment to methodological naturalism—Whence such a commitment without a prior philosophical ground? Purely pragmatic? But does that pragmatism itself not need a philosophical base—if it is not an empty assertion? And does not physics, say—as opposed to engineering—claim to describe, or attempt to describe, what is, and not just “what works”?

EDIT: Apologies for all these belated edits. I reject the supernatural (extra-natural) category on philosophical grounds. I think that science rests on a stronger base with that kind of rejection—rather than some kind of assertion that whatever cannot be known by naturalistic means is not, by definition, knowledge (which would seem to me a rather weird tautological claim); but that needs to be accepted as a philosophical base for the scientific project at all. Science, on its own, cannot—so far as I can see—make such a claim (without vicious circularity). However, I think that twhitehead’s argument—made elsewhere—is compelling for a scientific adoption of ontological naturalism. A mere methodological naturalism seems to be empty without some base of philosophical pragmatism. And that philosophical position also would need to be defended.

With all of the above said—

I tend to agree with blackbeetle’s arguments—as epistemic arguments. I am also not sure that that isn’t as far as we can go. In my own metaphorical formulation: I see no reason to assume that the grammar of our consciousness is (or can be) exhaustive of the syntax of the cosmos—in which and of which we also are.* Any epistemology that does not acknowledge our reflexive relationship with the world that we observe over-reaches itself. I take that as grounds for ontological caution. That is why I claim no more for my own ontological (gestaltic) nondualism than that it seems to me to make more sense (perhaps in the abductive sense) than ontological dualism—and that “makes more sense” is what I tend to argue; not that I see it as a logical or nomological necessity. Again, I embrace the principle of falsification: the fact that various dualisms seem falsified by their own contradictions does not verify nondualism, which merely remains unfalsified. Nor do I see ontological dualism as falsified tout court. I see twhitehead’s argument as rendering any supernaturalist dualism as empty.

____________________________________________

* This is, however, no reason to set any a priori limits.

Originally posted by vistesd
To a certain extent, I suppose that depends on whether (and to what extent) individual physical scientists themselves are committed to an ontological (metaphysical), rather than a methodological naturalism. The principle of falsification that undergirds science ought to stand against any, otherwise, ontological commitment at all. That is an argument that s ...[text shortened]... hilosophical pragmatism. And that philosophical position also would need to be defended.

Your thoughts here bring up some of my favorite topics. Just a couple of comments:

The idea that some sort of philosophical commitment underlies a commitment to methodological naturalism reminds me of the idea in politics, that to adopt an apolitical approach, is to take a political stance, and the idea that "if you're not for us, you're against us" that we have heard from one president and that we have seen from some theists on this forum.

I would like to compare it to the game of chess. Coming to RHP to play, we see that certain rules apply, and if we want to play, we follow the rules. If we want to play some form of fantasy chess, or want to believe that the outcome of games is the will of the gods depending on our off-board behavior, we are free to do that on our own. RHP won't participate.

I think the same principle applies in science, and I think that the principles and demarkations and "rules" and philosophical stance of science were developed between Galileo and the Pope. (I use those two persons as symbolic of the accommodation made between science and religion when science started being systematized.) Not all people are willing to keep the demarcations between the two clear. But like chess at RHP, if you want to "play" science, there are certain rules, involving reproducibility of results, avoiding the supernatural as an explanation for anything, etc. You are free to ignore these rules when not playing science, of course. (And this what some non-theists on this forum do, when they insist that science disproves metaphysical supernaturalism or renders it irrelevant to life.)

But what I am saying about your suggestion that science must have a philosophical undergirding is that the rules for playing science, at least the chief rule called " you can use methodological naturalism but avoid metaphysical naturalism when doing science" then, may actually come from outside science. It turns out to be a very good rule, IMO, for both science and religion, so long as they are to coexist. This may be a pragmatic defense, but there it is.

Originally posted by JS357
Your thoughts here bring up some of my favorite topics. Just a couple of comments:

The idea that some sort of philosophical commitment underlies a commitment to methodological naturalism reminds me of the idea in politics, that to adopt an apolitical approach, is to take a political stance, and the idea that "if you're not for us, you're against us" that we ...[text shortened]... on, so long as they are to coexist. This may be a pragmatic defense, but there it is.

I think (correct me if I’m wrong—and I thought of this after my last reply) that you are articulating a Wittgensteinian argument based on rules (such as the rules of grammar in different language games). So I think I might have been arguing against something that you really were not saying. Both on that ground, and on the ground that I think Wittgenstein might be right, I’ll stand corrected.

With that said, W. (on my reading of him) would reject all metaphysical talk (and the conceptualizations underlying such talk) as meaningless. If someone wants to make a metaphysical claim, then a proper analysis of the terms will reveal that it is at bottom empty.

Now, I would recast your rule as “avoid metaphysical supernaturalism[/i]”, because I do not see how metaphysical naturalism interferes with doing proper science, whereas supernaturalism does (discussions of “Last Thursdayism” come to mind. However, I stand corrected, again, on the idea that science needs any metaphysical undergirding—especially under a Wittgensteinian view that all such undergirding would be empty anyway. Good call.

Your rule-based position may be pragmatic in nature, but I don’t see it as reducing science to simple pragmatism (again, my physics versus engineering example)—it simply says, if I understand it rightly, that no metaphysics is needed to discover and articulate real epistemic knowledge via scientific methodology. By extension, epistemology itself needs no metaphysical base, only knowledge-permitting rules.

At bottom, I think that leaves a “strong atheism” with regard to all metaphysical claims, and W’s notion of the “mystical” leaves the ineffable—ineffable. I think I have to be more careful about my own non-dualism, and learn to state it without leaking in a metaphysical commitment. I know how to do that, I think I just get careless and then “bewitch my own mind with language” (to paraphrase W). Perhaps you have shown that “fly the way out of the fly bottle”! 😉 Much appreciated.

Hey vistesd - been reading Karen Armstrong's The Case For God: passage about Socrates, Plato - the nature of dialogue; writing being no more than a paedagogical tool, aide-memoire (even the magnificent Phaedrus) which prompts me to ask: dialogue - it implies a predisposition towards friendship, doesn't it, rather than the adversarial cut-and-thrust? Even between relative opposites.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
Hey vistesd - been reading Karen Armstrong's The Case For God: passage about Socrates, Plato - the nature of dialogue; writing being no more than a paedagogical tool, aide-memoire (even the magnificent Phaedrus) which prompts me to ask: dialogue - it implies a predisposition towards friendship, doesn't it, rather than the adversarial cut-and-thrust? Even between relative opposites.

It's deeper than predispotition towards friendship;

I remember Phaedrus 274A, “…one has at first to try to satisfy the masters that are (agathoi) good”. The same idea is found at Nomoi (902A): “All the mortals are possessions (ktimata) of the gods”, whilst at 906A is noted that “…gods are good (agathoi) and take care of the welfare of their possessions”. The concept is, as it is obvious at Phaedon 62B too, that according to a certain dogma all the human beings remain in the state of “en tini froura” (under a higher supervision) that they are not allowed to sidestep or avoid because they are possessions of the gods (of course, as such, they are well treated by them).

The flip side: according to Aitareya Upanisad II.3, Brahman created the Worlds (Loka) and their Guards (the Lokapalas, which are gods/ devatas) and then created Purusa, the Kosmic Man, who is designed to live “within Brahman”. And in Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 1.4.10. we see that “…whoever amongst men understands Brahman, the Absolute, becomes Absolute. Even the gods cannot stop this outcome because this man is becoming their Self. However, the man who worships another divine force (supposedly different to Brahman/Self) because he believes that himself and this divine force are different, he is ignorant. He is an animal, a possession of the gods”. The scribe of the Upanisads believes that Purusa is momentarily a hostage of the cosmic forces as well as of the forces of the nature of the Physical World that block his way towards his aim to get to know his own self, an aim that once it is fulfilled it will allow him even to rule the gods. Leaving this difference aside, the two theories agree that the main aim is “knowing thyself”. (So it is not surprising the fact that Socrates is under pressure at Phaedrus 230A -he cannot get to know his self and therefore he states that it seems to him ridiculous to study various things when he still ignores the nature of his self. In another, earlier dialogue, at Charmides 169D-E, is duly noted that “…the knowledge of one’s self is the science of the sciences”. Again, the difference between Plato and the scribes of the Upanisad is that the former construed a complicated idea as regards Self -Nous and Logos-, whilst the Easterns are satisfied with the concrete simplicity of Atman).

Hence, everything that points towards the aim “knowing thyself”, is an act of love and compassion. In this context, dialogue is indeed a product of Love and compassion
😵

Originally posted by black beetle
It's deeper than predispotition towards friendship;

I remember Phaedrus 274A, “…one has at first to try to satisfy the masters that are (agathoi) good”. The same idea is found at Nomoi (902A): “All the mortals are possessions (ktimata) of the gods”, whilst at 906A is noted that “…gods are good (agathoi) and take care of the welfare of their possessio ...[text shortened]... f love and compassion. In this context, dialogue is indeed a product of Love and compassion
😵

My post was intended merely to address forum decorum, but it was underpinned by precisely these concerns. K. Armstrong does delve into these matters, accessibly and elegantly. And yes I am interrogating my shelves for that dusty and no doubt poorly translated Penguin edition of the Phaedrus.

Originally posted by Bosse de Nage
My post was intended merely to address forum decorum, but it was underpinned by precisely these concerns. K. Armstrong does delve into these matters, accessibly and elegantly. And yes I am interrogating my shelves for that dusty and no doubt poorly translated Penguin edition of the Phaedrus.

Till then, methinks you could enjoy Jowett's work, it's good;
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/phaedrus.html
😵

Originally posted by vistesd
I think (correct me if I’m wrong—and I thought of this after my last reply) that you are articulating a Wittgensteinian argument based on rules (such as the rules of grammar in different language games). So I think I might have been arguing against something that you really were not saying. Both on that ground, and on the ground that I think Wittgenstein m ...[text shortened]... ase W). Perhaps you have shown that “fly the way out of the fly bottle”! 😉 Much appreciated.

Wow your opinion is so valued and your response is so complimentary to my thoughts that of course I will say you understand me rightly. 🙂

Originally posted by black beetle
No, methinks it would make us think a bit about the nature of our thoughts😵

What do you mean 'the nature of our thoughts'?

A trillion brain cells. Electrical/chemical processes. Is thought more than these?