Originally posted by lucifershammer
I'm not sure what you're asking here. I didn't say justificatory processes contribute to the truth of something; however I do disagree with vistesd's spiritual epistemic skepticism.
(1) I agree that all experience is participatory. All our efforts to conceptualize, represent, describe are in some way self-referential, as well as perspectival.
(2) Re your red shirts and eggs—are you a direct realist?
(3) Everything that can be said about the motivations of being a heretic can be said about the motivations of those who think of themselves as orthodox. That, however, was a tongue-in-cheek comment. Whether or not I enjoy being a heretic in certain contexts has naught to do with the honesty of that hereseism.
(4) My “epistemic skepticism” is partial, not complete. My arguments also go to the difference between
episteme and
gnosis, though I seldom use the latter word because of sectarian associations that I don’t necessary subscribe to.
The general epistemological definition of (epistemic) knowledge is “justified true belief.” I am not (yet anyway) challenging one’s ability to make propositional statements, that may be epistemically justifiable, about the phenomenal nature of the experience itself—I am challenging the ability to such statements about the preconceptual “noumenal” ground.
(5) The experience of the divine, or the divine ground, or the mystery (I will use whatever terminology you like here, as long as we both know what the other is talking about, and keep in mind whatever dualist versus non-dualist difference we might have)—that “experience” is either (a) non-conceptual, at the pre-conceptual level of awareness; or (b) experience through a conceptual screen at the get-go.
In the latter case, there is nothing that you can say about the divine ground that is not biased by the conceptual/representational content you bring to it. It is like putting on colored glasses, and then attempting to describe the color of a wall.
In the former case, the attempt is to translate a non-conceptual experience in terms of the conceptual “grammar” of our consciousness. Again, that is to place concepts “on” the experience. I think that might be analogous to drawing gridlines of a blank sheet of paper, and then asserting that the paper is described by those gridlines.
The divine ground is itself ineffable. Our attempts to represent it conceptually will always represent as much of ourselves as the ground.
NOTE: I responded in a similar vein to you question about ineffability in the “Madeleine McCann picture blessed” thread. http://www.redhotpawn.com/board/showthread.php?threadid=70233 . I think what I said there is on point here as well.